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When Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) in 1969, 1 the legislation was acclaimed as one of the most 
important environmental measures ever enacted.1 States soon fol-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1977). 
2. Senator Jackson, in introducing for Senate consideration on July 10, 1969, the legis-
lation of which he was the chief sponsor, stated that the National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969 was the "most significant measure in the area of natural resource policy ever consid-
ered by the Congress." 115 CONG. REc. 19008 (1969). On December 20, 1969, the Senator 
added that S. 1075 was the "most important and far-reaching environmental and conserva-
tion measure ever enacted by the Congress." Id. at 40416 (1969). Accord, id. at 40422 (re-
marks of Senator Allott, the ranking minority member of the Senate Interior Committee); 
id. at 40924 (remarks of Representatives Dingell and Saylor, Managers on the Part of the 
House). 
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lowed the federal lead, so that by 1976 thirty jurisdictions had 
adopted statutes similar to the national legislation. 3 The Montana 
legislature was in the vanguard, passing the Montana Environmen-
tal Policy Act (MEP A) in 1971. • 
The federal agencies now appear to have accepted full respon-
sibility for implementation of NEPA, despite some initial reluc-
tance.11 Several agencies contended at first that the statute did not 
authorize them to consider in decisionmaking any environmental 
factors not expressly provided for in the substantive legislation 
pursuant to which the agency was acting. That interpretation 
never achieved widespread recognition, much less acceptance, in 
the federal bureaucracy and was summarily dismissed by the judi-
ciary. Agencies never raise the issue today, and courts simply as-
sume that it has been settled. 
Despite the prompt and thorough demise of the notion in the 
national arena, the theory continues to be espoused in some states. 
Courts in few jurisdictions have addressed the question, but most 
have rejected the narrow interpretation of the effect that environ-
mental policy acts have on agency decisionmaking. Montana, how-
ever, has been the exception. In 1976, the sup1eme court of the 
state appeared to endorse the doctrine; the Montana agencies im-
mediately embraced the court's ruling and extended it.8 This arti-
cle is a critical analysis of the Montana interpretations, in light of 
analogous federal and state law and the Montana Constitution; it 
yields the conclusion that the views articulated are simply incor-
rect as a matter of law and policy.7 
I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACTS 
Interpretation of the Montana Environmental Policy Act has 
not been extensive,8 and the Montana Supreme Court has explic-
3. w. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 810 (1977) [hereinafter cited as w. RODGERS]. 
For more thorough discussion, see notes 181-82 infra. 
4. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 75-1-101 et seq. (1979). 
5. See Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN-
STITUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 244-46 (E.L. Dolgin & T.G.P. Guilbert, eds. 1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Anderson]. Accord, W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 712-13. 
6. Neither the judicial nor the agency articulation of this theory can be reduced to 
manageable proportions without sacrificing substantive content. For a thorough discussion 
of the court's interpretation, see section I(C)(3) of this article infra. For a full statement of 
the agency view, see notes 255 & 278 infra. 
7. While this article does focus on the problem as it arises in a particular jurisdiction, 
the treatment accorded the issue is not wholly site specific. Thus, the paper should assist 
those who may on occasion encounter a recalcitrant bureaucrat, a reluctant agency, or a 
persistent applicant at any level of government. 
8. The Montana legislature has provided little explicit guidance as to its intent in 
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itly declared that in construing the statute "it is appropriate to 
look to the federal interpretation of NEPA. "9 Therefore, a compre-
hensive evaluation of the national legislation will be provided. 
That assessment will be followed by a review of decisions rendered 
in states that have adopted environmental policy measures. Fi-
nally, an in-depth examination of developments in Montana will 
be presented. 
A. The National Environmental Policy Act 
Congressional intent in enacting NEPA will be gleaned from 
analysis of the act's statutory language and legislative history. Lest 
the reader feel that he 'or she is being asked to accept on faith the 
view of Congressional purpose offered, judicial interpretation of 
that legislative intent will be included. This will precede a separate 
examination of the federal cases that address more directly the 
precise issue considered in this article.10 
1. Congressional Intent 
a. General Expressions in the Legislative History 
NEPA emerged in 1969 from a legislative process which had 
begun ten years earlier.11 During that time, understanding of and 
concern about the environment increased substantially, while evi-
dence of ecological abuse and degradation mounted. 11 Congress re-
passing the measure. Few Montana agencies have expressly articulated their views of 
MEP A, and none has done so in a manner that is very comprehensive, well-considered, or 
persuasive. Finally, the Montana Supreme Court has addressed the statute in a significant 
way only twice. For a thorough discussion of what has occurred in Montana, see section 
l(C)(3) of this article infra. 
9. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 
Mont. 477, 506, 559 P.2d 1157, 1172 (1976) (Haswell, J., ·dissenting). Accord, Kadillak v. 
Anaconda Co.,_ Mont. _, 602 P.2d 147, 153 (1979). 
10. Because of the peculiar significance that attaches to these decisions, they will be 
accorded special treatment. This organizational scheme of necessity will entail duplication, 
since some of the cases that speak explicitly to the authority question also are those which 
most articulately construe Congressional purpose. 
11. See S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1969); 115 CoNG. REc. 29067 
(1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson); id. at 40422 (remarks of Senator Allott). Accord, F.R. 
ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POL-
ICY ACT 4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NEPA IN THE COURTS]. 
12. See S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, 8-9, 12-13 (1969). Specific expres-
sions of concern were voiced throughout floor debate on NEPA. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 
26577-80, 26583-85 (1969). 
The terms "environmental" and "ecological" as well as "impacts" and "effects" respec-
tively are used interchangeably in this article, even though the technical definition of the 
words may not be identical. While Congress is certainly not the definitive authority on mat-
ters of this sort, the terms are often mixed in the legislative history and the statute. Com-
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sponded by enacting an imp,ressive array of measures that were 
designed to remedy specific problems such as air and water pollu-
tion. However, no comprehensive scheme for addressing declining 
environmental quality was formulated. 13 
In the last half of the decade, members of Congress increas-
ingly came to realize that agencies of the federal government were 
responsible for many environmental problems. 14 The legislators 
learned that a major source of difficulty was the failure of agencies 
to take into account ecological matters in the decisional process111 
and that this deficiency frequently was attributable to questions of 
agency authority. "In many areas of Federal action," Congress 
found "no body of experience or precedent for substantial and con-
sistent consideration of environmental factors in decisionmak-
ing."18 In other fields of federal activity, the legislators discovered 
that "existing legislation [did] not provide clear authority for the 
consideration of environmental factors which conflict with other 
objectives."17 Finally, and most significantly, Congress found that 
pare 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (1977) with 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C}(ii) (1977). 
13. Congress over the past decade has passed a procession of landmark conser-
vation measures on behalf of recreation and wilderness . . . establishment of a 
system of national trails and a system of national scenic rivers, air and water pol-
lution control, noise abatement. . . . 
S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1969). Accord, 115 CONG. REC. 40422 (1969) 
(remarks of Senator Allott). 
[T]here is still no comprehensive national policy on environmental management. 
There are limited policies directed to some areas where specific problems are r!iJC-
ognized to exist, but we do not have a considered statement of overall national 
goals and purposes. 
S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969) (emphasis added). 
14. See S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 8 (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 26573-74 
(1969) (remarks of Representative Pelly); id. at 29052-53 (remarks of Senator Muskie). 
15. Many of the environmental controversies of recent years have, in large mea-
sure, been caused by the failure to consider all relevant points of view in the plan-
ning and conduct of Federal activities .... 
In the past, environmental factors have frequently been ignored and omitted 
from consideration in the early stages of planning because of the difficulty of eval-
uating them in comparison with economic and technical factors. 
S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969). See R.A. LIROFF, A NATIONAL Poucv FOR 
THE ENVIRONMENT 80-82 (1976). Cf. 115 CoNG. REC. 29055 (1969) (remarks by Senator Jack-
son stating that S. 1075 was designed to insure that agencies took into account all environ-
mental considerations in decisionmaking). 
16. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969). Accord, 115 CONG. REC. 29067 
(1969) (Differences in the Senate- and House-Passed Versions of S. 1075). 
Virtually every agency of the Federal Government plays some role in determining 
how well the environment is managed. Yet, many of these agencies do not have a 
mandate, a body of law, or a set of policies to guide their actions which have an 
impact on the environment. 
S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). Accord, id. at 14. 
17. Id. at 19. Accord, 115 CONG. REc. 29067 (1969) (Differences in the Senate- and 
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the "authorizing legislation of some agencies [had] been construed 
to prohibit the consideration of important environmental values."18 
The specific contention made by the agencies was that they 
were precluded from applying in decisionmaking ecological factors 
not expressly provided for in the substantive statutes under which 
they were operating. The experience of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC) is illustrative. The AEC "had continually asserted, 
prior to NEPA, that it had no statutory authority to concern itself 
with the [nonradiological] adverse environmental effects of its 
actions:"18 
[T]he Commission ... refuse[s] to consider, as outside its regula-
tory jurisdiction, evidence of possible thermal pollution [the ef-
fects on a river-its water, flora and fauna-of the injection of 
heated water] of the Connecticut River as a result of the dis-
charge of cooling water by applicant's facility.10 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals approved this interpretation in 
New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Commission. 21 
The chief sponsor of NEPA, Senator Jackson, most clearly ar-
ticulated the Congressional response to this problem in explaining 
the Senate Bill on the floor. The Senator indicated that he was 
aware of the construction espoused by agencies, such as the AEC, 
as well as its affirmation by the First Circuit, and that NEPA was 
intended, in part, to overturn that interpretation: 
[NEPA] ... will give all agencies a mandate, a responsibility, 
and a meaningful tool to insure that the quality of America's fu-
House-Passed Versions of S. 1075). 
In [certain] agencies, especially when the expenditure of funds is involved, an offi-
cial's latitude to deviate from narrow policies or the "most economical alternative" 
to achieve an environmental goal may be strictly circumscribed by congressional 
authorizations which have overlooked existing or potential environmental 
problems or the limitations of agency procedures. 
S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969). 
The members of Congress also realized that agencies could not be expected to, and did 
not in fact, accord the same consideration to environmental factors as those deemed to be 
part of their primary missions. See 115 CONG. REc. 29053 (1969) (remarks qf Senator Mus-
kie); id. at 26573 (remarks of Representative Pelly). 
18. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). 
In [certain] areas, lack of express authority has been interpreted to prohibit con-
sideration of environmental factors. 
115 CONG. REc. 29067-68 (1969) (Differences in the Senate- and House-Passed Versions of 
s. 1075). 
19. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). 
20. New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 171 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 
962 (1969). 
21. Id. 
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ture environment is as good or better than today's. Departments 
such as the Departments of Defense, Transportation, Commerce, 
and Housing and Urban Development will then no longer have an 
excuse for ignoring environmental values in the pursuit of nar-
rower, more immediate, mission-oriented goals. Agencies such as 
the Atomic Energy Commission which now contend they have no 
legislative authority to consider environmental values will be 
given the authority, the responsibility, and a directive to do 
so. . . . [l]t is time that AEC be given a larger mandate against 
which to weigh the environmental impact of its planned and pro-
posed activities. The same is true of many other agencies.22 
183 
Senator Jackson had earlier voiced almost identical sentiments, 
when he explained that his intention in amending the initial ver-
sion of the Senate Bill was to provide 
an expanded statement of national environmental management 
goals and to . . . grant new authority to Federal agencies, w.hich 
at the present time, have no mandate or responsibility for the 
management and protection of the human environment [so that 
no] agency will then be able to maintain that it has no mandate 
or no requirement to consider the environmental consequences of 
its actions.118 
Similar views are articulated throughout the legislative history. 24 
22. 115 CONG. REC. 29055-56 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson) (emphasis added). 
One commentator has asserted that Congress knew about the contention made by the AEC 
in the First Circuit case. See Peterson, An Analysis of Title I of the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969, 3 ENVT'L L. REP. 50035 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Peterson]. Cf. R. 
STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 778 n.8 (1978). 
23. National Environmental Policy: Hearing on S. 1075, S. 237 and S. 1752 Before 
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1969) [herein-
after cited as Hearing]. Nearly the same thought appears several times in the Senate Re-
port. See S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 13 (1969). 
24. These statements are made most often in the context of examination of particular 
provisions of NEPA. Thus, Representative Dingell declared that section 102 was "primarily 
designed to assure consideration of environmental matters by agencies in their planning and 
decision-making-but most especially those agencies who now have little or no legislative 
authority to take environmental considerations into account." 115 CONG. REC. 40925 (1969). 
Accord, id. at 40418 (Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the Senate). The Senate Re-
port includes similar statements. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 
(1969). Senator Jackson stated that "subsection 102(b) requires the development of proce-
dures designed to insure that all relevant environmental values and amenities are consid-
ered in the calculus of project development and decisionmaking." 115 CoNG. REC. 29055 
(1969). Finally, in alluding to section 105, the Senator remarked: 
The bill specifically provides that its provisions are supplemental to the existing 
mandates and authorizations of all Federal agencies. This constitutes a statutory 
enlargement of the responsibilities and concerns of all instrumentalities of the 
Federal Government. 
Id. at 19009. Expressions of legislative intent also may be found in the statutory language of 
specific provisions of NEPA. For a discussion of that wording and accompanying legislative 
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In sum, general expressions of Congressional intent in the leg-
islative history indicate that Congress meant NEPA to address the 
contribution of federal agencies to the declining quality of the na-
tional environment and their failure to take into account ecological 
factors in decisionmaking by requiring agencies to fully consider all 
environmental impacts of their actions. 211 
b. Statutory Language of NEPA and Specific Expressions in the 
Legislative History Explaining that Language 
Congress also manifested quite clearly its intent in the statu-
tory language of particular provisions of NEPA and in the legisla-
tive history explicating the terminology employed. Thus, Congress 
formulated a national policy and goals for the environment and 
expressly declared that they were to be "supplementary to those 
set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies." All agen-
cies were authorized and directed to "administer and interpret" 
extant powers in accordance with the newly articulated principles 
and to meet stringent requirements mandating comprehensive con-
sideration of all environmental factors in decisionmaking. These 
commands were to be followed "to the fullest extent possible," un-
less full compliance was rendered impossible by a clear conflict of 
statutory authority. Agencies were instructed to review existing au-
thorizations to ascertain whether discrepancies existed so that re-
medial measures might be proposed to the President. 
i. The National Environmental Policy and Goals of NEPA: Sec-
tion 101 ' 
In section 101 of NEPA, Congress declared a policy and estab-
lished goals for the nation's environment.26 Section lOl(a) enunci-
ates NEP A's fundamental policy: the federal government must use 
"all practicable means and measures" to protect ecological values/n 
This was grounded in Congressional recognition of the "profound 
history, see section l(A)(l)(b) of this article infra. 
25. The above interpretation of Congressional intent is supported by case law. See, 
e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 942 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). The construction also finds support in the 
scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 22; NEPA IN THE COURTS, supra note 
11, at ch. I. 
26. 42 u.s.c. § 4331 (1977). 
27. Id. Congress evinced its concern by declaring that it would be the "continuing 
policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and 
other concerned public and private organizations . . . to create and maintain conditions 
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony .... " Id. 
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impact of man's activity on the interrelation of all components of 
the environment" and the "critical importance of restoring and 
maintaining environmental quality."28 
To insure that this general policy would be realized, Congress 
imposed upon agencies a duty to achieve six specific national goals 
for the environment, which are enumerated in section lOl(b).29 
Thus, the federal government has a "continuing responsibility" to 
do everything possible to act as "trustee of the environment for 
future generations;"80 to assure "safe, healthful, productive and 
aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;"81 to "attain the 
widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degra-
dation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable"82 conse-
quences; to "preserve important historic, cultural and natural as-
pects of our national heritage;"88 to "maintain an environment 
which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;"84 to 
"achieve a balance between population and resource use;"86 and to 
"enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the 
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources."86This obli-
gation is qualified only by the requirement that agencies "use all 
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of 
national policy. "37 
While section 101 does not explicitly delineate the relationship 
between its exhortations and agency decisionmaking, its history 
clearly does. Senator Jackson observed that an important, specific 
28. Id. 
29. Section 101 was intended to provide 
a congressional declaration that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of 
the Federal Government to use all practicable means consistent with other essen-
tial considerations of national policy to improve and coordinate Federal planning 
and activities to the end that certain broad national goals in the management of 
the environment may be attained. 
S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). Accord, id. at 6. 




34. 42 u.s.c. § 4331(b)(4) (1977). 
35. Id. 
36. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969). The Senate Report stated that 
"it is vital that" efforts to protect and improve the "quality of the Nation's renewable re-
sources such as air and water . . . be continued and intensified because they are among the 
most visible, pressing, and immediate concerns of environmental management." Id. at 19. 
37. There is rather widespread agreement that the "general substantive policy of the 
Act [set forth in section 101) is a flexible one" and "leaves room for a responsible exercise of 
discretion." Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). But cf. Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recognition of 
the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. 
INDUS. AND ·COM. L. REV. 685, 694 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Cohen & Warren]. 
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reason for including the "statement of national policy and the dec-
laration of national goals found in section 101 . . . [was to provide] 
a statutory foundation to watch [sic] administrators may refer to it 
[sic] for guidance in making decisions which find environmental 
values in conflict with other values."38 The Senate Report declares 
that one express purpose of the provision was to "contribute to a 
more orderly, rational, and constructive Federal response to envi-
ronmental decisionmaking."39 Similar expressions of intent were 
voiced by chief proponents of the measure in the House;•° Finally, 
it is difficult to understand how Congress could have contemplated 
that the national environmental policy and goals would be realized 
without full consideration by agencies of all environmental e:ff ects 
of their actions.'1 Judicial interpretation also holds that section 
101 was meant to provide guidance in agency decisionmaking that 
has ecological impacts.42 Indeed, several Circuit Courts of Appeal 
have stated that agencies are to reach decisions "after a full, good 
faith consideration of environmental factors made under the stan-
dards set forth in §§ 101 and 102 of NEPA" and that the "actual 
balance of costs and benefits struck by the agency according to 
those standards,'' must accord adequate "weight to environmental 
factors. "43 
38. 115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969). This statement echoes remarks that the Senator had 
made on the floor six months earlier. See id. at 19009. In describing section 101, Senator 
Jackson also observed: 
What is involved is a congressional declaration that we do not intend as a govern-
ment . . . to initiate actions which endanger the continued existence or the health 
of mankind. 
Id. at 40416 (emphasis added). Accord, id. at 19009 & 29056. 
39. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). The report then states that the 
section was meant specifically to rectify deficiencies in agency authority which prevented 
adequate "consideration of important environmental values." Id. 
40. See 115 CoNG. REC. 40925-26 (1969) (remarks of Representatives Mailliard and 
Saylor respectively, both of whom were Managers on the Part of the House). 
41. Cf. NEPA IN THE CouRTS, supra note 11, at 259 (Six provisions of section lOl(b) 
when "read in conjunction with the legislative history and with the Act's other provisions 
... suggest that Congress said more about the freedom of agencies to consider and trade off 
environmental values than the courts have yet fully recognized."). 
42. The language of NEPA, as well as its legislative history, make it clear that 
the Act is more than an environmental full-disclosure law. NEPA was intended to 
effect substantive changes in decisionmaking. Section JOI (b) of the Act states 
that agencies have an obligation . . . to preserve and enhance the environment. 
To this end, § JOI sets out specific environmental goals to serve as a set of poli-
cies and to guide agency action affecting the environment. 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) (emphasis added). Accord, Concerned About Trident v. Schles-
inger, 400 F. Supp. 454, 480 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Concerned 
About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
43. Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972). Ac-
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Case law fully supports the remainder of the analysis of this 
provision offered above. Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals declared that "section 101 sets forth the Act's 
basic substantive policy: that the federal government 'use all prac-
ticable means and measures' to protect environmental values.""" 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that section lOl(b) re-
quires agencies to do everything feasible "to preserve and protect 
the environment" by enumerating "specific environmental goals to 
serve" as guidance.u In Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. 
AEC, the court observed that the same provision imposed an "ex-
plicit duty on federal officials" in the nature of a "continuing re-
sponsibility" to "avoid environmental degradation, preserve 'his-
torical, cultural, and natural' resources, and promote 'the widest 
range of beneficial uses of the environment' .... ""6 Other courts 
have found that the adequacy of agency decisionmaking should be 
measured in light of the substantive mandates of section 101.° Fi-
nally, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has stated 
cord, Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973); 
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1973). The origin of this concept ap-
pears to be Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). While these observations arise in the context of explicat-
ing how judicial review of substantive agency decisions made pursuant to NEPA will be 
undertaken, the remarks still have considerable force. The District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals has even indicated that the substantive mandate of section 101 imposes 
upon agencies a duty to fully take into account environmental factors in their decisional 
processes: 
Only once-in § 102(2)(B)-does the Act state, in terms, that federal agencies 
must give full "consideration to environmental impact as part of their decision-
making processes." However, a requirement of consideration is clearly implicit in 
the substantive mandate of§ 101 . ... 
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972) (emphasis added). 
44. Id. at 1112. Accord, Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174 
(6th Cir. 1972); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 786 (D.Me. 1972). 
The Calvert Cliffs court appears to be referring in this passage to section lOl(a). See Ander-
son, supra note 5, at 299. 
45. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). Accord, Concerned About Trident v. Schlesinger, 
400 F. Supp. 451, 480 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Concerned About 
Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
46. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). Accord, Environmental Defense Fund v. TV A, 468 F.2d 
1164, 1174 (6th Cir. 1972). Cf. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 2337 (1979) (section 
lOl(b) articulates the NEPA purposes set forth in "bold strokes" in section 101(a) with even 
greater particularity). 
47. See, e.g., Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375, 1380 (W.D. Tenn. 1972); Sierra Club 
v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Sierra 
Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974); Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. 
Ala. 1973). 
188 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
that the "general substantive policy 'of section 101' leaves room for 
a responsible exercise of discretion," while still recognizing the im-
portance of taking into account ecological factors: 
Congress did not establish environmental protection as an exclu-
sive goal; rather it desired a reordering of priorities, so that envi-
ronmental costs and benefits will assume their proper place along 
with other considerations.48 
In sum, Congress enunciated in section 101 of NEPA a broad 
national policy of environmental protection and six specific goals 
for agencies to attain in management of the country's environment. 
These principles were meant to impose new and additional respon-
sibilities upon the federal bureaucracy. 
ii. The Nq,tional Environmental Policy and Goals Supplement 
Existing Agency Authority: Sections 105 and 102(1) 
Congress made clear in both sections 105 and 102(1) of NEPA 
that it intended the declarations of section 101 to add to extant 
statutory powers. Section 105 explicitly states that "the policies 
and goals set forth in this Act are supplementary to those set iorth 
in existing authorizations of Federal agencies."49 Thus, agencies 
are to treat NEP A's mandates as additions to prior congressional 
commands. 
The genesis of section 105 was an exchange during the hearing 
on the Senate Bill between Senator Jackson, the head, and Profes-
sor Caldwell, a consultant, of the Interior Committee. In that collo-
quy, the Senator stated that he was considering the imposition of a 
48. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). The scholarly commentary supports the interpretation of 
section 101 provided in this paper. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 22; NEPA JN THE CouRTS, 
supra note 11, at chs. I, VII. The guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
also are in agreement with the view espoused in this article. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1-1500.2 
(1979 and 1973); 40 C.F.R. § 1500.G(b) (1973). The CEQ was established by Title II of 
NEPA, which also defines the council's responsibilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 4341 et seq. (1977). 
The CEQ has emerged as the overseer of NEPA implementation by the federal agencies. 
Between 1970 and 1973, the council promulgated three sets of guidelines for agency compli-
ance with the act. The third set (38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (1973)) was not superseded until Nov-
ember 29, 1978, when a fourth set of guidelines was issued by the CEQ (43 Fed. Reg. 55992). 
For purposes of this article, the 1978 guidelines, which appear at 40 C.F.R. 1500 et seq. 
(1979), will be referred to as "new." The 1973 guidelines will be referred to as "old" and 
references to them will be dated "(1973)." Many courts have relied upon the CEQ guidance. 
See, e.g., Scientists Institute for Public Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088, 1090 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 14-16 (S.D. Tex. 1974). But even though they 
"have become influential interpretive aids, the guidelines are not automatically embraced." 
W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 708. 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1977) (emphasis added). 
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"general requirement that would be applicable to all agencies that 
have responsibilities that affect the environment rather than trying 
to go through agency by agency."110 The committee apparently de-
cided to adopt the concept, because upon completion of the hear-
ing, its staff was directed to 
draft an expanded statement of national environmental manage-
ment goals and to . . . grant new authority to Federal agencies 
which, at the present time, have no mandate or responsibility for 
the management and protection of the human environment [so 
that no] agency will then be able to maintain that it has no man-
date or no requirement to consider the environmental conse-
quences of its actions. H 
Committee intent that NEPA expand pre-existing statutory au-
thority of agencies is confirmed by statements included in its re-
port, 62 as well as subsequent remarks of Senator Jackson: 
The bill specifically provides that its provisions are supplemental 
to the existing mandates and authorizations of all Federal agen-
cies. This constitutes a statutory enlargement of the responsibili-
ties and the concerns of all instrumentalities of the Federal 
Government. H 
Nothing occurred during the deliberations of the conference com-
mittee that detracts from the Senate's clearly expressed intention 
to provide agencies with additional power; indeed, the actions of 
50. Hearing, supra note 23, at 117. His reasons for exploring that possibility were 
clearly articulated during the exchange: · 
Id. 
I am trying to avoid a recodification of all of the statutes . . . . If we try to go 
through all of the agencies that are now exercising certain responsibilities pursu-
ant to law in which there is no environmental policy or standard laid out, we could 
be engag_ed in a recodification of the Federal statutes for a long, long time. 
51. Id. at 206. 
52. The purpose of S. 1075 is ... to supplement existing, but narrow and frac-
tionated, congressional declarations of environmental policy. 
S. 1075, as reported by the committee, would provide all agencies and all Fed-
eral officials with a legislative mandate and a responsibility to consider the conse-
quences of their actions on the environment. This would be true of the licensing 
functions of independent agencies as well as the ongoing activities of the regular 
Federal agencies. 
S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 14 (1969). Moreover, the Section-By-Section 
Analysis included in the report states: 
This section (105 of NEPA] provides that the policies and goals set forth in this 
act are supplementary to the existing mandates and authorizations of Federal 
agencies. 
Id. at 21. Accord, 115 CONG. REC. 29068 (description of section of the Senate bill which 
became section 105 in Differences in the Senate- and House-Passed Versions of S. 1075). 
53. 115 CoNG. REC. 19009 (1969) (emphasis added). 
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that committee reinforce the "theory of a present jurisdictional 
grant."114 
Most telling was the conference committee's deletion of a pro-
vision in the House Bill that was apparently intended to have the 
opposite effect of the section of the Senate Bill which had ex-
pressly made NEPA supplementary. The language in the House 
measure, which was adopted as an amendment on the floor 
provided: 
Nothing in this Act shall increase, decrease, or change any re-
sponsibility or authority of any Federal official or agency created 
by other provision of law.'111 
Representative Aspinall, who offered the amendment, stated that 
its express purpose was 
to make clear that nothing in this act changes the authority and 
responsibility of existing agencies created by other provisions of 
law. In my opinion, if additional authority is needed and direc-
tion to existing agencies is needed, they should be provided by 
separate legislation. M 
The conference committee omitted this provision of the House Bill 
and retained the Senate version mandating supplementation. 57 The 
54. Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 231, 254 (1970) [hereinafter 
cited as Hanks & Hanks). Moreover, upon return of the legislation from conference, Senator 
Jackson inserted in the Congressional Record a document entitled Major Changes in S. 1075 
as Passed by the Senate which provided: "The effect of ... section (105) is to give recogni-
tion to the fact that the bill is in addition to, but does not modify or repeal existing law. 
115 CONG. REC. 40418 (1969). 
55. 115 CoNG. REC. 26589 (1969). The amendment was in the nature of an addition; 
the House Bill never included a provision comparable to that in the legislation passed by 
the Senate. See H.R. 12549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Section 103 of the Senate Bill, 
which became section 105 of NEPA, provided: 
The policies and goals set forth in this Act are supplementary to, but shall not be 
considered to repeal the existing mandates and authorizations of Federal agencies. 
S. 1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
56. Id. at 26589 (emphasis added). In comments made just prior to introduction of the 
new language, the Representative indicated his recognition of the fact that the Senate ver-
sion would supplement extant agency authority. Indeed, Representative Aspinall's very in-
tent in proffering the amendment apparently was to counter the perceived effect of the 
Senate Bill. See id. at 26587. 
57. "In accepting [certain) change[s) to section 102 (and also to the provisions of sec-
tion 103), the House conferees agreed to delete section 9 of the House (Aspinall] amend-
ment from the conference substitute." Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House, 
H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). Section 105 of NEPA "is a slightly 
revised version of section 103 of the Senate bill." Id. at 9. Compare section 103 of S. 1075, 
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969, with section 105 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1977). In explaining 
the final provision, the House Managers stated: 
This section declares that the policies and goals set forth in the bill are supple-
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comments of Representative Aspinall, when sharply criticizing the 
reading accorded the final legislation by all of the other House con-
ferees, only give credence to the view that NEPA was meant to 
enlarge extant agency power: 
It has been my position from the beginning that existing Federal 
agencies should not be given new statutory authority by the leg-
islation. All agencies should cooperate so far as possible under 
their existing authority in complying with the congressional 
statement of environmental policy and should seek, through nor-
mal procedures, the authority they need to fully comply with this 
policy.118 
By deleting the Aspinall amendment and adopting the Senate pro-
vision, the conference committee clearly laid to rest any contention 
that NEPA was not intended to expand pre-existing authority of 
agencies. 119 
Section 102(1) of the act also manifests legislative intent to 
add to extant agency power: 
Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possi-
ble: (1) the policies, regulations and public laws of the United 
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with 
the policies set forth in this Act. 80 
By requiring that prior agency authority be construed and imple-
mented in a manner that comports to the greatest degree possible 
mentary to those set forth in existing authorities of Federal agencies. 
Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House, H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess. 10 (1969). 
58. 115 CONG. REC. 40926 (1969) (emphasis added). Representative Aspinall's interpre-
tation simply cannot withstand the overwhelming weight of contrary authority: the com-
ments of Senator Jackson as well as the statements included in the Senate Report; the lan-
guage in the Statement of the Managers; and the remarks of Senator Jackson and Senator 
Allott indicating support by the Senate conferees for the interpretation expressed by their 
counterparts in the House. See 115 CONG. REC. 40415-16, 40421 (1969). "Under the rules for 
interpretation of legislative history, the interpretation of the National Environmental Policy 
Act stated by the managers of the bill for the House of Representatives is the correct inter-
pretation of the Act." v. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
166 (1971) (citation omitted) [hereinafter cited as v. YANNACONE & B. COHEN). Accord, 
Hanks & Hanks, supra note 54, at 256. 
59. Another important modification made by the conference committee, which adds 
force to the argument that Congress intended to supplement pre-existing agency power, is 
fully explained in the Hanks article. Id. at 252. 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1977) (emphasis added). Omission of the term "goals," which 
appears in sections 101 and !05 of NEPA, from section 102(1) probably should be ascribed 
to deficient drafting, because there is not indication in the legislative history of any Con-
gressional intent to exclude "goals" from section 102(1). Indeed, policies and goals, as well 
as principles, are used interchangeably throughout the legislative history. See, e.g., 115 
CONG. REC. 19009 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). 
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with the national policy and goals of environmental protection of 
section 101, Congress made those new considerations supplemen-
tary to existing authorizations. 61 
Very little legislative history speaks directly to section 102(1), 
and virtually none mentions its additive effect. However, the Sen-
ate report does state that one purpose of the provision was to ad-
dress deficiencies in extant authority of agencies, which had pre-
vented full consideration of environmental factors, by 
supplementing that power with the policy and goals of section 
101.62 Thus, section 102(1) also indicates that Congress intended to 
add to prior agency authority.68 
The judiciary agrees with the interpretation of NEPA pro-
vided above. Few decisions have expressly analyzed either section 
61. Supplementation thus results when the policy and goals of section 101 are super-
imposed upon extant statutory requirements by operation of the mandatory phraseology 
that both precedes, and is included in, section 102(1). The only exception to supplementa-
tion occurs when there is a clear conflict of statutory authority between those pre-existing 
authorizations and the policy and goals of section 101. The recent decision in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C.Cir. 1979) illustrates this phenome-
non. The court found that NEPA did not vest the agency with discretion to deny on envi-
ronmental grounds lease applications filed under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. 
§ 201(b) (1976), where Congress has indicated its intent that the leasing statute impose 
upon the agency a mandatory duty to grant such requests. The following specific observa-
tion about section 102(1) appears in Berklund: "The courts have concluded that the limit of 
this directive is reached when the NEPA policies conflict with an existing statutory 
scheme." Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 558 (D.C.Cir. 197!!). 
See generally note 84 infra. For a discussion of how Congress intended agencies to construe 
prior authority and what agencies were instructed to do where clear conflicts were discov-
ered, see id. 
62. In many areas of federal action there is no body of experience or precedent 
for substantial and consistent consideration of environmental factors in decision-
making. In some areas of federal activity, existing legislation does not provide 
clear authority for the consideration of environmental factors which conflict with 
other objectives. 
To remedy present shortcomings in the legislative foundation of existing pro-
grams, . . . section 102 authorizes and directs that the existing body of federal 
law, regulation, and policy be interpreted and administered to the fullest extent 
possible in accordance with the policies set forth in this act. 
S.REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1969). The few remaining direct references to 
the section in the legislative history are almost exclusively descriptive. See, e.g., Statement 
of the Managers on the Part of the House, H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 
(1969). After making just such an allusion, Senator Jackson does state: 
Taken together, t:1e provisions of section 102 direct any Federal agency which 
takes action that it must take into account environmental management and envi-
ronmental quality considerations. 
115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969). But, more explicit references to section 102(1) do not appear 
in the legislative history. Cf. id. at 40925-26 (1969) (remarks of Representatives Mailliard 
and Saylor linking section 102(1) to section 101). Finally, virtually no legislative history 
speaks with directness to supplementation. 
63. For examination of section 102(1) from a different perspective, see section 
l(A)(l)(b)(iii)(b) of this article infra. 
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105 or 102(1) in this context.64 However, many courts, by finding 
that the act requires agencies to take into account ecological con-
siderations not explicitly provided for in the standards of the. sub-
stantive legislation pursuant to which they are proceeding, have 
clearly indicated that NEPA is supplementary.611 Finally, the 
guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
64. EDF v. Matthews, 410 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D.D.C. 1976) provides the most compre-
hensive treatment of supplementation: 
[I]n light of NEPA's broad mandate that all environmental considerations be 
taken into account, we find that NEPA provides FDA with supplementary author-
ity to base its substantive decisions on all environmental considerations including 
those not expressly identified in the FDCA [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] and 
FDA's other statutes. This conclusion finds support in the legislative history, the 
precise statutory language, the holdings of the courts, and the construction 
adopted by other Federal agencies .... NEPA requires FDA to consider environ-
mental factors in its decision-making process and supplements its existing author-
ity to permit it to act on those considerations. 
Section 102(1) is one of the provisions of NEPA upon which Calvert Cliffs court relies for 
the proposition that the act by implication requires agencies to "give full 'consideration' to 
environmental impact as part of their decision-making processes." Calvert Cliffs Coordinat-
ing Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 
(1972). Cf. id. at 1115 n. 12, 1126 (reference to section 105 in the context of stating that the 
Senate sponsors intended a "supplementing" of "responsibilities in water quality matters"). 
In Gulf Oil Co. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 145 (9th Cir. 1973), the judges stated that section 
102(1) would remove "any doubt in our minds that the secretary's range of choices [under 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act] includes suspension [of leases) to conserve the nat-
ural resources of the outer continental shelf." One court has recently rejected a claim that 
section 102(1) of NEPA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to deny on environmental 
grounds applications filed under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 where applicants have 
satisfied all requirements of the leasing measure. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C.Cir. 1979). 
65. Thus, the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 
must take into account nonradiological environmental effects, especially water quality im-
pacts, when licensing nuclear power plants even though the Atomic Energy Act only man-
dates consideration of radiological hazards. See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). Similarly, the Corps of 
Engineers must take into account ecological impacts when issuing permits to allow refuse to 
be dumped into, or dredging and filling to occur in, navigable waters under the Rivers and 
Harbors Act. See Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). Cf. Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. 
Va. 1971), reu'd and remanded, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971); Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 833-34 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 527 F.2d 1386, 
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976); NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 695 (D.D.C. 1974), re-
manded for reconsideration, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977), reu'd and remanded on other 
grounds, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
Courts also have found that "NEPA makes environmental considerations part of the 
mandate" of agencies. See, e.g., NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1979); 
NAACP v. FPC, 520 F.2d 432, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1975), atf'd 425 U.S. 662 (1976); Greene 
County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 849 
(1972). Finally, courts have not accorded supplementary effect to NEPA in those rare in-
stances where a clear conflict of statutory authority has been found to exist. See, e.g., Natu-
ral Resource Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C.Cir. 1979). See generally note 
84 infra. 
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strongly and explicitly support the construction offered in this arti-
cle,66 and the scholarly writing also favors this interpretation.67 
1n sum, Congress addressed the question of agency power 
most directly in sections 105 and 102(1) of NEPA by making the 
national environmental policy and goals of section 101 supplemen-
tary to extant authorizations.68 Treatment of the issue in section 
102(2), while often quite explicit, is sometimes less direct; however, 
the section does remain significant and will be examined below.69 
m. Agency Implementation of the National Environmental 
Policy and Goals to the Fullest Extent Possible: Section 102 
Section 102 is fundamentally important to the expansion of 
agency duties worked by NEPA. Some members of Congress feared 
that the "lofty declarations" of section 101 might become "nothing 
more than that"70 and recognized that if the section's "goals and 
principles [were] to be effective, they must be capable of being ap-
plied in action."71 The legislators also realized that those "policies 
66. The new and old guidelines are substantially the same; however, the latter speak 
more comprehensively to supplementation: 
This means that each agency shall interpret the provisions of the act as a 
supplement to its existing authority and as a mandate' to view traditional policies 
and missions in the light of the act's national environmental objectives. 
40 C.F.R. § 1500.4 (1973). Accord, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (1979). 
67. See, e.g., Hanks & Hanks, supra note 54; Donovan, The Federal Government ar.d 
Environmental Control: Administrative Reform on the Executive Level, 12 B.C. INDUS. 
COM. L. REV. 541 (1971). 
68. The meaning of supplementation in this context is largely self-explanatory. Any 
ambiguity as to Congressional intent that remains after reading the statutory language can 
be clarified by consulting the legislative history in the text and footnotes immediately 
above. These passages indicate that Congress meant to grant new authority to agencies and 
to enlarge pre-existing statutory mandates so that all ecological factors woald be considered 
in decisionmaking. 
The authors of a treatise on environmental law explain that the effect of NEPA "upon 
the existing statutory authority of federal agencies slwuld be described as 'supplemental' 
rather than 'modified' or some other word of limitation." V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, supra 
note 58, at 167 n. 12. 
69. The implications of section 102(1) for section 102(2) are somewhat different from 
those for the concept of supplementation and will be discussed as well. 
70. See Hearing, supra note 23, at 116 (remarks of Senator Jackson). 
A statement of national policy for the environment-like other major policy decla-
rations-is in larg<! measure concerned with principle rather than detail. ... 
S. REP. No. 91-296, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). 
[l]f an environmental policy is to become more than rhetoric, and if the studies 
and advice of any high-level, advisory group are to be translated into action, each 
of these agencies must be enabled and directed to participate in active and objec-
tive-oriented environmental management. 
115 CONG. REC. 29087 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). 
71. Id. The Senate Report states that the express purpose of section 102 was "to es-
tablish action-forcing procedures which will help to insure that the policies enunciated in 
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and goals [could] be implemented if they [were] incorporated into 
the ongoing activities of the Federal Government in carrying out 
its other responsibilites to the public. "72 Thus, Congress in section 
102 sought to insure that these principles would be infused into 
day-to-day agency programs and operations73 by imposing 
mandatory duties upon the agencies that require full consideration 
of ecological factors in decisional processes: 
Section 102 authorizes and directs all Federal agencies, to the ful-
lest extent possible, to administer their existing laws, regulations, 
and policies in conformance with the policies set forth in this act. 
It also directs all agencies to assure consideration of the environ-
mental impact of their actions in decisionmaking. . . . 
Taken together, the provisions of section 102 direct any 
federal agency which takes action that it must take into account 
environmental management and environmental quality 
considerations. 74 
section 101 are implemented." Id. at 19. The meaning of the action-forcing concept is most 
clearly defined in a colloquy between Senator Jackson and Professor Caldwell during the 
Senate hearing in which the committee consultant stated: 
[I] would urge that in the shaping of [a national environmental] policy, it have an 
action-forcing, operational aspect. When we speak of policy we ought to think of a 
statement which is so written that it is capable of implementation; that it is not 
merely a statement of things hoped for; not merely a statement which will compel 
or reinforce or assist all of these things, the executive agencies in particular . . . to 
take the kind of action which will protect and reinforce what I have called the life 
support system of this country .... For example, it seems to me that a statement 
of policy by the Congress should at least consider measures to require the Federal 
agencies, in submitting proposals, to contain within the proposals an evaluation of 
the effect of these proposals upon the state of the environment, that in the licens-
ing procedures of the various agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission 
. . . there should also be, to the extent that there may not now exist fully or 
adequately, certain requirements with respect to environmental protection. 
Hearing, supra note 23, at 116. Senator Jackson agreed. Id. at 116-17. 
72. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969). Accord, 115 CONG. REc. 19009 
(1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). 
73. To insure that the policies and goals defined in this act are infused into the 
ongoing actions and programs of the Federal Government, the act also establishes 
some important "action-forcing" procedures. 
Id. at 40416. Accord, 115 CONG. REC. 29067 (1969) (Differences in the Senate- and House-
Passed Versions of S. 1075). 
74. Id. at 40416 (remarks of Senator Jackson) (emphasis added). Accord, id. at 40925 
(remarks of Representative Dingell). Cf. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 
(1969) (section 102 remedies present deficiencies in agency authority so as to permit full 
consideration of environmental factors). The case law supports the interpretation of legisla-
tive intent that appears in this paragraph of the article. See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 99 
S.Ct. 2335, 2337 (1979); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 
1131-32 (5th Cir. 1974). So do the new CEQ guidelines. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(a); 1502.1 
(1979). The commentators agree. See, e.g., Hanks & Hanks, supra note 54, at 251-53, 267; V. 
YANNACONE & B. COHEN, supra note 58 at 159-61. 
196 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
An explanation of the introductory language modifying the two 
parts of section 102 in which the obligations are imposed will pre-
cede analysis of those provisions. 
Prefatory Language 
The introductory wording employed by the drafters clearly in-
dicates that the enlarged agency responsibilities were intended to 
be mandatory: Congress authorized and directed that, to the ful-
lest extent possible, the duties shall be performed. The legislative 
history also is instructive. The source of section 102 of the final act 
was the Senate bill. In the preliminary measure, "to the fullest ex-
tent possible" did not modify the provision that became section 
102(2) of NEPA.711 However, the conference committee did make 
the phrase applicable to it. The explanation of the House Manag-
ers for this change clearly indicates their intention that the modifi-
cation be interpreted expansively: 
The purpose of the new language is to make it clear that each 
agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the direc-
tives [of section 102(2)) unless the existing law applicable to 
such agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes full com-
pliance with one of the directives impossible. 78 
Thus, an agency is to follow the commands of the section to the 
maximum extent, except where explicitly precluded from doing so 
75. The wording that introduced section 102 of S. 1075 provided: 
The Congress authorizes and directs thst the policies, regulations, and public laws 
of the United States to the fullest extent possible, be interpreted and adminis-
tered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and that all agencies of 
the Federal Government [perform six enumerated tasks]. 
See S.REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969). The House Bill included no provision 
comparable to section 102. See H.R. REP. No. 91-378 (Part 2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 
H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969), 115 CoNG. REc. 26590-91 (1969). 
The prefatory phraseology, "to the fullest extent possible," did modify the provision of 
the Senate Bill that became section 102(1). Thus, much of the legislative history which un-
derlies the interpretation that follows is directed to the part of the Senate Bill thst eventu-
ally became section 102(2). Nevertheless, thst fact should not detract from its applicability 
to section 102(1), because the language modifying both sections is identical and Congress 
was fully aware of that. See H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1969); 115 
CoNG. REc. 40417-18 (1969) (Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the Senate). 
76. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969) (emphasis added). In observ-
ing that this addition was part of a compromise which had resulted in omission of the 
Aspinall amendment, all of the House conferees except Aspinall reiterated their "view thst 
the new language does not in any way limit the congressional authorizaton and directive to 
all agencies of the Federal Government set out in subparagraphs (A) through (H) of clause 
(2) of section 102." Id. (emphasis added). The Senate conferees agreed with this reading of 
the "new language." 115 CONG. REc. 40418 (1969) (Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by 
the Senate). 
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by a "clear conflict between its existing statutory authority and 
[NEPA]. "77 In ascertaining whether any deficiencies or inconsis-
tencies in extant authorizations prohibit total adherence to 
NEPA's mandates, the agency is specifically instructed by Con-
gress that it "shall not construe its existing authority in an unduly 
narrow manner."78 If a clear conflict "expressly prohibits or makes 
full compliance with one of'' the act's commands impossible, "then 
compliance with the particular directive is not immediately re-
quired. "79 "However, as to other activities of that agency, compli-
ance is required;"80 and, even where clear conflicts were discovered, 
Congress contemplated future adherence.81 
This reading of the prefatory language is drawn almost exclu-
sively from the interpretation accorded the relevant terminology 
by the Managers on the Part of the House,82 a view to which the 
77. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Se8s. 10 (1969). The language employed by 
Congress is strong, clear, and repetitive. Agencies are to fully comply unless the "existing 
law applicable to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance ... 
impossible" or "to do so would clearly violate their existing statutory authorizations." Id. at 
9, 10. Accord, 115 CONG. REc. 40418 (1969) (Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the 
Senate). A respected commentator has observed that "surprisingly few" conflicts of this sort 
exist. See W. Ro~GERS, supra note 3, at 718, 764. 
78. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., lat Sess. 10 (1969). Accord, 115 CONG. REc. 
40418 (Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the Senate). This expression of legislative 
intent also was important enough to bear repetition. In explaining section 102, the House 
conferees emphatically stated that "no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construc-
tion of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance." H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 9lst 
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969). Their statement also declared that "it is the intent of the confer-
ees that the provision 'to the fullest extent possible' shall not be used by any Federal agency 
as a means of avoiding compliance with the directives set out in section 102." Id. at 9, 10. 
Accord, 115 CONG. REC. 40418 (Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the Senate). 
The express requirements for agency review of prior authority appear in section 103 of 
NEPA: 
All agencies of the Federal Government shall review their present statutory au-
thority, administrative regulations, and current policies and procedures for the 
purpose of determining whether there are any deficiencies or inconsistencies 
therein which prohibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions of this 
Act and shall propose to the President not later than July 1, 1971, such measures 
as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity with the 
intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in this Act. 
79. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., lat Sess. 9 (1969). Accord, 115 CONG REc. 40418 
(Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the Senate). 
80. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 9lst Cong., lat Sess. 9 (1969). Accord, 115 CONG. REC. 40418 
(1969) (Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the Senate). This affords additional evidence 
of the breadth of the command in section 102. 
Id. 
81. [Where] the existing law applicable to [an] agency's operations does not make 
compliance possible . . . then compliance with the particular directive is not re-
quired but the provisions of section 103 would apply. 
82. That group, which was responsible for preparing the Statement of the Managers 
on the Part of the House that became part of the Conference Report, included all of the 
House conferees except Representative Aspinall. He "refused to sign" the Statement, be-
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Senate fully subscribed,88 and is strongly and clearly supported by 
case law,84 the CEQ guidelines,811 and scholarly writing.86 In sum, 
the wording that introduces the two parts of section 102 com-
mands agencies to comply with the duties imposed to the maxi-
cause he could not "read into the [statutory) language that was finally agreed upon by the 
conferees the interpretation that is given to it in the statement of the House managers." 115 
CONG. REC. 40926 (1969). 
83. See 115 CONG. REc. 40415-16, 40421 (1969) (remarks of Senators Jackson and 
Allott); id. at 40417-18 (Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the Senate). 
84. After some initial hesitation, the courts have accepted the view that Con-
gress intended for NEPA's various requirements to be interpreted and applied in 
the strictest manner. The phrase "to the fullest extent possible," has become the 
touchstone of NEPA interpretation. 
NEPA IN THE CouRTS, supra note 11, at 49. Calvert Cliffs is exemplary: 
Of course, all of these Section 102 duties are qualified by the phrase "to the fullest 
extent possible." We must stress as forcefully as possible that this language does 
not provide an escape hatch for footdragging agencies. . . Congress did not intend 
the Act to be such a paper tiger. Indeed, the requirement of environmental consid-
eration "to the fullest extent possible" sets a high standard for the agencies ... 
[T]he dispositive factor in our interpretation is the expressed views of the Senate 
and House conferees who wrote the "fullest extent possible" language into 
NEPA .... Thus the Section 102 duties are not inherently flexible. They must be 
complied with to the fullest extent, unless there is a clear conflict of statutory 
authority. 
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972) (citations omitted). Accord, Environmental Defense Fund v. 
TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1174-76 (6th Cir. 1972); Public Serv. Co. v. NRC, 582 F.2d 77, 81 (1st 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1979). The case law respecting conflicts in statutory 
authority is succinctly summarized in the recent decision of Texas Comm. on Natural Re-
sources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1978), reh. denied, 576 F.2d 931, cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 966: 
The statutory conflict exception has been applied sparingly .... The conflict be-
tween the agency's organic statute and NEPA must be both fundamental and ir-
reconcilable .... Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association, 426 
U.S. 776, reh. den., 429 U.S. 875 (1976). In a limited number of cases statutorily 
mandated guidelines, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. (D.D.C.), aff'd, 502 
F.2d 1154 (Em. App. 1974) or an indispensable need for haste, Atlanta Gas Light 
Co. [v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142, 150 (5th Cir. 1977)] have rendered compliance with 
NEPA impossible. In a small number of cases NEPA compliance has not been 
required when the agency's organic legislation mandated specific procedures for 
considering the environment that were "functional equivalents" of the impact 
statement process. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 489 F.2d 1247 (1973); Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 
486 F.2d 375 (1973). 
85. While the new and old guidelines are substantially the same, the old guidelines are 
more comprehensive and provide: 
The phrase "to the fullest extent possible" in section 102 is meant to make clear 
that each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with that section unless 
existing law applicable to the agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes 
co_mpliance impossible, in the light of the act's national environmental objectives. 
40 C.F.R. § 1500.4 (1973). 
86. See, e.g., NEPA IN THE CouRT8, supra note 11, at chs. I, III; Donovan, supra note 
67, at 546-48, 556; Hanks & Hanks, supra note 54, at 254-57. 
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mum degree possible, unless expressly precluded from doing so by 
a clear conflict of legislative authority. The statutory language and 
legislative history of both provisions will now be examined. 
(a) Section 102(2) 
Section 102(2) directs all agencies "to assure consideration of 
the environmental impact of their actions in decisionmaking" by 
establishing "some important 'action-forcing' procedures."87 Sev-
eral parts of the section explicitly command agencies to fully take 
into account ecological factors in their decisional processes, while 
others do so less directly. However, analysis of the obligations im-
posed by all of these provisions leads inexorably to the conclusion 
that Congress intended agencies to undertake comprehensive ex-
amination of all environmental effects of their proposed actions 
and consider those impacts fully before rendering final decisions.88 
102(2)(A) 
Section 102(2)(A) requires utilization of "a systematic, inter-
disciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the 
natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in 
planning and decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's 
environment."89 Thus, whenever an agency intends to take action 
that could have an ecological effect, the agency must conduct rigor-
ous and comprehensive research which guarantees that the final 
agency decision results from integrated consideration of the widest 
possible range of information on the environmental impacts of the 
proposed action. 90 
87. 115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). Accord, S. REP. No. 
91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20; 115 CONG. REC. 29067-68 (1969) (Differences in the Sen-
ate- and House-Passed Versions of S. 1075). 
88. Sections 102(2)(A), (B), (C), (E), and (H) are relevant to the inquiry here. Each is 
modified, of course, by the prefatory instruction: "The Congress authorizes and directs, to 
the fullest extent possible, all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . . " 
NEPA was amended in 1975, and the changes in clause 102(2) are best described by 
Professor Rodgers: 
In August 1975 Congress amended NEPA by adding a new paragraph to section 
102(2) ... The new paragraph is designated 102(2)(0) and the old subsection 
102(2)(0) is redesignated 102(2)(E) with subsequent redesignations for the re-
maining original paragraphs (nqw (F) through (I)). The change is confusing for the 
reason that the case law for several years has given personality to the original 
designations. 
W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 719 n. 26. The references in this article will be to the amended 
provisions. 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1977). 
90. Congress gave virtually no substantive content to the phrase "integrated use of the 
natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts;" however, it is difficult to 
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This interpretation of the statutory language is supported by 
Congressional intent as expressed in the legislative history. The 
Senate Interior Committee, in explaining the "operating proce-
dures" prescribed in section 102(2), provided explicit instructions 
"to be followed by all Federal agencies:" 
Whenever planning is done or decisions are made which may have 
an impact on the quality of man's environment, the responsible 
agency or agencies are directed to utilize to the fullest extent pos-
sible a systematic, interdisciplinary team approach . . . that 
[brings] together the skills of the landscape architect, the engi-
neer, the ecologist, the economist and other relevant 
disciplines. . . . 91 
The Senate Report affirms that environmental data is to be col-
lected from the widest spectrum of areas and makes clear that the 
information assembled is to be applied in agency decisionmaking: 
[D]ecisions ... which may have an impact on the quality of 
man's environment . . . should draw upon the broadest possible 
range of social and natural scientific knowledge and design arts.ell 
Indeed, one of the most vexing problems which Congress sought to 
remedy with section 102(2)(A) was narrowly focused decisionmak-
ing that did not take into account numerous pertinent ecological 
impacts: 
Many of the environmental controversies of recent years have, in 
large measure, been caused by the failure to consider all relevant 
points of view in the planning and conduct of Federal activities 
. . . . Too often planning is the exclusive province of the engineer 
and cost analyst. 98 
The case law supports this interpretation of the section and 
gives meaning to the provision, meaning that cannot be gleaned 
from a reading of the rather cursory legislative history. Several Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeal have stated that section 102(2)(A) must be 
complied with prior to an agency determination respecting envi-
imagine how Congress could have used more all-encompassing terminology. The Statement 
of the Managers on the Part of the House simply speaks in terms of "integrated use of the 
sciences and arts," which includes almost everything conceivable. H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sees. 20 (1969). 
Congress meant for agencies to take seriously the obligation imposed, because the lan-
guage of section 102(2)(A) commands agencies to "insure use of the arts and sciences" and 
is modified by the strong prefatory phrase. 
91. Id. Accord, 115 CONG. REc. 29068 (1969) (Differences in the Senate- and House-
Passed Versions of S. 1075). 
92. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Seas. 20 (1969). 
93. Id. 
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ronmental impact statement preparation under section 102(2)(C).94 
Some decisions find that the former provision requires use of a rig-
orous team approach that draws upon expertise from all relevant 
fields. 911 Many other opinions indicate that NEPA's mandate to 
employ interdisciplinary methodology is intended to assure that 
the ecological impacts of proposals are fully comprehended and ad-
dressed. 96 The scholarly commentary supports the interpretation 
accorded section 102(2)(A) in this article;97 while the CEQ guide-
lines simply provide that agencies must "comply with the mandate 
of section 102(2)(A)."98 
102(2)(B) 
Section 102(2)(B) manifests similar Congressional purposes. 
This provision requires agencies to "identify and develop methods 
and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified 
94. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 834-36 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 908 (1973); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). 
95. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 835 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 908 (1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 927-
28 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). In Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Corps of Engineers, the court stated: 
The systematic interdisciplinary approach of § 102(2)(A) is designed to assure bet-
ter programs and a better environment by bringing together the skills of the biolo-
gist, the geologist, the ecologist, the engineer, and landscape architect, the econo-
mist, the sociologist and other disciplines relevant to the project. The mandated 
approach makes planning no longer the sole concern of the engineer and the cost 
analyst, and assures consideration of the relationship between man and his 
surroundings. 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 927-28 (N.D. Miss. 
1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). 
If the agency has made a good faith effort to comply, courts appear reluctant to find 
that the requirements of NEPA have not been satisfied. See, e.g., id. at 929; Hanly v. Klein-
dienst, 471 F.2d 823, 835 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
96. Thus, some courts have stated that agencies should consult with other agencies 
having some interest in, or expertise relating to, proposed actions. See, e.g., Simmans v. 
Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 19 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 
1972). Another opinion states that agencies must support research on important issues 
raised by proposed actions prior to their implementation. Enviromental Defense Fund v. 
Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (D.D.C. 1971). The District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals has stated that "officials making the ultimate decision . . . must be informed of the 
full range of responsible opinion [including opposing views] on the environmental effects in 
order to make an informed choice." Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 
783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971). That court also has suggested that an agency should seek the 
advice of impartial scientists. See Soc'y for Animal Rights v. Schlesinger, 512 F.2d 915, 917 
(D.C. Cir. 1975). 
97. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 67, at 555-56; Peterson, supra note 22, at 50041; W. 
RODGERS, supra note 3, at 719-20. 
98. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2(a), 1502.6, 1507.2(a) (1979). 
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environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate con-
sideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical 
considerations."99 Thus, agencies whose activities affect the envi-
ronment must develop analytical techniques to guarantee that all 
ecological effects of their proposed actions, not previously amena-
ble to precise measurement, can be assessed so that the environ-
mental desirability of proposals can be weighed with their eco-
nomic and technical feasibility in reaching decisions. 
The legislative history confirms this interpretation of the sec-
tion's wording and clarifies some of the terminology employed. The 
Senate Report states that the provision applies to "all agencies 
which undertake activities relating to environmental values" and 
gives content to "environmental values" by emphasizing those 
qualities "relating to amenities and aesthetic considerations."100 
"Presently unquantified" values and amenities were defined by the 
Senate as ones "which are at present not considered in cost-benefit 
analysis and other methods used in Federal decisionmaking."101 
Agencies were specifically instructed to create new means for 
assessing ecological factors not formerly reducible to ascertainable 
worth.102 The express purpose for imposing this requirement was 
to guarantee that these environmental qualities would now be fully 
taken into account in decisionmaking. In calling for the develop-
ment of analytical methods and procedures, the Senate Report 
speaks of incorporating the values in official decisionmaking, while 
the Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House declares 
unequivocally that the techniques are intended "to insure that un-
quantified environmental amenities will be considered in the 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1977). 
100. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969). 
101. 115 CoNG. REC. 29068 (1969) (Differences in the Senate- and House-Passed Ver-
sions of S. 1075). The Senate Report also fleshes out the meaning of the term in the context 
of describing environmental factors as those that are difficult to evaluate "in comparison 
with economic and technical factors." S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969). 
Some telling examples of the meaning of the phrase "presently unquantified environ-
mental amenities and values" may be drawn from NEPA itself. Thus, terms such as "histor-
ical, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage," "diversity and variety of indi-
vidual choice," and "esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings," which appear in the 
goals enumerated in section 101(b), define the "environmental amenities and values" of sec-
tion 1-02(2)(8). 
· 102. "Sec. 102 authorizes and directs all agencies to develop new methods of evaluat-
ing environmental values." 115 CONG. REc. 29068 (1969) (Differences in the Senate- and 
House-Passed Versions of S. 1075). Cf. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969) 
(adequate methodology must be developed for evaluating full environmental impacts and 
costs of federal actions). 
It seems almost superfluous to note that the language used by Congress explicitly man-
dates that these qualities are to "be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking." 
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agency decisionmaking process."1os The legislative history also 
makes clear that an important reason for the imposition of these 
new obligations was the failure of agencies to take into account 
many ecological parameters when rendering decisions: 
In the past, environmental factors have frequently been ignored 
and omitted from consideration in the early stages of planning 
because of the difficulty of evaluating them in comparison with 
economic and technical factors. As a result, unless the results of 
planning are radically revised at the policy level-and this often 
means the Congress-environmental enhancement opportunities 
may be foregone and unnecessary degradation incurred.104 
Finally, the Senate Report indicates that unquantifiable ecological 
qualities were to be weighed fully with other values in making final 
choices: 
A vital requisite of environmental management is the develop-
ment of adequate methodology for evaluating the full environ-
mental impacts and the full costs of Federal actions.1011 
Judicial decisions strongly support the interpretation of sec-
tion 102(2)(B) offered above. The District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals has found that the provision forcefully and 
clearly manifests Congressional intent that agencies give full con-
sideration to all environmental factors in decisionmaking. 106 Some 
103. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969) (emphasis added); H.R. REP. 
No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969) (emphasis added). 
104. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969). The Senate Report and the 
floor debates are replete with examples of environmental abuse incurred because of agen-
cies' failure to accord adequate weight to values less amenable to precise quantification. See, 
e.g., S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 20 (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 26575, 26578 
(1969) (remarks of Representatives Mailliard, Schadeberg and Minshall). 
Of course, the term "appropriate," which modifies decisionmaking in section 102(2)(B), 
could be construed so as to downplay the significance accorded ecological factors; however, 
such an interpretation would directly contravene the very purposes for which NEPA was 
enacted. Consideration must be "appropriate" in light of the problem sought to be reme-
died-environmental degradation. 
105. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969) (emphasis added). This also is 
implicit in much of the rest of the legislative history. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 14, 16 (1969). 
106. First, the court noted that section 102(2)(B) was the only provision of the act 
which states, "in terms, that agencies must give full 'consideration' to environmental impact 
as part of their decisionmaking processes." The District of Columbia Circuit Court then 
warned that a "purely mechanical compliance" with the requirements of "§ 102(2)(C) and 
(D) will not satisfy the Act if they do not amount to full good faith consideration of the 
environment," because such mandates "must not be read so narrowly as to erase the general 
import" of section 102(2)(B). Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 
1112-13 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). Next, the court specifically 
examined sections 102(2)(A) and (B), concentrating upon the latter: 
The sort of consideration of environmental values which NEPA compels is clari-
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opinions have stated that the purpose of the section is to insure 
that the complete ecological impact and total cost of federal ac-
tions will be properly balanced in the decisional process.107 Many 
courts have made somewhat less salient observations which none-
theless affirm the analysis above.108 Scholarly writing supports the 
construction in this article, 108 and the new CEQ guidance simply 
provides for agency compliance. 110 
In sum, the express wording and the legislative history of sec-
tions 102(2)(A) and 102(2)(B) show that Congress intended for 
agencies to deploy techniques which would guarantee· that full con-
sideration was accorded in decisionmaking to all environmental 
tied in Section 102(2)(A) and (8) ... In order to include all possible environmen-
tal factors in the decisional equation, agencies must "identify and develop meth-
ods and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified 
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in 
decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations." 
Id. at 1113. One of the citations omitted from this quotation (note 9) included a statement 
by Senator Jackson in which he declared that "subsection 102(b) requires the development 
of procedures designed to insure that all relevant environmental values and amenities are 
considered in the calculus of project development and decisionmaking." The other deleted 
citation (note 8) stated that the "word 'appropriate' in § 102(2)(8) cannot be interpreted to 
blunt the thrust of the whole Act or to give agencies broad discretion to downplay environ-
mental factors in their decisionmaking processes." 
107. The purpose of§ 102(2)(8) is to lend methodology to the broad interdisci-
plinary approach. It requires that agencies develop purposeful methods and proce-
dures to evaluate objectively the full environmental impact of a proposed project 
and weigh the ecological desirability of the project along with its economic and 
technical feasibility in planning and decisionmaking. This technique insures that 
the full cost of the federal action will be known. 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 928 (N.D. Miss. 
1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The omitted 
reference was to the legislative history mentioned in this article. On appeal, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals expressly referred to, but did not disturb, the "full cost" analysis of 
the district court. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1133 
(5th Cir. 1974). However, the appellate court stated that the "provisions of subsection (8) 
... order no more than that an agency search out, develop and follow procedures reasona-
bly calculated to bring environmental factors to peer status with dollars and technology in 
their decisionmaking." Id. The court in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1366 
(S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 
(5th Cir. 1974), found that the "reason for the methodology required by Section 102(2)(8) of 
NEPA is to ensure that the 'full cost' of the action will be known, including the environmen-
tal factors:" 
The legislative history of NEPA clearly reveals that Congress intended the "devel-
opment of adequate methodology for evaluating the full environmental impacts 
and the full costs-social, economic, and environmental-of federal actions. 
108. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 
(E.D. Ark. 1971); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 835 (2d Cir. 1972). 
109. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 22, at 50041; Donovan, supra note 67, at 555. 
110. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.2(b) (1979). Cf., id. at § 1501.2(b) & § 1502.23. The old guide-
lines only rely upon the section as authority for their promulgation. See 40 C.F.R. § 
1500.l(b) (1973). 
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effects.111 
102(2)(H) 
Section 102(2)(H) requires agencies to "initiate and utilize 
ecological information in the planning and development of re-
source-oriented projects. um Thus, "each agency which studies, 
proposes, constructs or operates projects having resource manage-
ment implications" must undertake research to secure data re-
specting the "effects upon ecological systems" of its proposals.118 
While the statutory language does not explicitly require that infor-
mation so assembled be applied by agencies in making decisions on 
particular proposals, such. use is implicit in the wording of the pro-
vision. Similar Congressional intent is manifested in the Senate 
Report, which states that any agency undertaking "projects having 
resource management implications is authorized and directed to 
consider the effects upon ecological systems to be a part of the 
analyses governing its actions and to study such effects as a part 
of its data collection. um The few courts that have addressed sec-
tion 102(2)(H) generally have agreed with this interpretation,1111 as 
have the commentators. 118 
102(2)(C) 
Section 102(2)(C) requires that agencies "include in every rec-
111. Sections 102(2)(A) and (B) address in a very similar manner the issue of agency 
authority. Each clearly commands agencies to deploy techniques which will guarantee that 
full consideration is accorded in decisionmaking to all environmental factors, particµlarly 
those not formerly taken into account. Congress could not have contemplated that agencies 
would restrict their consideration in decisionmaking to ecological effects expressly men-
tioned in their substantive mandates, when many of those environmental impacts were the 
very ones previously ignored in agency decisional processes and for whose consideration 
Congress explicitly sought to provide in the two sections. 
112. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(H) (1977). This section is treated here because its thrust is 
more similar to those just considered than to sections 102(2)(C) and (E). 
113. S. REP. No. 91-296, 9lst Cong., 1st Seas. 22 (1969). Little attention will be ac-
corded the legislative history of this section, which consists of only one paragraph. 
114. Id. 
115. This directive recognizes the growing importance of the environmental sci-
ences and directs the agencies to undertake research of a broader scope than may 
have been traditionally within their jurisdiction. 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (D.D.C. 1971). Cf. Citizens 
Against Toxic Sprays v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908, 912, 933-35 CD.Ore. 1977) (one section 
of NEPA relied upon by court for finding inadequate agency examination of effects of herbi-
cide spraying on human and animal health). 
116. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 22, at 50045; Donovan, supra note 67, at 555. The 
new CEQ guidelines merely call for agencies to "comply with the requirements of Sec. 
102(2)(H)." 40 C.F.R. § 1507.2(e) (1979). The old guidance is silent. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500 
(1973). 
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omrnendation or report on 'proposals for . . . major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a de-
tailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term 
productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented.117 
The section also provides that "prior to making any detailed state-
ment, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain 
the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law 
or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact in-
volved" and that "copies of such statement and the comments and 
views of the appropriate Federal, State and local agencies . . . 
shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review 
processes." Thus, whenever an agency intends to take any action 
that will have important ecological impact, an agency employee 
must confer with agencies that have responsibility for each envi-
ronmental effect concerned and then prepare and circulate for 
comment a comprehensive written statement. That document must 
analyze fully the ecological consequences of the proposed activity 
so that the agency can consider throughout its decisional process 
all environmental impacts with other relevant factors in making a 
final decision. 118 
117. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1977). 
118. This is the section that imposes the infamous environmental impact statement 
requirement. According to one commentator, "thousands of such statements have been pre-
pared by the agencies" and the "issues clustering about§ 102(2)(C) have dominated NEPA 
litigation." Anderson, supra note 5, at 320. Another writer has observed that "section 
102(2)(C) is the heart of NEPA," combining the "legislative objectives of full disclosure, 
consultation, and reasoned decisionmaking prescribed as the cutting edge of administrative 
reform." W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 725. 
Because the legislative history pertaining to this section is very sparse, considerable 
reliance will be placed upon the CEQ guidelines and commentary as each provision of the 
section is examined. A major reason for the dearth of legislative history was an important 
modification in the measure by Senators Jackson and Muskie after the Senate bill had 
passed and been sent to the House, but before the legislation went to conference. Section 
102(2)(C) of S. 1075, as initially agreed upon in the Senate, required agencies to make, and 
justify "findings" in five areas, relating to the ecological impacts of proposed agency actions. 
Under the Jackson-Muskie "agreement, but with no apparent reason for a 'compromise', the 
requirement for a 'finding' was changed to a requirement for a 'detailed statement.'" NEPA 
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Actions that trigger impact statement preparation include any 
activity that could have a significant effect on the environment, 
such as "project proposals, proposals for new legislation, regula-
tions, policy statements, or expansion or revision of ongoing pro-
grams. "119 Once a determination is made that the proposed action 
may have an important ecological impact, a responsible agency em-
ployee must prepare a comprehensive document in writing that ad-
dresses five topics related to the environmental consequences of 
the activity.120 That official must confer with, and solicit the views 
IN THE COURTS, supra note 11, at 8. See 115 CONG. REc. 29058 (1969). The language mandat-
ing justification for those findings was deleted as well. Compare section 102(c) of S. 1075, S. 
REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) with section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 
4332(2)(C) (1977). The relevant Senate and House reports were prepared prior to the time 
when the agreement was consummated, and the conference report does not mention the 
changes. 
119. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969). "Major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment" are defined comprehensively in the 
new and old CEQ guidance. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4, 1508.14, 1508.18, 1508.27 (1979); 40 
C.F.R. § 1500.6 (1973). Professor Rodgers observes that an "issue perpetually in litigation is 
the threshold NEPA question of whether a particular proposal is a 'major' federal action," 
and a thorough discussion of the case law is provided in his treatise. See W. RODGERS, supra 
note 3, at 750-67. 
It is important to note that the "major federal action" requirement is not imposed upon 
agencies under the other provisions of section 102(2). Thus, agencies must comply with 
them "even when no § 102(2)(C) environmental impact statement [is] required." Hanly v. 
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 834 n. 16 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). Ac-
cord, Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied 424 U.S. 967 (1976). 
120. Thorough treatment of each requirement in this article is simply not warranted 
for several reasons. First, the provisions, as enacted in final form, were never explained by 
Congress. See note 118 supra. Second, the wording of the initial three is largely self-explan-
atory: they simply mandate full consideration of all environmental effects of the proposal, 
especially those that would be unavoidable were it approved, and of alternatives to the pro-
posal. The language employed is very broad: "the" environmental impact and "any" adverse 
environmental effects. Some assistance can be gleaned from the CEQ guidelines. For defini-
tions of the terms "environmental impact of the proposed action," "adverse environmental 
effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented," and "alternatives to 
the proposed action," see 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8 (1973). For a more thorough discussion of "al-
ternatives," see the analysis of section 102(2)(E) at notes 127-37 and accompanying text 
infra. 
The fourth factor requires comparison of the lasting and cumulative losses of resources 
to be incurred for the sake of present gains. There is no helpful legislative history on this 
provision. The 1973 CEQ guidance speaks of "tradeoffs between short-term environmental 
gains at the expense of long-term losses, or vice versa" and foreclosure of future options. 40 
C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(6) (1973). An example would be offshore oil leasing, where near-term 
depletion of the resource means that it will be unavailable in the future. 
The fifth requirement mandates consideration of the permanent losses not only to the 
environment, but also of the resources committed to the particular action proposed. The old 
CEQ guidelines speak in terms of action that "irreversibly curtails the range of potential 
uses of the environment" and warn that the term "resources" includes the "natural and 
cultural resources committed to loss or destruction by the action" as well as the "labor and 
materials devoted to [the] action." 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(7) (1973). 
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of, any other federal agency that has power over, or peculiar expe-
rience with reference to, any ecological effect of the proposed ac-
tion.121 Copies of the document and attendant suggestions of fed-
eral, state, and local environmental agencies are to be circulated to 
interested parties, and both must accompany the proposal through 
the extant agency procedures for review leading to a final deci-
sion.122 While Congress did not explicitly command agencies to ap-
ply in the decisionmaking process the full range of ecological infor-
mation· gathered, indications of this Congressional intent appear 
throughout the language and relevant legislative history of section 
102(2)(C). m 
Case law interpreting the provision is legion, primarily because 
section 102(2)(C) affords so many procedural bases upon which to 
challenge specific project proposals. Indeed, significant segments of 
Even though the language in the Senate bill that expressly mandated balancing in deci-
sionmaking was deleted, Congress still intended that agencies engage in a weighing process. 
This intent is manifested in the wording of the statute itself. Inherent in the duties imposed 
by section 102(2)(C)(iii) is the prospect that the agency may select an approach that is less 
detrimental to the environment than the proposal. Implicit in the requirements of section 
102(2)(C)(iv) and (v) is the notion that agencies are to weigh the permanent losses to be 
incurred for present gain with· long-term productivity in making decisions. That Congress 
intended balancing to occur also becomes clear when the commands of section 102(2)(C) are 
read in light of the statute as a whole and particularly with the policy and goals of section 
lOl(b) as well as the general Congressional purpose for enacting NEPA. See section l(A)(l) 
of this article supra. 
121. For a thorough discussion of "who" must prepare the EIS, see W. RODGERS, 
supra note 3, at 777-85. The legislative history suggests that the provision was intended to 
induce coordination in environmental decisionmaking: 
The problem of providing for better federal environmental management practices 
is not totally caused by the lack of a policy . . .. The present problem also in-
volves the need to rationalize and better coordinate existing policies. 
S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969). The consultation requirement also can be 
construed as an "important aspect of the interdisciplinary decisionmaking sought to be pro-
moted by NEPA because the consultation must precede the statement which in turn must 
precede the action." W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 729. The new CEQ guidelines make ex-
tensive provision for preparers to obtain the comments of other agencies. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 
(1979). 
122. The legislative history directly· addresses these requirements in only a very lim-
ited manner. The language of the commands and the broad Congressional purpose in pass-
ing NEPA discussed above, at section l(A)(l), however, manifest Congressional intent that 
the impact statement procedures were to be an integral component of the broader decisional 
process. See W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 731. The CEQ clearly recognizes this in its guide-
lines. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1; 1502.5; 1503.4; and Pt. 1505 (1979). 
123. NEPA requires preparation of a thorough document detailing all environmental 
effects of proposed action which must be included in every recommendation or report on 
proposals. Two of the five topics to be discussed in the impact statement explicitly mandate 
balancing. See note 120, supra. Agencies are instructed to solicit expert opinion from other 
agencies both before and after preparation of the document so that this expertise may be 
applied in making determinations. Finally, the impact statement and expert comment on it 
must accompany the proposal and be given full consideration, at every meaningful stage of 
the agency decisional process. See notes 121-22 supra. 
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whole books have explored the hundreds of judicial decisions con-
struing this provision. They should be consulted for detailed analy-
sis. 124 While examination of those opinions is beyond the scope of 
this article, it is still possible to state that judicial interpretation 
comports with the view of NEPA articulated here. 111 The CEQ 
guidelines and scholarly writing also support the analysis 
offered. 128 
102(2)(E) 
Section 102(2)(E) requires that agencies "study, develop, and 
describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of ac-
tion in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning 
alternative uses of available resources. "Ul7 Thus, whenever the sug-
gested manner of proceeding with any proposed activity may lead 
to irreconcilable conflicts over competing and incompatible use of 
the environment, the agency must fully explore and evaluate op-
tions that could have less adverse ecological impact so that all al-
ternatives might be considered with the principal recommendation 
in final decisionmaking. 
The legislative history of section 102(2)(E) is not extensive; 
however, it does afford some guidance. Agencies have an affirma-
tive duty to seek out, examine, develop, and provide comprehen-
sive information on all feasible approaches to any proposed activ-
ity that could result in unavoidable environmental conflicts. 118 The 
124. It hardly bears repeating that the issues clustering about § 102(2)(C) have 
dominated NEPA litigation to date and that consequently a major portion of this 
chapter must discuss those cases. 
Anderson, supra note 5, at 320. For full treatment of the topic, see id. at 320-410; NEPA IN 
THE COURTS, supra note 11, at 56-178; W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 725-98. 
125. For a thorough discussion of the case law, see the sources listed in note 124 
supra. 
126. The council guidance has been treated extensively above. Much of the commen-
tary also has been relied upon to support the interpretation in this paper, and therefore, will 
not be referred to again. Moreover, most of the writers not mentioned in the preceding 
discussion of 102(2)(C) agree with the construction espoused. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 
22, at 50041-43; F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 9.02, at 9-37 through 9-117 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as F. GRAD]. 
127. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). A simple comparison of the language of this section and 
the "alternatives" wording of section 102(2)(C)(iii) clearly reveals that Congress intended to 
impose greater obligations upon agencies under section 102(2)(E). 
128. The Differences in the Senate- and House-Passed Versions of S. 1075 advises that 
the agency obligations are triggered "in instances where environmental conflicts cannot be 
avoided." 115 CONG. REc. 29068 (1969). The type of activity about which Congress evinced 
concern was that which involved "unresolved conflicts over competing and incompatible 
uses of land, water, or air resources." S. REP. No. 91-296, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1969). The 
Senate Report states that agencies "shall develop information and provide descriptions of 
the alternatives." Id. The wording of section 102(2)(E) requires full consideration of options. 
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possibilities explored must be broad. They should include no ac-
tion, an equivalent with fewer side effects than the initial proposal, 
activity on a smaller scale that reduces harm to the environment, 
and mitigation that decreases the adverse impacts of the proposed 
action.129 In order to minimize premature foreclosure of less dam-
aging options, the analysis of alternatives is to be prepared early 
enough to accompany the principal recommendations through the 
agency review process.180 The possible approaches must be dis-
cussed in sufficient detail for agency officials to make a reasoned 
final choice by contrasting the major proposal with these op-
tions.181 While this provision of NEPA does not expressly mention 
decisionmaking, implicit in the duty to develop alternatives is the 
prospect that the agency may select an approach that is less detri-
mental to the environment than the course of action 
recommended. 
The case law fully supports this interpretation of section 
102(2)(E). An early leading decision prescribes a rule of reason for 
agency treatment of options.182 However, courts clearly emphasize 
A description is a thorough and comprehensible account; development cannot be limited to 
the mere statement of an idea, but rather mandates elaboration which leads to meaningful 
proposals; and study means more than consideration and could entail research or modeling. 
See W. RODGERS, supra note 5, at 797-98. 
129. Legislative intent that there be extensive examination of all feasible possibilities 
may be gleaned from Congressional outrage at the contribution of agencies to environmental 
degradation, which was often attributable to failure to consider alternatives. See generally 
section l(A)(1) supra. 
130. Cf. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969) (Omission of ecological 
factors from consideration in early stages of planning in the past had meant that environ-
mental enhancement opportunities were foregone and unnecessary degradation incurred); 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.2(c) (1979) (agencies are to study, develop, and describe appropriate alterna-
tives early in the planning process to insure that planning and decisions reflect environmen-
tal values). 
131. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1969). Accord, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(b) 
(1979). 
132. The requirement in NEPA of discussion as to reasonable alternatives does 
not require "crystal ball" inquiry ... But if the requirement is not rubber, 
neither is it iron. The statute must be construed in the light of reason. 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This stan-
dard is not as restrictive as it may appear at first blush. In the context of the. agency propo-
sal to lease 380,000 acres for offshore energy development, the court required examination of 
the options of elimination of oil import quotas, increased exploration and development on-
shore, and modifications in FPC pricing and rationing of natural gas, some of which the 
agency had no statutory authority to implement. Moreover, the same court has recently 
stated that "under the rule of reason, the agency is not released from its obligation to con-
sider alternatives 'to the fullest extent possible.' " Natural Resources Defense Council v. 
SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Furthermore, "NRDC v. Morton's rule of reason does 
not preclude a discussion of alternatives because implementation is dependent upon action 
by another agency or because they do not offer a complete solution to the problem; or be-
cause they require radically new approaches to the agency mission; or because they would 
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the need for agencies to discuss the possibilities of taking no ac-
tion, of proposed activities fundamentally reduced in magnitude, 
and of projects developed concurrently with mitigation mea-
sures. 188 The judiciary has stated that this examination of options 
"must make clear the reasons for the agency's choice, address the 
environmental effects of the alternatives, compare them, explain 
how future options might be narrowed by present decisions, and 
respond to the recommendations of responsible critics. "184 In the 
end, "what is required is information sufficient to permit a rea-
soned choice of alternatives so far as environmental aspects are 
concerned."186 Courts also have defined the important terms in-
cluded in section 102(2)(E) similarly to the way they are described 
in this article.186 The CEQ guidance and the commentary strongly 
substantiate the interpretation provided above. 187 
Discussion of this provision concludes examination of section 
102(2). Its relevant parts evince clear Congressional intent that 
agencies are to undertake comprehensive review of all environmen-
tal impacts of their proposed actions and utilize the information 
collected in making decisions on proposals. Some of the provisions 
explicitly manifest this purpose, while the others do so less 
take time to implement." W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 793 (citations omitted). For a dis-
cussion of the cases that stand for these propositions, see the deleted references. 
133. For a discussion of relevant precedent, see id. at 793-94. 
134. For decisions that impose these requirements, see id. 
135. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
Discussion by the agency, which "makes passing mention of possible alternatives to the pro-
posed action [but] does so in such a conclusory and uninformative manner that it affords no 
basis for a comparison of the problems involved with the proposed project and the difficul-
ties involved in the alternatives," has been found inadequate. See Monroe County Conserva-
tion Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1972). 
Another observation by that court summarizes the importance of the section and em-
phasizes the difficulty of divorcing its commands from those of the third element of section 
102(2)(C): -
The requirement for a thorough study and a detailed description of alternatives, 
which was given further Congressional emphasis in § 4332(2)(E), is the linchpin of 
the entire impact statement. 
Id. at 697-98 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that "section 
102(2)(E) is supplemental to and more extensive in its commands than the requirement of 
102(2)(C)(iii)." Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1135 
(5th Cir. 1974). Accord, Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
136. See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1974). 
137. Numerous references to alternatives appear throughout the new CEQ guidelines 
that support the views expressed in this article. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2(c), 1502.1, 
1502.2(d) & (e), 1502.IO(e), 1502.14 (1979). The commentary is in accord with the construc-
tion of section 102(2)(E) provided above. See W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 724, 792-98; 
NEPA IN THE COURTS, supra note 11, at 270-71, 285; Peterson, supra note 22, at 50039, 
50044. 
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directly. 
(b) Section 102(1) 
Any lingering doubt that Congress intended agencies to apply 
the full range of data on ecological effects assembled should be dis-
pelled by section 102(1): 
Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent pos-
sible: (1) the policies, regulations and public laws of the United 
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with 
the policies set forth in this Act.188 
Thus, whenever agencies are construing or implementing prior au-
thority, they must do so in a manner that comports to the greatest 
degree possible with the national policy and goals of environmental 
protection enunciated in section 101. An interpretation that pre-
cludes agency consideration of ecological factors not found in pre-
existing authorizations simply could not be one which either con-
strues or administers that power in a way that most fully agrees 
with section 101. 
The legislative history confirms this interpretation of Congres-
sional intent. The Senate Report clearly states that the explicit 
purpose of section 102(1) was to rectify deficiencies and conflicts in 
prior agency authorizations, which had precluded agencies from 
fully taking into account all ecological impacts of their decisions: 
In many areas of Federal action there is no body of experience or 
precedent for substantial and consistent consideration of environ-
mental factors in decisionmaking. In some areas of Federal activ-
ity, existing legislation does not provide clear authority for the 
consideration of environmental factors which conflict with other 
objectives. 
To remedy present shortcomings in the legislative foundation 
of existing programs, . . . section 102 authorizes and directs that 
the existing body of Federal law, regulation, and policy be inter-
preted and administered to the fullest extent possible in accor-
dance with the policies set forth in this act.189 
The Differences in the Senate- and House-Passed Versions of 
S.1075 went even further by declaring that "lack of express author-
ity" in certain "areas of Federal activity" had "been interpreted to 
138. 42 u.s.c. § 4332(1) (1977). 
139. S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1969). An almost identical indica-
tion of legislative purpose, that does not explicitly mention section 102(1), appears at page 
13 of the report under the rubric of "Relationship of S. 1075 to Existing Policies and 
Institutions." 
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prohibit consideration of environmental factors."140 The more gen-
eral propositiOn~ that section 102(1) was a "mandate to heed the 
policies of section 101,"141 also is articulated throughout the legis-
lative history. 1411 The decisional precedent,143 the guidelines of the 
CEQ, 144 and scholarly writing support the view espoused in this 
article. 1411 • 
Summary of Congressional Intent as Expressed in Statutory 
Language and Legislative History of NEPA 
It is arguable, of course, that Congress intended agencies to 
gather comprehensive data on all environmental effects of their 
proposed activities, but only utilize information collected on those 
impacts explicitly provided for in the substantive standards of the 
statute pursuant to which the agency was acting. Indeed, the pre-
cise command . to consider ecological values in agency review 
140. 115 CONG. REC. 29067 (1969). That document also adopts almost verbatim the 
first two sentences of the quotation from the Senate report appearing in the text accompa-
nying note 139, supra. The other specific references to clause 1!12(1) that appear in the 
legislative history simply describe the clause. See note 62 supra. Subsequent to making just 
such a statement, however, Senator Jackson declared that "taken together, the provisions of 
section 102 direct any Federal agency which takes action that it must take into account 
environmental management and environmental quality considerations." 115 CONG. REC. 
40416 (1969). That observation certainly could be taken to mean that all ecological factors, 
including those not expressly provided for in extant statutory authorizations, were to be 
considered in decisionmaking. 
141. Hanks & Hanks, supra note 54, at 261 n. 121. 
142. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 40925 (1969). Accord, id. at 40926 (remarks of House 
Manager Saylor); id. at 19009 (remarks of Senator Jackson). 
143. There is simply very little case law that directly addresses section 102(1). It was 
one of the provisions of NEPA relied upon by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the proposition that the act implicitly requires agencies to "give full 'considera-
tion' to environmental impact as part of their decisionmaking processes." Calvert Cliffs Co-
ordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
942 (1972). In Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th 
Cir. 1974), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly observed that "section 102(1) of 
the Act contains a Congressional declaration that environmental factors be considered 'to 
the fullest extent possible'." That court also has stated that the purpose of section 102(1) is 
to insure that the policies enunciated in section 101 are implemented." Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 931 (1973). Accord, Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 
849, 851 (8th Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was astounded by the FPC's 
failure to "consider all available and relevant information in performing its [licensing] func-
tions" in "view of the explicit requirement in NEPA ... that the Commission interpret its 
mandate under the Federal Power Act in accordance with the policies set forth in [section 
102(1) of) NEPA." Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1972), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). 
144. See note 66 supra. 
145. See Peterson, supra note 22, at 50037-38; Hanks & Hanks, supra note 54, at 251, 
256-57, 261; Anderson, supra note 5, at 239-40, 283, 304; Donovan, supra note 67, at 546-47. 
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processes appears only once in NEP A. 146 However, Congressional 
intent, as expressed throughout the statutory language and legisla-
tive history of the act, clearly contravenes such a limited interpre-
tation. Moreover, it simply makes no practical sense for Congress 
to prescribe procedures that compel thoroughgoing analysis of all 
environmental effects while restricting agency consideration of the 
data compiled. 
The legislative history plainly states that one of the major rea-
sons for enactment of NEPA was to remedy environmental abuse 
and degradation attributable generally to agency failure to take 
into account ecological impacts in decisionmaking and specifically 
to the claim of many agencies that their authority either explicitly 
precluded consideration of, or minimized the value assignable to, 
environmental factors. The statutory mandates of all agencies were 
enlarged by section 105 of NEPA, which expressly states that the 
policy and goals of the act supplement existing agency authoriza-
tions and by section 102(1), which authorizes and directs that ex-
tant authority is, to the fullest extent possible, to be administered 
and interpreted in accordance with the national policy of environ-
mental protection and the six specific goals declared in section 101. 
Explicit commands that agencies take into account ecological im-
pacts in decisionmaking appear in sections 102(2)(A) and (B). Im-
plicit in the requirements of 102(2)(C) and (E), that agencies un-
dertake comprehensive review of all environmental effects of, and 
alternatives to, their proposed actions is a mandate to consider in 
decisional processes the impacts found. An intent that agencies 
perform this thorough analysis, but not take into account many of 
the ecological effects discovered; simply cannot be ascribed to Con-
gress. Finally, agencies must follow to the maximum extent possi-
ble the directives of section 102 unless a clear conflict of statutory 
authority renders full compliance impossible, in which event sec-
tion 103 instructs agencies to propose appropriate remedial 
measures. 
In sum, Congress clearly manifested its intent in the legisla-
tive history and statutory language of NEPA that agencies were 
not to be restricted in decisionmaking to consideration of those en-
vironmental factors expressly provided for in the substantive stan-
dards of the legislation under which they are proceeding. This con-
struction of Congressional purpose is fully supported by judicial 
146. Section 102(2)(C) states that "copies of the staff's 'detailed statement' and com-
ments thereon 'shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review 
processes.'" Sections 102(2)(A) and (B), however, do require agencies to insure that consid-
eration is accorded to certain ecological values in decisionmaking. 
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interpretation, the CEQ guidelines, and scholarly commentary. 
2. Federal Case Law 
The federal courts have flatly rejected the theory that agencies 
are precluded from taking into account ecological impacts not 
mentioned in the statutes pursuant to which they are acting. Some 
courts have done so quite explicitly by addressing the precise ques-
tion of agency authority. Others have been less direct; many have 
construed Congressional intent as interpreted above, while some 
have simply indicated that agencies must consider all environmen-
tal effects. Thorough analysis of those cases that address the exact 
issue treated in this article will precede less comprehensive exami-
nation of those opinions which are more indirect.147 
a. Decisions Explicitly Addressing the Issue 
Shortly after the passage of NEPA, the activities of several 
agencies raised directly the issue of agency authority to take intO 
account ecological considerations not expressly enumerated in the 
substantive legislation under which the agency was proceeding. 
Four courts expeditiously and summarily dismissed the argument 
that agencies were preclud~d from considering environmental fac-
tors not explicitly provided for in extant statutory mandates, so 
that by 1971 the theory had been effectively quashed.148 
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy 
Commission was the first major case in which a federal appellate 
court interpreted NEPA.149 In assessing "claims that one of the 
agencies charged with its administration [had] failed to live up to 
the congressional mandate," the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
of Appeals stated that its duty was "to see that important legisla-
tive purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or 
147. Few courts have had an opportunity to decide the precise question of agency au-
thority to take into account those ecological impacts not expressly mentioned in statutes 
under which they are proceeding. An important reason for this is that the theory that agen-
cies were precluded from considering such factors was never espoused by many agencies, 
was thoroughly and quickly discredited by the federal judiciary, and was totally abandoned 
by the agencies soon after its demise in the courts. 
148. Environmental Defense Fund v. Matthews, 410 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1976) is the 
only decision subsequent to this time in which an agency raised, and a court explicitly con-
sidered, the exact question examined in this article. That case probably should be character-
ized as aberrational. See note 171 infra. For a discussion of cases decided after 1971 in 
which the issue was either not squarely raised or met, see id. 
149. 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). Many 
cases were decided prior to this one; however, no court had construed NEPA in the same 
detail or with such breadth. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). 
216 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy."m 
The court performed that task quite admirably; indeed, Calvert 
Cliffs is the most widely cited NEPA decision, and its "interpreta-
tion has been accepted as the definitive judicial gloss on NEPA."m 
The case arose from a challenge to AEC rules implementing 
the act that "specifically exclude[d] from full consideration a wide 
variety of environmental issues."1112 The Commission contended 
that it lacked independent authority, in making decisions on the 
licensing of nuclear power plants, to take into account nonradio-
logical environmental effects when other agencies had specific re-
sponsibility for those particular impacts. m The court emphatically 
rejected that interpretation, expressly holding that the "sweep of 
NEPA is extraordinarily broad, compelling consideration of any 
and all types of environmental impact of federal action."1M The 
command clearly was not restricted to those ecological factors ex-
plicitly enumerated in the statute pursuant to which the AEC was 
acting: 
NEPA, first of all, makes environmental protection a part of the 
mandate of every federal agency and department. The Atomic 
Energy Commission, for example, had continually asserted, prior 
to NEPA, that it had no statutory authority to concern itself with 
the adverse environmental effects of its actions [other than the 
"specific radiological hazards caused by its actions" a position 
that "was upheld in State of New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy 
Commission"]. Now, however, its hands are no longer tied. It is 
not only permitted, but compelled, to take environmental values 
into account. Perhaps the greatest importance of NEPA is to re-
quire the Atomic Energy Commission and other agencies to con.-
sider environmental issues just as they consider other matters 
within their mandates. 11111 
150. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). 
151. Anderson, supra note 5, at 297. 
152. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). A technical reading of the AEC's rules reveals that the 
Commission did not completely deny that it had authority to consider ecological impacts 
outside its statutory mandates. See 35 Fed. Reg. 18469 (1970). 
153. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). 
154. Id. at 1122 (emphasis added). 
155. Id. at 1112 (emphasis added). 
Only once-in § 102(2)(B)-does the Act state, in terms, that federal agencies 
must give full "consideration" to environmental impact as part of their decision 
making processes. However, a requirement of consideration is clearly implicit in 
the substantive mandate of§ 101, in the requirement of § 102(1) that all laws and 
regulations be "interpreted and administered" in accord with that mandate, and 
in the other specific procedural measures compelled by § 102(2). . . . Thus a 
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In explaining the "sort of consideration of environmental values 
which NEPA compels,"168 the court drew from expressions of in-
tent in the legislative history a requirement for full and rigorous 
consideration of all relevant ecological effects as an integral part of 
agency decisionmaking. 1117 To the AEC's contention that "environ-
mental data and evaluations merely [need] 'accompany' an appli-
cation through the review process, but receive no consideration 
whatever from the hearing board,"168 the court reacted sharply and 
critically: 
We believe that the Commission's crabbed interpretation of 
NEPA makes a mockery of the Act .... The word "accompany" 
. . . must . . . be read to indicate a congressional intent that en-
vironmental factors, as compiled in the "detailed [environmental 
impact] statement" be considered through agency review 
processes .... Compliance to the "fullest" possible extent would 
seem to demand that environmental issues be considered at every 
important stage in the decision making process concerning a par-
ticular action-at every stage where an overall balancing of envi-
ronmental and nonenvironmental factors is appropriate and 
where alterations might be made in the proposed action to mini-
mize environmental costs.119 
The Corps of Engineers assumed very different positions in 
two early NEPA cases. In Kalur v. Resor, the Corps promulgated 
regulations governing consideration of environmental matters in 
purely mechanical compliance with the particular measures required in § 
102(2){C) & (E) will not satisfy the Act if they do not amount to full good faith 
consideration of the environment .... The requirements of § 102(2) must not be 
read so narrowly as to erase the general import of §§ 101, 102(1) and 102(2)(A) & 
(B). 
Id. at 1112-13 n.5. As to the specific question of impacts on water quality, the court stated: 
Water quality certifications essentially establish a minimum condition for the 
granting of a license. But they need not end the matter. The Commission can then 
go on to perform the very different operation of balancing the overall benefits and 
costs of a particular proposed project, and consider alterations (above and beyond 
the applicable water quality standards) which would further reduce environmental 
damage. 
Id. at 1125. 
156. Id. at li13. 
157. Id. at 1113-14 nn. 6, 7, & 9. 
158. Id. at 1117. 
159. Id. at 1117-18. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals added that the 
commission "must itself take the initiative of considering environmental values at every 
distinctive and comprehensive stage of the process." Id. at 1119. The court also relied upon 
legislative history for the proposition that "section 102 duties . . . must be complied with to 
the fullest extent, unless there is a clear conflict of statutory authority." Id. at 1115. This is 
exemplary of the statements about Congressional intent made throughout Calvert Cliffs 
which serve to confirm the interpretation provided in this article. 
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which the agency contended that it did not have to comply totally 
with NEPA.160 The Corps argued, as did the AEC, that it was not 
required to independently take into account water quality consid-
erations but could defer to the determinations of agencies respon-
sible for water pollution control when issuing refuse permits under 
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.161 The court found Calvert 
Cliffs controlling and rejected the Corps' position,162 stating that 
under NEPA the "particular economic and technical benefits of 
planned action must be assessed and then weighed against the en-
vironmental costs:"163 
Water quality certifications essentially establish a minimum con-
dition for the granting of a license. But they need not end the 
matter. The Corps of Engineers can then go on to perform the 
very different operation of balancing the overall benefits and 
costs of a particular proposed project, and consider alterations 
above and beyond the applicable water quality standards that 
would further reduce environmental damage.164 
The same agency adopted a quite different posture in litiga-
tion involving another provision of the Rivers and Harbors Act.161 
Plaintiffs argued that the Corps' authority to deny their permit ap-
plication was limited to considerations expressly enumerated in the 
substantive legislation.166 However, the Corps asserted, and the 
160. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971). One reason espoused for NEPA's 
inapplicability was the fact that the "Corps of Engineers is an agency dedicated to guarding 
the environment." Id. at 12. However, the court summarily dismissed that claim. 
161. Recognizing the expertise of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
the Corps will accept the findingb, determinations and interpretation, as the Re-
gional Representative of the EPA decides, concerning the applicability of water 
quality considerations upon requests for permits to dump refuse into navigable 
waters. 
Id. at 13. The Corps was proceeding under section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 
u.s.c. § 407 (1970). 
162. This is analogous to the Atomic Energy Commission stating that it would 
not independently examine any problem of water quality. These cases having dis-
tinctions without meaning it is held that the Calvert Cliffs' reasoning applies here 
with equal force. 
Id. at 13-14. 
Id. 
163. Id. at 14. 
[A]lternatives must be considered that would effect the balance of values. The 
point of the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that, with possible alter-
ations, the optimally beneficial action is finally taken. 
164. Id. at 14-15. 
165. In Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971), 
the Corps of Engineers was exercising its power to issue a permit to dredge and fill in navi-
able waters under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970). 
166. [Landholders) urged that the proposed [dredge and fill) work would not 
hinder navigation and that the Secretary [of the Army) had no authority to refuse 
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court agreed, that NEPA expanded the agency's power by author-
izing denial of permits for ecological reasons unrelated to interfer-
ence with navigation, flood control, or power production.167 In dis-
cussing the obligations imposed upon the agency by NEPA, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that: 
[T]he Army must consult with, consider and receive, and then 
evaluate the recommendations of all of these other agencies ar-
ticulately on all these environmental factors [in NEPA]. In re-
jecting a permit on non-navigational grounds, the Secretary of the 
Army does not abdicate his sole ultimate responsibility and au-
thority. Rather in weighing the application, the Secretary of the 
Army is acting under a Congressional mandate to collaborate and 
consider all of these factors. 168 
In Ely v. Velde, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion (LEAA) claimed that it could "not look beyond its governing 
statute and [was] prohibited in approving grants [to states], from 
reading into that statute the requirements of NHP A and 
NEPA."169 However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected 
that contention and held that LEAA was duty-bound to comply 
with NEP A.170 
the permit on other grounds. They acknowledged that "there was evidence before 
the Corps of Engineers sufficient to justify an administrative agency finding that 
our fill would do damage to the ecology or marine life on the bottom." 
Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). The 
court stated that the question presented to it was "whether the Secretary of the Army can 
refuse to authorize a dredge and fill project in navigable waters for factually substantial 
ecological reasons even though the project would not interfere with navigation, flood control, 
or the production of power." Id. 
167. "There is no doubt that the Secretary can refuse on conservation grounds to 
grant a permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act." Id. at 214. The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals also relied upon a Report of the House Committee on Government Operations, 
H.R. REP. No. 91-917, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. (1970) and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 661 et seq. (1974), in reaching its determination. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 
F.2d 199, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). 
168. Id. at 213. The same court reaffirmed Zabel v. Tabb in Bankers Life & Casualty 
Co. v. Village of North Palm Beach, Fla., 469 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 
916 (1973). 
169. Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd and remanded, 451 F.2d 
1130, 1133 (4th Cir. 1971), denying injunction, 363 F. Supp. 277 (E. D. Va. 1973), rev'd and 
remanded, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974). "NHPA" is the National Historic Preservation Act, 
16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq. (1974), a measure also relied upon by plaintiffs. LEAA's "governing 
statute" is the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1977). 
An important component of the agency's argument was that this legislation prohibited "any 
interference or control of th~ states by the federal government in the spending of grants, 
except as expressly authorized by the statute." Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1133 (4th Cir. 
1971) (citation omitted). 
170. "To summarize, we hold that the LEAA is duty-bound, in approving the grant at 
issue here, to comply with the procedural requirements of NHPA and NEPA." Id. at 1139. 
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Environmental Defense Fund v. Matthews was the only case 
decided after 1971 in which an agency raised, and a court expressly 
addressed, the precise issue under consideration in this article.171 
However, the opinion has considerable significance for Montana, 
because the position asserted by the agency in Matthews is virtu-
ally identical to that now espoused by the Montana agencies. 172 
Earlier in the decision the court articulated its reasoning: 
Reliance in the present case is misplaced, for it is plain that the LEAA has over-
drawn the "hands off'' policy of the Safe Streets Act. Properly read, neither the 
Act's language nor its policy prohibits or excuses compliance with NHPA and 
NEPA. 
Id. at 1135-36. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also stated: 
It is our conclusion that Congress, in enacting the Safe Streets Act, did not intend 
to forbid the LEAA from considering NHPA and NEPA. 
Id. at 1136-37. 
171. 410 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1976). Agency espousal in 1975 of the aberrational posi-
tion which led to this litigation may have been prompted more by threat of suit from the 
industry and desire to have the issue resolved than agency commitment to the principle 
involved. Indeed, the preamble announcing promulgation of the rule appeared to invite liti-
gation when it pronounced that this "amendment to the regulations constitutes final agency 
action on the matter." 40 Fed. Reg. 16,662 (1975). 
In other cases, agencies did make contentions similar, but not identical to, those of FDA 
in Matthews. In a lengthy dispute involving the SEC, the Commission never actually denied 
that NEPA empowered it to take environmentally protective measures pursuant to its sub-
stantive mandates. See NRDC v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974), remanded for recon-
sideration, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 834, 837-38 
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (197e). 
In Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975), 
the service prepared an EIS but claimed that section 410 of the Postal Reorganization Act 
of 1970, 39 U.S.C. § 410 (1962), exempted the agency from NEPA compliance. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals compared the language and legislative history of the two statutes 
and concluded that the service was not exempt from NEPA. Id. at 386. Accord, City of 
Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967, 974-75 (2d Cir. 1976). 
Finally, some agencies have contended that they did not have to comply with NEPA 
where there was a conflict of statutory authority between that act and the legislation pursu-
ant to which the agencies were acting. See generally note 84 supra; W. RODGERS, supra note 
3, at 764-66. Several agencies charged with responsibility for management of the public 
lands have recently asserted that NEPA had little, or no, applicability to them when acting 
pursuant to certain specific statutory schemes. The efforts of the Forest Service in this re-
gard have met with no success. See, e.g., Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 
573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978), reh. denied, 576 F.2d 931, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966. In Citi-
zens Against Toxic Sprays v. Bergland, 428 F. Supp. 908 (D.Ore. 1977), the court employs 
reasoning most similar to that used in decisions rendered in the early 1970's. However, it is 
not clear that the contentions of the Forest Service were like those espoused by agencies 
during the earlier period, and the court's rejection of the agency's muddled claims consists 
of less than one page of a thirty-two page opinion. See id. at 926-27. The Interior Depart-
ment has been vindicated in several cases where the agency contended that full NEPA 
compliance was not required for action taken pursuant to statutes governing mineral extrac-
tion on public lands. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 
(D.C.Cir. 1979); South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1980). 
172. In most of the cases just examined in the text, agencies simply did not make the 
type of thorough and precise disclaimer of authority articulated by FDA in EDF v. Mat-
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The FDA attempted to amend its regulations governing agency ob-
ligations under NEPA by limiting the "grounds on which the Com-
missioner of FDA [could] base any action to those expressly pro-
vided for in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et 
seq. (FDCA) or in other statutes which FDA administers [and by 
prohibiting the Commissioner] from acting solely on the basis of 
environmental considerations not identified in those statutes:"178 
A determination of adverse environmental impact has no legal or 
regulatory effect and does not authorize the Commissioner to take 
or refrain from taking any action under the laws he administers. 
The Commissioner may take or refrain from taking action on the 
basis of a determination of an adverse environmental impact only 
to the extent that such action is independently authorized by the 
laws he administers. 174 
The District of Columbia District Court thoroughly and em-
phatically repudiated all of the agency's claims. The court first 
made a general finding that "this limitation of the agency's discre-
tion to act in accordance with environmental considerations di-
rectly contravenes the mandate of NEPA to all Federal agencies to 
consider the environmental effects of their actions to the fullest 
extent possible."1711 FDA's specific contention that its statutes were 
in direct conflict with NEPA, thereby excusing the agency from 
full compliance, was then subjected to rigorous scrutiny and found 
to be wanting.178 The court relied on this finding and the sweeping 
command of NEPA to explicitly reject the theory espoused by 
thews. For example, in Calvert Cliffs and Kalur, the agency position was more in the nature 
of a deferral to the power of other agencies. 
Id. 
173. EDF v. Matthews, 410 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D.D.C. 1976). 
174. 40 Fed. Reg. 16, 662 (1975). 
175. EDF v. Matthews, 410 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D.D.C. 1976). 
176. Defendants [also) contend that FDA's statutes, particularly the FDCA, dic-
tate that it act only in accordance with specifically expressed criteria, and that to 
the extent that NEPA demands consideration of additional criteria, it is in direct 
conflict with those statutes. Accordingly, they maintain that such a direct statu-
tory conflict exempts FDA from full compliance with NEPA. 
It appears clear to us that, contrary to defendants' contention, FDA's existing 
statutory duties under the FDCA and its other statutes are not in direct conflict 
with its duties under NEPA. The FDCA does not state that the listed considera-
tions are the only ones which the Commissioner may take into account in reaching 
a decision. Nor does it explicitly require that product applications be granted if 
the specified grounds are met. It merely lists criteria which the Commissioner 
must consider in reaching his decision. In the absence of a clear statutory provi-
sion excluding consideration of environmental factors . . . we find that NEPA 
provides FDA with supplementary authority to base its substantive decisions on 
all environmental considerations including those not expressly identified in the 
FDCA and FDA's other statutes. 
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FDA: 
In the absence of a clear statutory provision excluding considera-
tion of environmental factors, and in light of NEPA's broad man-
date that all environmental considerations be taken into account, 
we find that NEPA provides FDA with supplementary authority 
to base its substantive decisions on all environmental considera-
tions including those not expressly identified in the FDCA and 
FDA's other statutes. This conclusion finds support in the legisla-
tive history, the precise statutory language, the holdings of the 
courts, and the construction adopted by other Federal agencies.177 
Finally, the court made clear that the NEPA mandate to take into 
account ecological considerations in decisionmaking was necessa-
rily meant to add to extant authority so that agencies could make 
determinations based upon them: 
NEPA requires FDA to consider environmental factors in its de-
cision-making process and supplements its existing authority to 
permit it to act on those considerations. It permits FDA to base a 
decision upon environmental factors, when balanced with other 
relevant considerations. Since the contested regulation prohibits 
FDA from acting on the basis of such environmental considera-
tions, it is directly contrary to the letter and spirit of NEPA.178 
By 1972, most agencies had simply abandoned the argument 
advanced by FDA in Matthews, so that the case is aberrational. 
However, the opinion is valuable because it provides a clear, defini-
tive, and thorough statement of the federal law on the precise 
question addressed in this article. In sum, all federal courts that 
have considered the issue have found that NEPA requires agencies 
to take into account in decisionmaking environmental factors not 
explicitly included in the legislation pursuant to which they are 
acting. 
b. Decisions Indirectly Addressing the Issue 
There are quite a few cases in which the federal judiciary has 
177. Id. 
178. Id. "Defendants also contend that the amending regulation constitutes full com-
pliance with NEPA be.::ause it does not prohibit 'consideration' of environmental factors, 
but merely prohibits such factors from being the exclusive basis for agency action." Id. at 
339. However, the court summarily dismissed this argument: 
Id. 
This view clearly places form over substance. What possible purpose can be served 
by consideration of environmental factors without the concomitant authority to 
act on those considerations? ... Requiring consideration without permitting ac-
tion as a result would render the NEPA process futile and meaningless in a way 
which the Court in Calvert Cliffs found it was never intended to be. 
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indicated less explicitly that agencies are to consider all ecological 
impacts in their decisional processes. Most of these decisions arise 
in the context of challenges to the adequacy of agency impact 
statement preparation. By finding that the agency failed to address 
properly certain environmental considerations, the courts. indicate 
that agencies do have authority to take into account many ecologi-
cal effects not mentioned in their substantive legislation. This 
phenomenon is manifested quite clearly in Hanly v. Mitchell. 179 In 
that case, the court examined the review of ecological factors un-
dertaken by the General Services Administration in deciding 
whether to locate a federal detention center in Manhattan and 
found the analysis deficient: 
The National Environmental Policy Act contains no exhaustive 
list of so-called "environmental considerations," but without 
question its aims extend beyond sewage and garbage and even be-
yond water and air pollution. . . . The Act must be construed to 
include protection of the quality of life for city residents. Noise, 
traffic, overburdened mass transportation systems, crime, conges-
tion and even availability of drugs all affect the urban "environ-
ment" . . . . Thus, plaintiffs do raise many "environmental con-
siderations" that should not be ignored. We believe the record in 
this case indicates that, as to the proposed jail, they were. 180 
In sum, federal courts have stated indirectly that agencies are to 
take into account all ecological impacts of their actions. 
3. Conclusion 
All relevant indications of Congressional intent, as expressed 
179. 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd sub nom., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). 
180. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972). Some courts subscribe to the 
principle propounded in Hanly. See, e.g., Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v. United States 
Postal Serv., 516 F.2d 378, 387-88 (2d Cir. 1975); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221, 
246 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344, 349-50 (D. Conn. 1972). 
Others state that agencies should prepare impact statements detailing the ecological effects 
of proposals "regardless of whether the agency has authority to do anything about it." 
Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240, 245 (10th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom., Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776 (1976) (citations omitted). 
Accord, Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 
487 F.2d 1029, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 
1323, 1340-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
As with the decisions expressly addressing the precise question of agency authority, 
there simply is not a plethora of case law that is less explicit, because after 1971 agencies 
generally had abandoned the argument that they lacked the power to apply ecological fac-
tors not found in their substantive mandates and courts appeared to presume that the ques-
tion had been resolved. Those decisions, that treat the issue indirectly by interpreting Con-
gressions,J intent, are discussed in section l(A)(l) of this article supra. 
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in the statutory language and legislative history of NEPA, as well 
as case law interpreting that purpose, emphatically· support the 
conclusion that Congress intended to require that agencies fully 
consider in their decisionmaking those environmental factors not 
explicitly provided for in the substantive mandates of the statutes 
under which agencies are acting. 
B. State Environmental Policy Acts 
Approximately thirty jurisdictions have adopted measures 
similar to NEPA. 181 The intent of state legislatures in enacting 
these statutes is very difficult to ascertain. Little legislative history 
accompanies passage of most legislation at this level of govern-
ment, and environmental policy acts are no exception. While the 
language used in some of these statutes is quite similar because 
they are patterned after NEPA, many of the state measures differ 
significantly from the federal act and from each other .182 For these 
reasons, the intent of the state legislatures in passing "little 
NEPA's" will not be examined in this paper.183 Considerable em-
phasis, however, will be placed upon decisions rendered by state 
courts. There has not been much case law development at this 
level, but most courts interpreting the state acts have construed 
the legislAtion in a manner quite similar to the federal courts.184 
181. As of January 1, 19~6, environmental impact statement requirements had 
been adopted by 30 states and Puerto Rico. Comprehensive legislation is found in 
13 states and Puerto Rico, and administrative equivalents in four others. Special 
SEPA's [State Environmental Policy Acts], limited to identifiable actions or geo-
graphical areas, are effective in 14 states .... 
W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 810 (citations omitted). 
182. Generally, the SEPA's adhere closely to the language of NEPA. Several, in 
fact, incorporate virtually verbatim the federal provisions. Many of the state stat-
utes, however, deviate from the federal model and from one another in notable 
particulars. 
W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 811. 
183. Even if the purpose of these legislative bodies in enacting an environmental pol-
icy measure could be ascertained, that information would be of limited value. State courts, 
in construing little NEPA's passed in a particular jurisdiction, rarely have looked to the 
intent of legislatures in other states, despite the fact that these courts frequently have relied 
upon federal interpretation. See note 244 infra. Nevertheless, legislative purpose will be 
examined in the context of judicial interpretation of legislative intent in passing measures 
substantially similar to NEPA and MEPA. This discussion will appear under the heading 
"Decisions Indirectly Addressing the Issue" at section l(B)(2) of this article infra, because 
no separate examination of legislative purpose (like section l(A)(l) supra) is provided in 
this part of the article. 
184. "The early history _of 'little NEPA' litigation strongly suggests that the state 
courts will generally follow the federal courts in their interpretation of NEPA." F. GRAD, 
supra note 126, § 9.07(3], at 9-168. Cf. W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 814 ("Case law on 
SEPA applicability falling into the broad categories of coverage familiar under NEPA" by 
1977). 
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1. Decisions Explicitly Addressing the Issue 
The courts of Washington state have directly confronted the 
question considered in this article and have declared that Wash-
ington's State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) mandates consid-
eration of environmental factors not present in the substantive leg-
islation under which state or local agencies are acting.180 Polygon 
Corporation v. City of Seattle186 provides the broadest and clear-
est articulation of the interpretation accorded SEP A by the Wash-
ington courts. The views expressed there originated in a line of 
case law that extends back to 1973.187 
In Polygon, an applicant for a building permit claimed that 
Because there are so few relevant state decisions, especially in comparison to federal 
case law development, those state court opinions examined will be accorded comprehensive 
treatment. 
185. Many of the Washington cases involve entities of local rather than state govern-
ment; however, that does not detract from the validity of these decisions because the Wash-
ington legislature explicitly provided that SEP A would apply to local agencies. See WASH. 
REv. CODE § 43.21C.030 (1970). 
These cases have special importance for Montana because the Montana Supreme Court 
looked to the decisional precedent of Washington for guidance in resolving the major MEPA 
case. See Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 
Mont. 477, 494, 559 P.2d 1157, 1166 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
186. 90 Wash.2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978). 
187. After holding that "SEPA confers substantive authority to the deciding agency to 
act on the basis of the [environmental] impacts disclosed," the Polygon court expressly 
stated that "this view was presaged by the Court of Appeals" in Juanita Bay Valley Com-
munity Ass'n v. Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59, 73, 510 P.2d 1140, 1149 (1973), petition for 
review denied, 83 Wash.2d 1002 (1973). In Kirkland, the court observed: 
The essential point is that SEPA requires the City, acting through its city council, 
actually to consider the various environmental factors. The change in the substan-
tive law brought about by SEPA introduces an element of discretion into the mak-
ing of decisions that were formerly ministerial, such that even if we assume, argu-
endo, that the issuance of a grading permit was prior to SEP A, a ministerial, 
nondiscretionary act, SEPA makes it legislative and discretionary. 
Id. Indeed, the supreme court itself had strongly indicated in a case decided earlier in 1973 
that SEPA provided agencies with substantive authority to deny permit applications where 
the activity contemplated would impose adverse environmental effects. See Stempel v. De-
partment of Water Resources, 82 Wash.2d 109, 118, 508 P.2d 166, 171-72 (1973). Similar 
expressions appear in an opinion rendered several months thereafter. See Eastlake Commu-
nity Council v. Roanoke Assoc., Inc., 82 Wash.2d 475, 492, 513 P.2d 36, 47 (1973). The 
Washington Supreme Court cited with approval the views espoused in Stempel and 
Eastlake again during that year. See Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wash.2d 754, 764, 513 P.2d 
1023, 1029 (1973). In 1976, this interpretation was reiterated. See Norway Hall Preservation 
and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash.2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976). 
The courts of Washington state also have expressly and consistently recognized that 
SEPA is "'supplementary' to existing authorizations" in a line of decisions extending back 
to 1973. See Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assoc., Inc., 82 Wash.2d 475, 492, 513 
P.2d 36, 47 (1973). Accord, Bellevue v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wash.2d 856, 
865, 586 P.2d 470, 476 (1978); Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wash.2d 78, 83, 569 P.2d 712, 
715-16 (1977); Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 
Wash.2d 271, 276, 525 P.2d 774, 778-80 (1974). 
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SEP A did not authorize denial of the permit where the applicant 
satisfied the substantive requirements of the legislation pursuant 
to which the permit would issue.188 The Washington Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected that argument and held that "SEP A 
confers substantive authority to the deciding agency to act on the 
basis of the [environmental] impacts disclosed."189 In response to 
the applicant's specific allegation that the act conferred no discre-
tion upon the agency,190 the court expressly stated that SEPA is 
supplementary to extant agency authorizations. The court ob-
served that the provision of that act, which is similar to section 105 
of NEPA and MCA § 75-1-105, "added to" the "authority" found 
in the permitting measure and that SEP A was intended to " 'over-
lay' the requirements which existed prior to its adoption."191 
188. Polygon first contends that SEPA does not create in the superintendent the 
authority to deny a building permit which he is otherwise directed to issue under 
applicable laws and regulations. . . . 
Procedurally, the environmental protection policy is to be implemented by 
the preparation and circulation of an environmental impact statement disclosing 
the environmental impacts of the proposed action. RCW 43.21C.030(2)(c). Poly-
gon urges that this procedural duty is all that SEPA requires. It contends that 
SEPA serves only an "informational" purpose and does not confer substantive 
authority to act with reference to the environmental impacts disclosed. 
Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 59, 63, 578 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1978). 
189. We have said that SEPA requires the disclosure and full consideration of 
environmental impacts in governmental decision making. . . . That mandate 
would be meaningless under the facts of this matter if the superintendent was 
powerless to decide in the manner that "full consideration of environmental im-
pacts" impelled. . . . 
We hold that SEPA confers on the City, acting through its superintendent of 
buildings, the discretion to deny a building permit application on the basis of ad-
verse environmental impacts disclosed by an EIS. 
Id. at 63-64, 65, 578 P.2d at 1312-13 (citation omitted). The court also observed that a 1977 
amendment to SEPA "strongly indicates [its holding] to be the legislature's view." Id. at 64, 
578 P.2d at 1312. That amendment cannot be taken to detract from the strength of the 
decision because the modification was, as the court noted, "not applicable to this case." Id. 
Moreover, the addition does not diminish the significance of the other important case de-
cided subsequent to its passage because the developer in that controversy also had applied 
for a permit prior to enactment of the amendment. See State v. Lake Lawrence Public 
Lands Protection Ass'n, 92 Wash.2d 656, 601 P.2d 494 (1979). However, the court there 
relied upon the amendment for several propositions. See note 194 infra. 
190. Polygon insists, however, that SEPA does not confer discretion here where 
prior to its enactment the superintendent's duties were ministerial. ... The Seat-
tle Municipal Coda § 3.03.020(e) provides in pertinent part: 
If the superintendent of buildings is satisfied that the work described in 
an application for permit and the plans filed therewith conform to the 
requirements of this Code and other perti[n]ent laws and ordinances 
. . . he shall issue a permit therefor to the applicant .... 
Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 59, 64-65, 578 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (1978). 
191. Id. RCW 43.21C.060, however, added to that authority [to grant a building 
permit] by providing: 
The policies and goals set forth in this chapter are supplementary to 
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In a very recent case, State v. Lake Lawrence Public Lands 
Protection Association, 191 the Washington Supreme Court reiter-
ated and further explicated its views. The issue there was very 
similar to the one presented in Polygon: whether a Board of 
County Commissioners had "authority to deny a preliminary plat 
on environmental grounds. "198 The court summarily stated that 
there "no longer [is] any question that a governmental decision-
making body whose deliberation is subject to the requirements of 
SEPA is empowered by that act to deny a permit application on 
environmental grounds" and that this "substantive aspect of 
SEPA [is] a supplement to all other statutory authorization."194 
The court found that the developer's specific contention-that sat-
isfaction of the platting measure's prescriptions required that the 
developer's application be approved-"misconstrues the nature of 
the SEPA mandate for environmental consideration:"196 
[T)he absence of environmental criteria from the platting statute 
is immaterial, for the obligation and authority to consider such 
matters is provided by SEPA. 
As we have repeatedly pointed out, SEPA is an overlay of 
law which supplements existing statutory authority. . . . Thus, 
it makes no difference that the platting statute does not provide 
explicit authority to deny the plat on environmental grounds, be-
cause SEPA does provide such authority.1" 
those set for th in existing authorizations of all branches of government 
of this state, including . . . municipal . . . corporations. . . . 
(Italics ours.) Thus, SEPA has been said to "overlay" the requirments which ex-
isted prior to its adoption. 
Id. at 65, 578 P.2d at 1313 (citation omitted). For a discussion of other Washington deci-
sions which recognize that SEPA is supplementary, see notes 187 supra & 194 infra. In 
Dunstan v. City of Seattle, 24 Wash. App. 265, 600 P.2d 674, 675-76 (1979), the Washington 
Appellate Court recently expounded upon the operations of SEP A, but added little to what 
was said in Polygon. 
192. 92 Wash.2d 656, 601 P.2d 494 (1979). 
193. Id. at_, 601 P.2d at 498. The platting statute included no specific environmen-
tal standards, but rather, required the Commissioners to "determine if 'the public use and 
interest will be served by the platting.' " Id. 
194. Id. (emphasis added). After relying primarily upon Polygon, the court does cite in 
a secondary way the amended provision of SEP A, discussed in note 189 supra, for two 
somewhat similar propositions. Id. However, the rather limited reliance placed upon this 
statutory provision certainly should not be taken to blunt the force of the remainder of the 
opinion. 
Id. 
195. Id. at-· 601 P.2d at 498. 
196. Id. (emphasis added). 
The Commissioners here were required by SEPA to consider the possible adverse 
impact of the proposed plat on the use of Wood Point for eagle perching and 
feeding, and were empowered by SEPA to deny the plat on the ground the ad-
verse impact was too great. 
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Finally, in explaining how the power of the Commissioners under 
the platting act was related to the authority of the Shorelines 
Hearing Board to issue a permit for development, the court had 
another opportunity to explain SEP A's effect: 
In making its determination whether a permit for development 
within the Shoreline may issue, the Board is subject to the man-
dates of SEPA to consider environmental concerns. . .. It is like-
wise empowered by SEPA to deny or condition the permit appli-
cation on the basis of specific adverse environmental effects 
discovered in the process of these deliberations.197 
Many of the earlier Washington decisions (which are only 
referred to in footnotes) construe SEP A in a manner quite similar 
to the two principal cases.188 In sum, the state courts of Washing-
ton have consistently, persuasively, and forcefully found that the 
environmental policy act of that jurisdiction empowers agencies to 
make decisions on the basis of considerations not expressly pro-
vided for in substantive legislation pursuant to which agencies are 
proceeding and that SEPA supplements extant agency 
authorizations. 
The question in City of Roswell v. New Mexico Water Quality 
Control Commission1" was more akin to that presented by Calvert 
Cliffs and Kalur v. Resor than the line of Washington state cases. 
However, the response of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was 
very similar to those of the Washington and federal courts. The 
state agency maintained that it was not subject to the New Mexico 
Environmental Quality Control Act (NMEQCA) because that 
" 'would in effect suspend, amend, or modify its authority to act 
Id. 
197. Id. at_, 601 P.2d at 499 (citations omitted). 
[T]he [Shoreline] Board's finding that the proposed plat was adequate to protect 
against adverse effects to the eagles . . . cannot bind the County Commissioners 
in their determination of an entirely different question-whether the preliminary 
plat should be approved. This conclusion follows from the limited and differing 
jurisdictions of the decision-making agencies, and from the unique nature of 
SEPA as a supplement to the statutory authority of each agency .... In sum-
mary, the environmental determinations mandated by SEPA are uniquely related 
to the particular decision being taken, and are conclusive only for that purpose. 
They are not binding on other decision-making bodies. . .. Such a result could 
contravene the clear intent of SEP A to infuse every governmental exercise of dis-
cretion with consideration of environmental amenities and values. 
198. See, e.g., Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 
87 Wash.2d 267, 277-78, 552 P.2d 674, 680 (1976). References to the other cases appear at 
note 187 supra. For decisions that fully suppart the interpretation of NEPA provided in 
section l(A)(l) of this article, see note 214 infra. 
199. 84 N.M. 561, 505 P.2d 1237 (1972), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 560, 505 P.2d 1236 (Ct. 
App. 1973). 
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pursuant to its specific statutory mandate' "200 and because it was 
an environmental control agency.101 Both arguments were summa-
rily dismissed. 209 The court stated that it could "see no apparent 
conflict with [the water pollution abatement] mandate and the re-
quirements of NMEQCA."108 In response to the commission's con-
tention-"that to elevate this section 'to the status of a condition 
precedent to the exercise of an agency's regulatory functions 
would, in effect, suspend, amend, or modify the authority of an 
agency to act pursuant to its specific statutory mandate pending 
performance of the obligations imposed' "-the court stated that 
"this is exactly what the legislature intended:"204 
This act requires that every agency or department consider, to 
the fullest extent possible under its statutory mandate, the effect 
that its action might have on the environment. Therefore, an 
agency or department is exempt from compliance only when there 
is a clear conflict of statutory mandate and then only to the ex-
tent of the confiict.1011 
The court replied to the same argument by observing that applica-
tion of the environmental policy act does "not stispend, amend or 
modify the authority of the Water Quality Control Commission" 
but "does add an additional requirement in the exercise of the 
Commission's authority."106 The court also rejected the agency's 
claim that "all that is required is that an agency keep environmen-
tal matters in mind:" 
Such is not the case. The requirements are strict and demanding. 
"To the fullest extent possible" throughout the decision-making 
process agencies must consider the environmental consequences 
of their proposed action.107 
In sum, the few state courts that have examined the precise 
question treated in this article have found that agencies must take 
200. Id. at 562, 505 P.2d at 1238. The commission argued that "it was not the inten-
tion of the legislature that it be subject to NMEQCA." Id. 
201. The agency contended that the "provisions of NMEQCA do not rationally apply 
to agencies or programs whose chief functions are regulation of the environment." Id. The 
Commission's substantive statutory mandate was basically water pollution control. 
202. The court "rejected the contention that [NMEQCA] does not apply to environ-
mental protection agencies and also rejected the contention that the Water Quality Act is in 
conflict with [NMEQCA]." Id. at 564, 505 P.2d at 1240. 
203. Id. at 564, 505 P.2d at 1239. 
204. Id. at 564-65, 505 P.2d at 1240. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. The New Mexico statute was repealed by 1974 N.M. Laws, Ch. 46 § 1. See 
generally Note, The Rise and Demise of the New Mexico Environmental Quality Act, "Lit-
tle NEPA," 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 400, 405-06 (1974). 
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into account in decisionmaking environmental factors not ex-
pressly mentioned in the legislation pursuant to which they are 
acting. 
2. Decisions Indirectly Addressing the Issue 
Because there is a dearth of case law development in the 
states, the number of courts that have indirectly confronted the 
question of agency authority is small. Nonetheless, additional sup-
port for the view that agencies are to consider all ecological im-
pacts may be found in those decisions where courts have inter-
preted the statutory language of "little NEP A's" or addressed the 
issue examined in this article in other less direct ways. 208 
The number of relevant opinions construing environmental 
policy acts is further limited by the fact that the wording of indi-
vidual statutes differs. However, courts in some jurisdictions have 
interpreted provisions of state legislation that are substantially 
similar to parts of NEPA and MEPA. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, in construing language "identical to NEPA's [section] 
102(2)(E),''208 has subscribed to the view expressed in section 
l(A)(l) of this article: 
The obligation imposed is greater than the ·simple taking into ac-
count of alternatives by the agency in its decision-making. The 
agency must "study, develop and describe" alternatives. Thor-
ough agency action is required.110 
That court, in a different case with the identical title, interpreted 
the prefatory wording, "to the fullest extent possible,'' as was done 
in section l(A)(l) above.111 The court also found that the Wiscon-
sin Environmental Policy Act was enacted for the general policy 
208. No line of decisional precedent comparable to that which follows Hanly v. Mitch-
ell has yet emerged at the state level. See generally § I(A)(2)(b) of this article supra. But cf. 
Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 44 Cal. App. 3d 158, 171, 118 
Cal. Rptr. 490, 498 (1974) (agency in considering application for building site permit must 
"take into account the total environmental impact"). 
209. Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wis.2d 161, 
174, 255 N.W.2d 917, 925 (1977). 
210. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
The purposes of this "study, develop and describe" requirement is [sic] to assure 
that alternatives are adequately explored in the initial decision-making process 
Id. at 175, 255 N.W.2d at 926. 
211. Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wis.2d 409, 
416, 438, 256 N.W.2d 149, 157, 160 (1977). The court relied upon that language to require 
the Public Service Commission to consider direct and indirect environmental effects of its 
ratemaking activities in deciding whether to. prepare an EIS. Id. at 429. 256 N.W.2d at 159-
60. 
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reason of effecting change in agency decisionmaking212 and that 
the state legislature meant to accomplish this result through ac-
tion-forcing procedures.213 The Washington Supreme Court has 
recognized that the same broad purpose underlies SEP A and has 
construed one of its provisions that is practically identical to sec-
tion 102(2)(B) of NEPA just as the national provision was inter-
preted in section l(A)(l) of this article.214 In terms much like those 
employed by the Washington court to describe the specific provi-
sion of SEPA, a New York opinion states that its "little NEPA" 
was intended to affect agency decisional processes. 2111 California 
212. The evident purpose of WEPA was to effect an across-the-board adjustment 
of priorities in the decision-making processes of agencies of state government. The 
Act constitutes a clear legislative declaration that protection of the environment is 
among the "essential considerations of state policy," and as such, is an essential 
part of the mandate of every state agency. 
Id. at 416, 256 N.W.2d at 153. 
213. Like its federal counterpart, WEPA contains a broad statement of govern-
mental commitment to the protection and enhancement of the environment . . . 
and imposes upon governmental agencies certain procedural obligations with re-
spect to their decision-making processes to assure that the substantive policies of 
the Act will be implemented. 
Id. (citations omitted). For thorough discussion of the Wisconsin statute, see Comment, 
Agency Decisionmaking Under the Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 
111. 
214. A very recent opinion illustrates the court's appreciation of the strong legislative 
mandate to protect the environment. In Asarco v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wash.2d 685, 
601 P.2d 501, 515 (1979), the supreme court declared that the purpose of the act was "not 
only to prevent further environmental degradation but to reverse, where possible, ecological 
damage already done." Moreover, the court went to great lengths in rejecting claims that a 
state agency was exempt from SEPA compliance either on the basis of a conflict between 
that statute and the Washington Clean Air Act or on the grounds that the procedures man-
dated in the air legislation provided the functional equivalent of an EIS. Id. at_, 601 P.2d 
at 516-18. Two other cases in which the court recognizes the policy implications of SEPA 
are Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash.2d 267, 
277, 552 P.2d 674, 680 (1976) and Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash.2d 
109, 118, 508 P.2d 166, 171 (1973). In Stempel, the court also spoke to the provision of its 
law that parallels section 102(2)(B): 
"Environmental amenities" will undoubtedly often conflict with "economic and 
technical considerations." In essence, what SEPA requires, is that the "presently 
unquantified environmental amenities and values will be given appropriate con-
sideration in decision making along with economic and technical considerations." 
Id. at 118, 508 P.2d at 172 (citations omitted). 
215. SEQRA [State Environmental Quality Review Act) was modeled after the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Its purpose was 
to intelligently assess and weigh environmental factors along with social, economic 
and other relevant considerations in determining whether or not a project or activ-
ity should be approved or undertaken. 
Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Bd. of Town of Tuxedo, 96 Misc.2d 1, 
408 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (1978), aff'd, 418 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1979). On appeal, even dissenting 
Justice Suozzi recognized that SEQRA was supplementary. Id. at_, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 649-
50. For discussions of the New York statute, see Comment, The New York State Environ-
mental Quality Act: An Overview and Analysis, 41 ALBANY L. REV. 293 (1977). 
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cases find that the same general policies apply to legislation passed 
there.216 
Decisions of very few jurisdictions address in other indirect 
ways the issue of agency authority. However, the judiciary in Cali-
fornia has required agencies to satisfy the procedural mandates of 
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)217 in several sit-
uations where the contention was made that compliance was 
unnecessary. 
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Arcata National 
Corporation, 218 the forestry industry claimed that the review and 
approval of timber harvesting plans under the Forest Practice Act 
(FPA) were exempt from the provisions of CEQA.219 The court 
first examined the two statutes and found them compatible. 220 The 
court also refused to "attach overriding significance" to the timber 
industry's contention that time discrepancies in the acts evinced 
legislative intent that environmental information reports (EIR's) 
not be prepared in connection with timber harvest plans. 221 The 
court then rejected the industry's argument that the "Forest Prac-
tice Act was the 'functional equivalent' of CEQA,," which would 
216. In Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal.2d 247, 
104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049 (1972), the California Supreme Criurt concluded that the 
"Legislature intended the EQA to be interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest 
possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory lan-
guage." Id. at 260, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 768, 502 P.2d at 1056. Accord, Wildlife Alive v. Chicker-
ing, 18 Cal.3d 190, 199, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 381, 553 P.2d 537, 541 (1976). 
The California cases also analyze agency consideration of alternatives in a manner simi-
lar to the interpretation presented in section l(A)(l) of this article. See, e.g., Wildlife Alive 
v. Chickering, 18 Cal.3d 190, 198, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 380, 553 P.2d 537, 540 (1976); Friends 
of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal.3d 247, 964 n.8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 
761, 771 n.8, 502 P.2d 1049, 1059, n.8 (1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Coastside 
County Water Dist., 27 Cal. App.3d 695, 705, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197; 202 (1972). 
217. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000 et seq. (1972). 
218. 59 Cal. App.3d 959, 131 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1976). ' · 
219. First, it is argued that in enacting the Forest Practice Act the Legislature 
demonstrated an intention not to require preparation of EIRs [Environmental In-
formation Reports] in conjunction with the review of timber harvesting plans 
. . . . Secondly, it is maintained that the Forest Practice Act, which is a compre-
hensive, self-contained regulatory system for the protection of the environment, is 
a "functional equivalent" of CEQA. 
Id. at 965, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 175. The Forest Practice Act, CAL. Pus. REs. CooE § 4511 et 
seq. (1972), provides for the review and approval of timber harvesting plans required to be 
submitted to the state forester. 
220. We entertain no doubt that the two acts in question are not in conflict, but 
rather supplement each other and, therefore, must be harmonized. . . . Since 
under the rules of interpretation we are to harmonize the two statutes, the provi-
sions of CEQA are deemed to be a part of the Forest Practice Act as well. 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Arcata, 59 Cal. App.3d 959, 966, 131 Cal. Rptr. 172, 
176 (1976). 
221. Id. at 973, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 180. 
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have rendered the requirements of the latter inapplicable. 222 One 
important reason for repudiation of this contention was the court's 
observation that the "test of 'functional equivalence' is met only if 
the . . . process outlined in the special legislation addresses the 
same issues as are addressed in ... CEQA."223 In comparing the 
procedures prescribed in CEQA and FP A, the court made some 
telling comments about the impact that CEQA was intended to 
have on agency consideration of environmental factors under sub-
stantive legislation. 2s. 
Most of the findings of the intermediate appellate court in Ar-
cata received the imprimatur of the California Supreme Court in 
Wildlife Alive v. Chickering. 2n The Fish and Game Commission 
argued that it was exempt from CEQA in fixing dates for hunting 
seasons,llll8 but the supreme court found that "both the express 
language and the apparent intent of CEQA require its application 
to the adoption of hunting regulations by the Commission."227 As 
in Arcata, the court carefully compared the procedural commands 
of the two relevant statutes and concluded that the "disparity be-
tween [their] respective demands . . . strongly suggests that the 
administrative procedures found in the Fish and Game Code were 
not intended as a substitute for compliance with CEQA."228 The 
court then rejected the agency's claim that temporal conflicts be-
tween the two measures indicated "legislative intent to exclude the 
Commission from application of [CEQA]."229 Finally, the court re-
222. Id. at 975, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 181. 
223. Id. at 975, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82 (citations omitted). 
224. While the Forest Practice Act contains numerous provisions to protect the 
soil, air, fish, wildlife, water resources and establishes minimum conservation stan-
dards for forest stocking and regeneration . . . there is no requirement whatever 
to comply with the crucial criteria laid down in section 21000 of CEQA. Espe-
cially, it is not required that the timber harvesting plan fully analyze and disclose 
the adverse environmental consequences of the proposed projects; that it provide 
reasonable alternatives to the proposed actions or that it recommend mitigation 
measures to minimize the impact of the proposed activities .... 
Id. at 976-77, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83 (citations omitted). 
225. 18 Cal.3d 190, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 553 P.2d 537 (1976). One particular issue con-
sidered in Arcata had been treated somewhat less comprehensively but quite similarly by 
the supreme court in Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm., 13 Cal.3d 263, 118 
Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017 (1975). In determining whether CEQA applied to the annexa-
tion activities of a Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO), an entity charged with 
environmental responsibilities by the statute creating it, the supreme court clearly found 
that CEQA and the formation statute should be harmonized. Id. at 283, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 
261, 529 P.2d at 1029-30. 
226. See F1sH AND GAME CODE § 200 et seq. (1958). 
227. Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal.3d 190, 207, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 386, 553 P.2d 
537, 546 (1976). 
228. Id. at 199, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 381, 553 P.2d at 541. 
229. Id. at 201, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 382, 553 P.2d at 542. 
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fused "to apply the 'functional equivalence' test."230 
Some California cases treat more tangentially the issue of 
agency authority considered in this article; however, the decisions 
discussed above are most relevant to the question. m Courts in 
other jurisdictions have either been silent or spoken so indirectly 
to the issue as to add little to this discussion. In sum, state courts 
addressing explicitly and less directly the precise problem treated 
here have indicated that agencies are to consider in their decisional 
processes ecological factors not found in their substantive 
mandates. 
C. The Montana Environmental Policy Act 
1. Legislative Intent 
During the 1960's, Montanans had become increasingly con-
cerned about the declining quality of their environment. One of 
the initial responses to this problem was enactment by the legisla-
ture of the Montana Environmental Policy Act in 1971.233 Al-
though little legislative history exists,Hs there can be no question 
that the Montana statute is based upon the national legislation. 
230. Id. at 203, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 383, 553 P.2d at 543. The court stated that the fed-
eral cases from which the test was derived "recognize an exemption only if the agency in 
question was primarily created for the protection of the environment" and only where the 
agency has prepared a "statement which constitutes a 'functional equivalent' of an environ-
mental impact report." Id. 
231. Thus, in the landmark case of Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of 
Mono County, 8 Cal.3d 247, 264 n.8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 776 n.8, 502 P.2d 1049, 1059 n.8 
(1972), the supreme court indicated that agencies may act upon adverse environmental im-
pacts that they discover. In Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 44 
Cal. App.3d 158, 171, 118 Cal. Rptr. 490, 498 (1974), the court added that agency "failure to 
consider the total environmental impact led, in turn, to a failure to analyze the project in 
terms of . . . unavoidable adverse environmental effects, mitigation measures, and feasible 
alternatives." Id. 
232. MEPA was touted as one of the most important measures passed by the legisla-
tive assembly that year: 
One of the major actions of the 1971 legislature, with long-term significance for 
the future of the state, was enactment of the Montana Environmental Policy Act. 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT iv (1972). This observation ap-
peared in the preface of the report and was written by Representative George Darrow, 
Chairman of the Environmental Quality Council, and chief sponsor of the act. The Montana 
Supreme Court has recognized that "Montana's Environmental Policy Act . . . is a broadly 
worded policy enactment in response to growing public concern over the innumerable forms 
of environmental degradation occuring in modern society." Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. 
Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 Mont. 477, 500, 559 P.2d 1157, 1169 
(1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
233. The Montana legislative assembly, like its counterparts in most other states, does 
not produce, record, or maintain much legislative history. Minutes, which are more in the 
nature of notes than verbatim transcripts, are taken of the committee meetings; and they 
are stored at the Montana Historical Society in Helena. 
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The language of MEPA and NEPA are almost identical.234 In testi-
fying before the House Committee on Environment and Resources, 
the chief sponsor of the measure observed that those sections of 
MEPA which "dealt with the responsibility of state agencies for 
protecting the environment ... were taken directly from the na-
tional policy act."2311 Finally, the Montana Supreme Court has 
flatly stated that "MEP A is modeled after NEPA. "1138 
There are only two differences of any significance between the 
language of the federal and state laws.237 The first appears in MCA 
§ 75-1-103(3), where the Montana legislature explicitly declared 
that "each person shall be entitled to a healthful environment,"238 
in contrast to the significantly weaker phraseology of the national 
legislation.139 The second difference, in MCA § 75-1-201(2)(e), re-
quires agencies of the state to recognize only the "national" rather 
than the "worldwide" character of environmental problems in pro-
viding support for "initiatives, resolutions and programs designed 
to maximize national," rather than "international, cooperation in 
234. For a comparison of the phraseology of the two statutes, see notes 237-40 and 
accompanying text infra. 
235. Minutes of State House of Representatives Committee on Environment and Re-
sources, January 14, 1971. What transpires in committee meetings, as reflected in the min-
utes, is very much a function of the minute taker's capability to accurately select, interpret, 
and record what has happened. Thus, the material appears vulnerable to attack on several 
grounds. The Montana Supreme Court, however, has relied upon these minutes. See State v. 
Coleman, _ Mont. _, 605 P.2d 1000, 1006 (1979). Cf. State v. Helfrich, _ Mont. _, 600 
P.2d 816, 818 (1979) (reliance upon statement of delegate who introduced proposed section 
of state constitution). 
236. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 
Mont. 477, 506, 559 P.2d 1157, 1172 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting). Accord, Kadillak v. 
Anaconda Co.,_ Mont._, 602 P.2d 147, 153 (1979). In the first case, the supreme court 
added that "Montana's Environmental Policy Act was enacted in 1971 and is patterned 
after the National Environmental Policy Act." Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of 
Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 Mont. 477, 500, 559 P.2d 1157, 1169 (1976) (Has-
well, J., dissenting). 
237. There are, of course, numerous substitutions that reflect the respective level of 
government. Compare MCA§ 75-1-103(2) (1979) with 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1977). Moreover, 
several minor technical changes were made. Compare MCA § 75-1-201(1)(c) (1979) with 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1977). 
It is interesting to note that the provision of MEP A as originally enacted, which re-
quired agencies to review their statutory authority for discrepancies and propose changes, 
was deleted subsequent to the review of the Montana Code Commission. Compare R.C.M. 
1947, § 69-6505 (Supp. 1977) with MCA § 75-1-101 et seq. (1979). 
238. MCA § 75-1-103(3) (1979). The language employed is quite similar to that used in 
Article II, Section 3 of the Montana Constitution. See section II of this article infra. 
239. The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environ-
ment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation 
and enhancement of the. environment. 
42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1977). Section 102(b) of the Senate Bill, which was similar to the Mon-
tana provisions, was modified in conference. See 115 CONG. REC. 40416 (1969) (remarks of 
Senator Jackson). 
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anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's 
world environment. "240 
Despite periodic attempts to repeal the act,241 the statute was 
not even amended until 1979, when the legislative assembly specif-
ically exempted one state agency from NEPA compliance when 
performing certain functions. 20 During the same session, efforts 
also were made to codify the position now adopted by the Montana 
agencies, as well as the interpretation espoused in this article; how-
ever, both attempts failed. 248 
Because the Montana legislature has adopted whole cloth the 
wording in the national act, Congressional intent and federal case 
law should be accorded considerable importance in construing 
MEP A. 244 By enacting verbatim the provisions of the national stat-
240. Compare MCA § 75-1-201(2)(e) (1979) with 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1977). This 
section of MEPA is troubling because Montana shares a common border, and many environ-
mental problems, with three Canadian provinces. 
241. See, e.g., S.B. 332, 44th Montana Legislature (1975). 
242. The department of public service regulation, in the exercise of its regulatory 
authority over rates and charges of railroads, motor carriers, and public utilities, is 
exempt from the provisions of this chapter. 
MCA § 75-1-201(4) (1979). The testimony respecting costs of MEPA compliance given by a 
department employee at a hearing on the provision may have persuaded the legislative as-
sembly. William J. Opitz submitted a prepared statement, alleging that a "core environmen-
tal group [seven people) would cost the general fund approximately $135,000 per year," to 
the Business and Industry Committee of the Montana Senate on March 9, 1979. Passage of 
this amendment, which shows that the legislature knew how to excuse agency compliance 
when it wanted to, arguably manifests legislative intent that no other agencies are meant to 
be exempt. In 1974, a measure was introduced that would have required agencies to prepare 
economic impact statements. See H.R. 612, 43rd Montana Legislature (1974). However, a 
compromise, in the nature of a resolution calling for "thorough economic analysis in envi-
ronmental impact statements," was reached. See H.R. J. REs. No. 73, 1974 Mont. Laws 1570 
(1974). 
243. Compare S.B. 506 with H.R. 742, 46th Montana Legislature (1979). It is always 
difficult to draw reliable conclusions from failure of a legislative body to enact proposals. 
See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 121 (1940); United States v. Southern Under-
writers Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1944). This is especially true where two bills purporting 
to have the opposite effect were rejected. Perhaps the only conclusion that can be drawn is 
that the legislative assembly intended to leave this issue to judicial resolution. 
244. Montana, like many other states, subscribes to the well-established general prin-
ciple of statutory interpretation that the "construction put upon statutes by the courts of 
the state from which they are borrowed is entitled to respectful consideration, and . . . only 
strong reasons will warrant a departure from it." Ancient Order of Hiberians v. Sparrow, 29 
Mont. 132, 135, 74 P. 197, 198 (1903). More specifically, the Montana Supreme Court has 
applied that doctrine to MEPA: 
Because MEP A is modeled after NEPA, it is appropriate to look to the federal 
interpretation of NEPA. 
Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 Mont. 477, 
506, 559 P.2d 1157, 1172 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting). Accord, Kadillak v. Anaconda Co., 
_Mont._, 602 P.2d 147, 153 (1979). Courts in other jurisdictions have treated the ques-
tion similarly. See, e.g., Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assoc., Inc., 82 Wash.2d 
475, 488 n.5, 513 P.2d 36, 45 n.5 (1973); No Oil, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 13 Cal.3d 68, 86 n.21, 
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ute, the legislative assembly should he taken to have intended, as 
did Congress, that agencies consider in decisionmaking ecological 
impacts not mentioned in the legislation under which they are act-
ing. This legislative purpose is manifested in the state environmen-
tal policy and goals expressly provided for in section 103 of MEP A, 
which are "supplementary to those set forth in existing authoriza-
tions of all hoards, commissions and agencies of the state," as 
stated in section 105. The intent is evidenced as well in the com-
mands of section 102 that all agencies are to "interpret and admin-
ister" the "policies, regulations and laws of the state" in accor-
dance with the environmental policy and goals of section 103 and 
to undertake comprehensive analysis of all ecological effects of 
agency decisions. These mandates are to be followed by the agen-
cies "to the fullest extent possible," except where they are prohib-
ited from doing so by a clear conflict of statutory authority, in 
which event such discrepancies were to be reported to the Gover-
nor and the Environmental Quality Council (EQC) by July 1, 1972, 
so that corrective action could he taken.2411 State agencies simply 
have not implemented satisfactorily these express commands of 
MEPA.246 
2. Agency Implementation 
a. The Early Years: 1971 to 1974 
Implementation of the Montana statute between 1971 and 
1974 was marked by considerable variation among state agencies 
and some recalcitrance. The act, which became law on March 9, 
1971, created a 13-member Environmental Quality Council.247 The 
118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 46 n.21, 529 P.2d 66, 78 n.21 (1974); Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, 
Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wis.2d 161,174, 255 N.W.2d 917, 925 (1977). 
245. The intent that agencies fully consider all environmental impacts is strongly rein-
forced in Montana by the special recognition accorded the right of "each person to a clean 
and healthful environment" in section 103(3) of MEPA, MCA § 75-1-103 (1979). 
246. This assessment is based upon the historical survey that follows. However, cave-
ats are in order. The study is not meant to be definitive but rather is a good faith attempt to 
provide, through examination of available secondary sources and interviews with some who 
participated in implementation, a general narrative. For more thorough discussion, the 
reader may wish to consult the written sources upon which this account is based. See S. 
PERLMUTTER, THE MONTANA ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT THE FIRST FIVE YEARS (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as s. PERLMUTTER]; ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
COUNCIL; Sharon M. Solomon, The Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA): An Over-
view (1974) (unpublished masters thesis, University of Montana, a copy of which is on file at 
the Reserve Desk, Mansfield Library, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Solomon]. 
247. MCA § 5-16-101 et seq. (1979). The EQC is primarily a creature of, and responsi-
ble to, the legislature. For a description of its functions and responsibilities, see MCA § 75-
1-301 et seq. (1979). The council is not explicitly directed to oversee MEPA implementation. 
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council began operating on September 1, 1971, with a small staff 
that assumed major responsibility for coordination of MEPA ad-
ministration within the state agencies. The EQC promulgated in-
terim guidelines for preparation of environmental impact state-
ments on October 7, 1971, and published revised interim guidelines 
on July 21, 1972.z.&8 
The effect of this guidance on agency operations is difficult to 
assess; many agencies apparently acted pursuant to internal proce-
dures without promulgating regulations, while others followed the 
EQC guidelines. 249 In the council's First Annual Report, the EQC 
characterized as "uncertain and incomplete" early attempts of 
agencies to comply with the impact statement requirement2110 and 
cited a few examples of agency failure to take into account envi-
ronmental considerations in decisionmaking. 2111 The council also 
noted that, "as of June 30, 1972, six agencies had filed 64 EIS's 
covering a wide range of action. "2112 
Agency reluctance to follow the commands of MEPA was evi-
denced by the poor response to the requirement that agencies re-
view their authority for inconsistencies with the act and report to 
the Governor and the EQC by July 1, 1972.2118 During the first year 
of MEP A administration, recalcitrance also was exhibited by those 
agencies which alleged that the environmentally protective nature 
of their statutory mandates should exempt them from compliance 
with the act.104 
See MCA § 75-1-324 et seq. (1979). However, like the Council on Environmental Quality at 
the federal level, the EQC has filled the breach, assuming considerable responsibility. for 
administration of the Montana measure. 
248. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 126 (1972). The revised 
guidelines appear at 170-7 4. 
249. Id. at 126. Accord, Solomon, supra note 246, at 19-20. 
250. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 128 (1972). Cf. S. PERL-
MUTTER, supra note 246, at 6-7 (agency unc;ertainty as to proper function of EIS). 
251. In some instances the EIS is an ·after-the-fact exercise used to justify deci-
sions already made. Consideration of alternatives is frequently inadequate. . . 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 128 (1972). 
252. Id. at 127. A list appears at 175. 
253. See id. at 129. An agency that failed to conduct this review and propose appropri-
ate changes, or which conducted the review and found no discrepancies, could arguably be 
estopped from relying upon such a conflict in the future. Cf. note 237 supra (Code Commis-
sion deletion of MEPA provision mandating agency review of authority). 
254. There is some support for this position in the legislative history at the federal 
level. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 40423, 40425 (1969) (remarks of Senator Muskie); Id. at 
40925 (remarks of Representative Dingell). Moreover, "a court developed exception for EPA 
regulatory activities providing 'the functional equivalent of an impact statement,' has been 
cautiously but consistently applied." W. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 765 (citations omitted). 
Accord, note 84 supra. The question remains, however, whether this limited rule would ap-
ply to any Montana agencies and its application would be especially troubling with respect 
to agencies such as the Department of State Lands, which apparently claimed that it was an 
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Although many agencies now espouse the view that MEPA 
does not compel them to consider ecological factors other than 
those found in their substantive legislation, there is little evidence 
that any agency did so during the initial year of MEP A implemen-
tation. However, in March, 1973, the Department of Health and 
Environmental Sciences claimed that it lacked authority to deny a 
permit to construct a powerplant on grounds not expressly pro-
vided for in the air pollution statute, and the Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation assumed a similar position 
with respect to its authority in August, 197 4. tH The council revised 
its guidelines again in September, 1973.968 Through the end of that 
year, the EQC seemed to vacillate "between viewing the guidelines 
as a service to state agencies and of having the force of law. "9117 
environmentally protective agency. Cf. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1971) 
(rejection of contention that Corps of Engineers was an agency dedicated to environmental 
protection and thus exempt from NEPA). 
255. The Department of Health stated that "over 3000 responses [had] been received 
commenting directly or indirectly on the draft [environmental impact] statement, mostly in 
opposition to the construction" and concluded that the "long-term adverse effects may well 
outweigh the short term gains." MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCI-
ENCES, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE PROPOSED MONTANA POWER COM-
PANY ELECTRICAL GENERATING PLANT AT COLSTRIP, MONTANA ii-iii (1973). As to its authority, 
however, the department noted: 
Although MEP A requires this agency to assess all forseeable impacts that might 
result from construction of the proposed plant, issuance of the requested permit is 
contingent only upon adequate demonstration by the applicant of the ability to 
prevent illegal air pollution. To date, research by the State and the applicant has 
not indicated that illegal air pollution would result. 
Id. at i. 
The Department of Natural Resources and Conservation prepared an EIS on a water 
use permit application for a project that could have had severe adverse effects on water 
quality in the stream and possibly resulted in the dewatering of the creek downstream. The 
department apparently was constrained by the Water Use Act, MCA § 85-2-101 et seq. 
(1979), which provides that permits are to be granted for beneficial uses whenever unappro-
priated water is available: 
Consequently, it appears that the Department's immediate legal obligation is to 
grant a permit for that amount of water, over and above that required for existing 
rights, which can be put to beneficial use-even if the result is dewatering of the 
stream. 
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL REsoURCES AND CONSERVATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE PRICKLY PEAR CREEK WATER DIVERSION PROPOSAL 38 (1974). This 
position was adopted, even though the EIS referred to MEP A several times and noted: 
Environmental quality is unquestionably a valid concern, and there are convincing 
arguments which support denying a water use permit solely on the basis of envi-
ronmental quality. However, the legality of such an action has not been firmly 
established. 
Id. at 39. 
256. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY COUNCIL, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 85-89 (1973). That re-
port also includes a list of documents submitted in compliance with MEPA. Id. at 50. 
257. See Solomon, supra note 246, at 58, citing a memorandum from EQC to Agency 
Heads of August 6, 1973, for the first proposition and remarks of R. Klinger, attorney for 
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However, in 1974, the council decided to attempt to enforce 
them.3118 
b. The Years of Ferment: 1974 to 1976 
The EQC argued that its guidelines had binding effect; but, in 
1975, that position was rejected by a state trial court.2H In re-
sponse to that decision and the failure of many agencies to issue 
procedural guidelines, the Governor created on April 30, 1975, a 
"Commission on Environmental Quality [CEQ] to promulgate uni-
form rules for implementation of the Montana Environmental Pol-
icy Act. "H0 The. commission drafted proposed rules, based upon 
the guidelines of the federal Council on Environmental Quality, in 
the summer of 1975, held a public hearing on November 17, 1975, 
and solicited written submissions during a comment period that 
closed on November 21, 1975.181 In January, 1976, the Montana 
CEQ adopted a final uniform version of the proposed rules imple-
menting MEP A, and many state agencies promulgated procedural 
regulations drawn almost verbatim from those rules during the re-
mainder of that year. H 2 
EQC, at an Environmental Asse88ment Seminar on November 13, 1973, for the second. 
258. During 1974, the EQC began reviewing EIS's to determine whether the docu-
ments were in compliance with the council's guidelines. Interview with G. Steven Brown, 
former head of the Montana Commi88ion on Environmental Quality (March 5, 1980). 
259. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Land Commissioners, 1st Judicial District 
of Montana, No. 38544 (1975). In response to the question of "whether.the EQC's guidelines 
are binding on and enforceable against the agencies of the State government," the district 
court stated that the council had "no apparent authority to require anybody to do any-
thing." Id. at 6-7. Thus, it was incumbent upon the executive branch to develop procedural 
rules implementing MEPA. Id. at 8. The court also made some gratuitous comments about 
MEPA implementation: 
A search by the Court of the Montana Administrative Code has failed to re-
veal any duly adopted rules by either EQC or any Department or agency having to 
do with MEP A environmental impact statements. . . . 
I would add in passing that MEP A is now more than four years old . . . . In 
that time, neither the EQC nor the executive or legislative branches of the state 
government have developed a workable system for effective enforcement of its 
provisions. 
Id. at 7-9. 
260. Exec. Order No. 4-75 (1975). The commission was comprised of the Directors of 
the Montana Departments of Health and Environmental Sciences, State Lands, and Natu-
ral Resources and Conservation and of the Montana Fish and Game Commission, as well as 
G. Steven Brown, an advisor to the Governor on environmental matters, who was appointed 
head. 
261. See Summary of Testimony and Recommendations of the Hearing Officer in the 
matter of the Adoption of Rules Implementing the Montana Environmental Policy Act 1 
(1975). 
262. See, e.g., Administrative Rules of Montana § 36-2.2(6)-P200 through -P280 
(1976). 
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On November 29, 1976, the EQC published a staff report enti-
tled "The Montana Environmental Policy Act The First Five 
Years," which remains the most reliable critical analysis of the 
act's implementation.168 Some of the conclusions reached in that 
report are disturbing. The council staff found that MEPA adminis-
tration generally was marked by considerable misunderstanding 
about the effect of the act on agency decisionmaking.164 More spe-
cifically, there was much uncertainty regarding the purpose of im-
pact statement preparation. Ha The most troubling conclusions, 
however, are those respecting the impact of MEPA on existing 
statutory authority of state agencies: 
There is general confusion as to MEPA's effect on an agency's 
authority to grant or deny a permit. If other, more specific stat-
utes would allow for permit approval, agencies are reluctant to 
deny the permit on MEPA grounds, regardless of the severity of 
environmental harm which may result .... 188 [T]he most perva-
sive obstacle to effective implementation of MEP A in the permit 
process [is] the lack of consistent definition of agency authority. 
When agencies grant or deny permits or licenses they are operat-
ing under specific statutory authorizations which, in most cases, 
set out conditions for granting or denying permits. Agencies hesi-
263. There simply has been very little dependable critical evaulation of MEPA admin-
istration. There is the masters thesis, supra note 246, but it is more descriptive than analyt-
ical. There are indications in other sources. See, e.g., the legislative responses, at notes 241-
43 and accompanying text supra; the Annual Reports of the Environmental Quality Council. 
But these are certainly not comprehensive or systematic and are subject to varying 
interpretations. 
Thus, the EQC staff report probably is the most reliable source; however, that study is 
vulnerable to criticism on quite a few grounds. The report was prepared by a staff member 
of the entity which as been the most vigorous proponent of rigorous MEP A implementation. 
Little explanation of the methodology for analyzing administration of the act is given, and 
the conclusions reached often appear impressionistic and subjective. However, those who 
prepared the report do openly admit the perspective employed: "If this discussion has 
tended to overemphasize the problems, it is because the report is aimed at searching for 
solutions." S. PERLMUTTER, supra note 246, at 25. 
264. See id. at 5-7, 14, 24. 
265. Agencies are preparing EISs, and can be forced to do so by a court of law. 
But since the responsibility for policy implementation is unclear and the other 
action-forcing provisions in Section 69-6504 have been ignored, no one is quite 
sure what the proper function of an impact statement is, what it should contain, 
or what should be done with it once it is prepared and presented to the agency 
decisionmakers. . . . 
The EIS is therefore relegated to a subordinate role; it is a descriptive docu-
ment, a compilation of data, a defense against litigation. But it is not an integral 
part of the decisionmaking process. It is seen by agency personnel as an unwanted 
and irrelevant burden imposed on them by a legislature which does not under-
stand their problems. 
Id. at 6, 24. 
266. Id. at 7. 
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tate to rely on the policy statements and directives of MEP A as a 
basis for decisionmaking, pref erring to limit their considerations 
to the range of factors set out in the specific permit-authorizing 
statute.187 
Finally, the assessments of the act's efficacy by the staff are 
problematic: 
In many cases, MEPA's only effect is to delay the announcement 
of decisions, which are made without regard to MEPA's policies 
in any event, until an impact statement is prepared .... 188 
[T]he environmental impact statement becomes a meaningless 
exercise in data compilation, designed to avoid litigation and to 
support decisions which are made on other than MEPA grounds. 
In this context, it is not surprising that EIS's are viewed by most 
agency personnel as a cumbersome, expensive, and superfluous 
burden.189 
Despite the deliberately hypercritical focus of the staff's anal-
ysis, the report does state that "MEP A has had a significantly 
healthy impact. "170 The staff found that "first and foremost, 
MEPA has gone a long way towards opening up the decisionmak-
ing processes in state government. "171 Moreover, the report attrib-
uted significant changes in numerous proposed agency actions to 
the act.371 The chapter entitled "MEPA and the Permit Process" 
concludes on a cautiously optimistic note: 
Compared with the pre-MEPA situation, then, progress has been 
made toward more responsible decisionmaking. Compared with 
the potential impacts of MEP A, however, and the urgent needs 
267. Id. at 14. Confusion about the effect of MEPA on extant agency power may have 
emanated from the highest levels of state government. In a letter to the Executive Director 
of the EQC in 1976, the Governor revealed some misunderstanding of the environmental 
policy statute: 
[D]uring the five year history of the Act ... there has been legitimate and ex-
pressed disagreement over the impact of MEPA on the executive branch's deci-
sion-making authority. The executive branch has been caught between the general 
mandate of MEP A and the specific limitations on executive branch authority pro-
posed by the Legislature in specific laws. The Legislature has passed legislation 
which specifically limits the authority of the executive branch to make decisions in 
the issuance of licenses, contracts, permits and leases. 
Letter from Thomas L. Judge to John W. Reuss (Aug. 20, 1976). 
268. S. PERLMUTI'ER, supra note 246, at 15. 
269. Id. at 8. 
270. Id. at 25. "It would be a mistake to assume that MEPA has had no positive ef-
fects on the permit activities of state agencies." Id. The authors readily admit: "If this dis-
cussion has tended to overemphasize the problems, it is because the report is aimed at 
searching for solutions." Id. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. at 25-26. 
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still to be addressed, we have barely begun. 273 
c. MEPA Implementation After the Beaver Creek Decision 
In July, 1976, the Montana Supreme Court issued the first 
opinion in which it analyzed the effect of MEPA on agency deci-
sionmaking under other state laws. In Montana Wilderness Asso-
ciation v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences,274 the su-
preme court expansively interpreted the act, finding that MEP A 
requires agencies to consider fully all environmental impacts of 
their decisions. 2711 ·That broad reading of the statute, and agency 
adoption of new guidelines during 1976, seemed to bode well for 
improved MEPA implementation. However, just when it appeared 
as if the act might be accorded the rigorous application that the 
legislative assembly contemplated,278 this expectation was dashed 
by the issuance, upon rehearing, of a second opinion that com-
pletely reversed the earlier decision. 277 Many state agencies quickly 
seized upon the December, 1976, opinion to fashion what has be-
come the present agency stance respecting the relationship be-
tween MEPA and other statutory authorizations. 278 
273. Id. Those who compiled the report also concluded that compliance with MEPA 
was significantly better where an agency intended to take action than"when an agency re-
views a project designed by a private applicant." Id. at 8. 
274. 171 Mont. 477, 559 P.2d 1157 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting). The decision re-
ferred to in the text was issued in July, 1976, and is the first opinion rendered in the case. 
Upon rehearing, the supreme court reversed the initial decision in December of that year, 
and the majority opinion in the first case became the dissenting opinion in the second. In 
this article, the second decision is referred to as the majority opinion and the first as the 
dissenting opinion. For comprehensive discussion of the Beaver Creek decisions, so named 
for the subdivision involved in the litigation, see section l(C)(3) of this article infra. 
275. Montana's Environmental Policy Act . . . is a broadly worded policy enact-
ment in response to growing public concern over the innumerable forms of envi-
ronmental degradation occurring in modern society. 
Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 Mont. 477, 
500, 559 P.2d 1157, 1169 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
[W]e find simply that the Revised EIS does not sufficiently consider and balance 
the full range of environmental factors required under the terms of MEP A. 
Id. at 515, 559 P.2d at 1176. For thorough analysis of this decision which became the dis-
senting opinion in Beaver Creek, see section l(C)(3) of this article infra. 
276. Some agencies apparently were on the "verge of changing" in response to the July 
decision of the supreme court. Interview with Steven J. Perlmutter, former attorney for the 
EQC and author of the report on MEPA cited at note 246 supra (March 13, 1980). 
277. The decision of the Court today deals a mortal blow to environmental pro-
tection in Montana. With one broad sweep of the pen, the majority has reduced 
constitutional and statutory protections to a heap of rubble, ignited by the false 
issue of local control. 
Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 Mont. 477, 
486, 559 P.2d 1157, 1161 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
278. The position of the Department of State Lands is as follows: 
The Department of State Lands as an agency of the State of Montana, acting 
244 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
The only other significant activity relating to administration 
of the act began in March, 1978, when the CEQ was reestablished 
for the purpose of formulating revised uniform rules for MEPA im-
plementation.279 The commission completed its work in May, 1979, 
at which time the state agencies with major responsibility for ad-
ministering the statute published notices proposing to adopt new 
rules based on the efforts of the CEQ. A public hearing was held 
on August 30, 1979, and the comment period remained open until 
September 14, 1979.280 Thereafter, the agencies reviewed the mate-
rial submitted and reported to the CEQ on December 10. The com-
mission subscribed to the suggestions of the agencies and recom-
mended to them in turn that they adopt the revised rules 
implementing MEP A. Many agencies did so on January 17, 
pursuant to laws passed by the Montana Legislature must be governed by such 
state law as interpreted by the Montana Supreme Court. The Montana Supreme 
Court in Montana Wilderness Association . . . held that the Montana Environ-
mental Policy Act is not regulatory in nature. The court withdrew an earlier opin-
ion which held that MEPA authorized an agency to take into consideration envi-
ronmental factors other than those specifically contained in the permitting 
legislation. 
ASARCO has applied for a permit under the Hard Rock Act. The Depart-
ment is mandated to issue the permit unless it is demonstrated that reclamation 
cannot be accomplished or that air and water quality standards will be violated. 
These are the only grounds the Department may use in denying a permit. 
Although MEP A requires that the impact on wildlife and the overall social 
and economic impact on the community be brought to the attention of the deci-
sion-maker and the public, it does not authorize denial of the application on these 
grounds. The Legislature could certainly make such a provision, but it has not 
done so. 
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF STATE LANDS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE 
PROPOSED PLAN OF MINING AND RECLAMATION FOR TROY PROJECT ASARCO INC., LINCOLN 
COUNTY, MONTANA 113-14 (1978). The position of the Department of Health and Environ-
mental Sciences is similar: 
The "Beaver Creek South" case indicates that the department's substantive deci-
sion-making authority to approve or deny subdivisions is limited to a considera-
tion of whether proposed water supply, sewage disposal and solid waste disposal 
systems are adequate to protect public health and prevent water pollution. 
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE SKI YELLOWSTONE SUBDIVISION, GALLATIN COUNTY, MONTANA 1 
(1979). The Montana Department of Fish and Game accorded MEPA a similar interpreta-
tion when considering an application for a zoo and menagerie permit under MCA§ 87-4-801 
et seq. (1979). See MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, PRELIMINARY ENVIRONMENTAL 
REVIEW FOR THE SNAKE PIT, A TOURIST ATrRACTION 5 (1977). 
The interpretation now espoused by the Montana agencies may very well be an unwar-
ranted extension of the Beaver Creek decision. It is certainly arguable that the applicability 
of the opinion should be limited to the Department of Health and only when it is acting 
pursuant to the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act. The court did not, and probably could not, 
bind other agencies in conducting their activities under different regulatory schemes. 
279. Exec. Order No. 4-78 (1978). 
280. See Mont. Admin. Reg. 88 (Jan. 17, 1980). 
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1980.281 Oddly enough, however, there is no reference to the precise 
question of agency authority in those rules. 
In summary, examination of the evaluation of MEPA adminis-
tration that has been done, as well as the action and inaction of 
the agencies themselves, leads inexorably to the conclusion that 
the act has not been particularly well implemented. Much of the 
difficulty can be attributed to a basic reluctance on the part of the 
agencies. 282 To be sure, some agencies and many state employees 
hav.e performed admirably in the face of significant adversity.288 
Moreover, officials in the legislative and judicial branches of gov-
ernment, as well as the Governor, must share the blame. First, the 
legislature has provided inadequate guidance for agencies, has ap-
propriated insufficient resources to permit proper administration 
' of the act, and has undertaken too little oversight to insure that 
MEPA has been implemented in accord with its intent. Second, 
the judiciary has not always interpreted the act in a manner which 
guarantees that "important legislative purposes heralded in the 
halls of the [legislative assembly] are not lost or misdirected in the 
vast hallways of the [state] bureaucracy."28' Fini:tlly, the Governor 
probably has not provided sufficient policy guidance or adequate 
281. The Departments of State Lands, Natural Resources and Conservation, and 
Health and Environmental Sciences promulgated regulations. See id. at 88, 124, 80, 
respectively. 
282. Some officials at the higher levels of state agencies have exhibited a distaste for 
MEPA as a matter of policy, and thus have not been concerned whether the act was imple-
mented properly. Others in the upper echelons, as well as many at lowers levels, have no 
doubt viewed MEPA as a nuisance to be tolerated and one which complicates achievement 
of primary agency missions. All of these factors, of course, mean that few rewards accom-
pany effective implementation of the act. Finally, sheer lack of resources simply may dictate 
that higher priority be accorded other agency responsibilities. 
283. The writers, as employee and student respectively of a state institution, are 
acutely aware of, and sensitive to, the severe fiscal constraints under which many Montana 
public servants labor. Cf. Solomon, supra note 246, at 67-68 (lack of adequate funding de-
terminative factor in narrow MEPA implementation); note 242 supra (assertion that assem-
bling a core team to prepare EIS's would cost the Department of Public Service Regulation 
$135,000). 
Many public servants in state government are competent individuals who make good 
faith efforts under less than ideal conditions. Cf. Cramton, The Why, Where and How .of 
Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 529 (1972) 
(regulators in federal government are "generally persons of ability who are trying to do the 
best job they can under difficult circumstances"). Moreover, significant advances have been 
made in some areas of MEPA implementation. For example, the quality of EIS preparation 
has improved markedly. Furthermore, even the admittedly hypercritical EQC analysis of the 
act's administration found some encouraging signs. See notes 270-72 and accompanying text 
supra. 
284. The allusion is to Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). 
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coordination for the executive branch agencies.2811 
In the end, however, it is simply impossible to ignore the lack 
of enthusiasm with which agencies pursued MEP A implementation 
in the early 1970's, especially when contrasted with the warm re-
ception accorded the Beaver Creek decision in the latter years of 
the decade. Most troubling, though, is the lingering impression 
that agencies view the act as something to be tolerated; that they 
consider impact statement preparation a worthless exercise in data 
collection; and that agency decisionmaking on actions that have 
important environmental impacts has not changed significantly.188 
3. Decisions of the Montana Supreme Court Interpreting MEPA 
The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted MEP A only 
twice.287 The first and principal decision is, of course, Montana 
Wilderness Association v. Board of Health and Environmental 
Sciences. 288 That case is truly an anomaly: it. is two opinions in 
one. The first decision was rendered in July 1976; but, upon re-
hearing, the court reversed its position and the initial opinion be-
came the dissent. 289 
The dispute in the Beaver Creek case involved the effect of 
MEP A on decisionmaking by the Department of Health and Envi-
285. In the letter from the Governor to the Executive Director of the EQC mentioned 
in note 264 supra, the Governor evinced misunderstanding of MEPA. The letter from the 
Executive Director, which elicited the Governor's response, also clearly expressed EQC con-
cern about the agencies' interpretation of MEPA's effect on their authority to act under 
substantive legislation. See notes 266-67 and accompanying text supra; Letter from John W. 
Reuss to Thomas L. Judge (July 15, 1S76). The Governor's cursory response to that expres-
sion of concern also reveals some lack of appreciation for the problem: "I believe that the 
executive branch has made a good faith effort to implement the MEPA mandate." Letter 
from Thomas L. Judge tQ John W. Reuss (Aug. 20, 1976). 
286. All of these difficulties, of course, may be ascribed to the narrow interpretation 
accorded MEPA by the Montana agencies. For criticism of environmental policy acts as 
"process" solutions, which cannot be expected to affect substantive agency decisionmaking, 
see Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth about NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973); Stewart, The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1780-81 (1975). 
287. The Montana Supreme Court denied a petition requesting that it take original 
jurisdiction over a matter raising the very issue considered in this paper. See Montana Wil-
derness Ass'n v. Montana Dept. of Health and Environmental Sciences, Montana Supreme 
Court No. 14814 (July 20, 1979). 
288. 171 Mont. 477, 559 P.2d 1157 (1976). This opinion is relied upon by Montana 
agencies for the position that they presently espouse. The other decision is Kadillak v. Ana-
conda Co., _ Mont. _, 602 P.2d 147 (1979), and it is more limited in scope. 
289. The second decision rendered in December, 1976, appears at 171 Mont. 477, 559 
P.2d 1157 (1976). The first opinion, which is the dissent in the second, is reported at 171 
Mont. 486, 559 P.2d 1161 (1976). 
For an informative account of the "bizzare change of position" and the Beaver Creek 
litigation as a whole, written by counsel for plaintiffs, see Goetz, Recent Developments in 
Montana Land Use Law, 38 MoNT. L. REV. 96, 109-21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Goetz]. 
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ronmental Sciences under the terms of the Sanitation in Subdivi-
sions Act. 290 That statute directs the agency to review proposed 
subdivisions for water quality and availability as well as sewage 
and solid waste disposal. 291 The developer contended that MEP A 
was not applicable to departmental review of the proposed subdivi-
sion plat. Moreover, the developer and the agency "strenuously 
argued that the Subdivision and Platting Act preempted the field 
of subdivision review to the nearly complete exclusion of other 
legislation. "292 
The supreme court majority was persuaded by the legislature's 
intent as expressed in the platting measure, to "place control of 
subdivision development in local governmental units in accordance 
with a compehensive set of social, economic and environmental cri-. 
teria and in compliance with detailed procedural requirements."298 
Because the court found no similar legislative purpose underlying 
MEPA, it reasoned that any extension of state agency authority 
over subdivisions beyond the substantive areas expressly provided 
for in the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act would clearly violate the 
intent of the legislature to assign responsibility over subdivisions 
to localities in the platting statute.294 The majoiity then observed 
290. MCA § 76-4-101 et seq. (1979). 
291. See MCA § 76-4-121 (1979). 
292. Goetz, supra note 289, at 112. 
Beaver Creek allies itself with the Department's position. The Department con-
cedes that an environmental impact statement is required, but contends its re-
sponsibilities under MEPA are circumscribed by ... the Subdivision and Platting 
Act and the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act. They allege the clear legislative intent 
of the Subdivision and Platting Act is to place final subdivision approval authority 
in the hands of local government (e.g., [MCA § 76-3-101 (1979))), and the Depart-
ment can interfere with town, city, or county subdivision approval only to the 
extent of its particular expertise and authority under the Sanitation in Subdivi-
sions Act. Thus, they allege, if a Department environmental impact statement is 
required; it need deal in detail only with the environmental effects related to 
water supply, sewage disposal, and solid waste disposal. 
Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 Mont. 477, 
500, 559 P.2d 1157, 1169 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
293. Id. at 484-85, 559 P.2d at 1161. 
294. Significantly, no similar mandate is given in the 1971 MEPA. Thus we con-
clude that the district court's reasoning, necessarily implied from its holding, that 
MEPA extends the Department's control over subdivisions beyond matters of 
water supply, sewage and solid waste disposal is in error as it is in direct conflict 
with the legislature's undeniable policy of local control as expressed in the Subdi-
vision and Platting Act. 
A further comparison of the local control versus State control over subdivi-
sions is this-the 1973 legislature charged local governing bodies with comprehen-
sive control over subdivision development, and amended that law in 1974 and 
1975. If the 1971 MEPA already lodged this control in the state Department, such 
legislation was superfluous. 
Id. at 485, 559 P.2d at 1161. 
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that "nowhere in the MEPA is found any regultory language" and 
that the department's "only regulatory function is in the statuto-
rily prescribed areas of water supply, sewage and solid waste dispo-
sal. "2H '.!'he majority's opinion totally ignores legislative purpose as 
expressed in the statutory language and legislative history of both 
MEP A and NEPA, as well as federal and state case law interpret-
ing statutory provisions analogous to those in the Montana act. 
Thus, the majority's reasoning is simply not persuasive, especially 
when contrasted with the clear and comprehensive thinking of the 
dissenting justices. see 
The dissenters accurately perceived at the outset that "state v. 
local control is simply a 'red herring' in this case."297 Those in dis-
sent rejected the contention that provision in the Subdivision and 
Platting Act for "local review of environmental factors [obviated] 
the necessity for departmental review," by declaring unequivocally 
that "such an interpretation conflicts with the terms of MEP A," 
specifically those provisions making the act "supplementary."298 
Justice (now Chief Justice) Haswell, author of the dissenting opin-
ion, addressed the question of conflict among the three acts and 
found none, reasoning that the "statutes must be read together as 
creating a complementary scheme of environmental protection:"299 
295. Id. 
296. Not one case-federal, state, or Montana-is cited in the majority opinion. More-
over, the court resolved the issue on the merits without ever considering the preliminary 
questions of standing and right to injunctive relief. See id. at 482, 559 P.2d at 1160. Fur-
thermore, the majority wholly ignores the commands of Montana's constitution. For addi-
tional critical analysis of the opinion, .~ee Goetz supra note 289, at 109-21. 
The Beaver Creek decision should be limited to its facts. The majority did not purport 
to, nor could it, bind agencies other than the Department of Health, and as to that agency, 
only when acting pursuant to the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act. Even if the case is read in 
its most favorable light, the proposition for which it stands cannot be extended beyond 
those situations in which schemes of regulatory control present clear conflicts between state 
and local authority. 
297. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 
Mont. 477, 486, 559 P.2d 1157, 1162 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
The essential fallacy of the majority approach lies in the premise that the legisla-
ture vested control of subdivision development in the local governments to the 
exclusion of state involvement. This is obviously not the case since the Depart-
ment of Health and Environmental Sciences is directed by statute to review sub-
divisions by the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act, and that Act contains an express 
reference to the preparation of an environmental impact statement. 
Goetz, supra note 289, at 115 (citation omitted). 
298. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 
Mont. 477, 503-04, 559 P.2d 1157, 1171 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting): 
Had the legislature intended local review to replace the rigorous review required 
by responsible state agencies, it could easily have so stated. 
Id. at 504, 559 P.2d at 1171. 
299. Id. at 505, 559 P.2d at 1171. 
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The existing statutes evince a legislative intent that subdivision 
decisions be made at the local planning level based upon factors 
with an essentially local impact, and that state involvement trig-
gers a comprehensive review of the environmental consequences 
of such decisions which may be of regional or statewide 
importance. 800 
249 
In finding that there was "no irreconcilable repugnancy between 
these acts which would render either the Subdivision and Platting 
Act or MEPA a nullity,"801 the dissenting justices stated that the 
policy act was intended to improve the quality of environmental 
decisionmaking by state agencies.809 Chief Justice Haswell con-
cluded that the "district court was correct in treating MEP A as 
the controlling statute in this case. "803 
The dissenters observed that their interpretation of the act 
found strong support in the Calvert Cliffs decision, especially the 
federal court's rejection of the agency's contention that it was pre-
cluded from considering ecological parameters regulated by other 
federal agencies, but not mentioned in its own express authority. 8°' 
By requiring that the state agency's impact statement include dis-
cussion of environmental factors not explicitly enumerated in the 
agency's existing statutory mandates, the dissent made clear that 
MEPA imposes upon state agencies the additional responsibility to 
consider those matters in decisionmaking. The dissenting opinion 
called for full treatment of aesthetics and wildlife concerns even 
though the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act speaks only to water 
Id. 
300. Id. at 504, 559 P.2d at 1171. 
The concurrent functions of local and state governments with respect to environ-
mental decisions serve to enhance the environmental policy expressed in all of the 
statutes here considered, that action only be taken upon the basis of well-in-
formed decisions. 
The dissent illustrated its interpretation by comparing the provisions of MEPA with 
certain parts of the Subdivision and Platting Act. The dissenters found that the environ-
mental factors, which the subdivision legislation required localities to consider, did "not 
approach the scope of the inquiry required by MEPA." Id. 
301. Id. at 504, 559 P.2d at 1171. The dissenters admit that the prospect of depart-
mental "'veto' [of] local subdivision approval solely on the basis of its EIS" is "feasible," 
but dismiss the "specter of state government vetoing viable local decisions." Id. at 505, 559 
P.2d at 1171. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. at 506, 559 P.2d at 1172. 
304. Support for our interpretation of the scope of MEP A is found in a leading 
federal case interpreting the NEPA. In Calvert Cliffs ... the AEC argued that 
... it was prohibited from independently evaluating and balancing environmental 
factors which were considered and certified by other federal agencies. The Calvert 
Cliffs court found the AEC's interpretation of NEPA unduly restricted. 
Id. at 505-06, 559 P.2d at 1171-72. 
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supply, sewage, and solid waste disposal. In finding the impact 
statement inadequate, the dissenters noted that the document 
"does not sufficiently consider and balance a full range of environ-
mental factors required under the terms of MEPA."806 Finally, the 
dissenting justices rejected the majority's opinion that the act is 
not regulatory, stating instead that "MEPA does more than ex-
press lofty policies which want for any means of legislative or 
agency implementation."806 
The dissent's view of MEP A's effect upon agency decision-
making thus fully comports with the intent of the Montana legisla-
ture in passing that act, with Congressional intent in enacting 
NEPA and federal decisional precedent, as well as state case law: 
pre-existing agency authority is supplemented by the requirements 
of MEP A and that power must be administered and interpreted to 
the fullest extent possible in accordance with the act. The only ex-
ception to that strong regulatory mandate is a clear and unavoida-
ble conflict between MEPA and prior statutory authority. 
The dissenters' interpretation of the act also is consistent with 
the later opinion of the Montana Supreme Court in Kadillak u. 
Anaconda Co. 807 In Kadillak, the court found an irreconcilable 
conflict in statutory power that precluded MEP A compliance. 
That conflict was created by the restrictive time frame for deci-
sionmaking in the Hard Rock Mining Act. 808 The court observed 
that the "60 day period [was] a woefully inadequate period for the 
305. Id. at 515, 559 P.2d at 1176. 
If the policy and purpose of MEPA are to have any practical meaning, state agen-
cies must perform their duties pursuant to the directives contained in that Act. 
Id. at 515-16, 559 P.2d at 1176-77. 
306. Id. at 502, 559 P.2d at 1170. The dissenters then referred to the action-forcing 
provisions of MEP A and linked them to the goals and policies of the act. Numerous other 
allusions, which support the interpretation of environmental policy acts provided in section 
I(A)(l) and I(C)(l) of this article, appear throughout the case. See, e.g., Montana Wilder-
ness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 Mont. 477, 505, 559 P.2d 
1157, 1171 (1976) (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
307. _ Mont. _, 602 P.2d 147 (1979). 
308. MCA § 82-4-301 et seq. (1979). 
At the time application for Permit 41A was filed, the Hard Rock Mining Act 
required: 
"Upon receipt of an application for an operating permit the mining site 
shall be inspected by the department. Within sixty (60) days of receipt 
of the complete application and reclamation plans by the board and re-
ceipt of the permit fee, the board shall either issue an operating permit 
to the applicant or return an incomplete or inadequate application to 
the applicant along with a description of the deficiencies. Failure of the 
board to so act within that period shall constitute approval of the ap-
plication and the permit shall be issued promptly thereafter." Section 
82-4-337, MCA. (Emphasis added.) 
Kadillak v. Anaconda Co.,_ Mont._, 602 P.2d 147, 152 (1979). 
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preparation of a proper EIS. "soe The court relied heavily on federal 
case law for the specific "proposition that when a statutory time 
limit precludes the statutory duty of preparing an EIS, the EIS 
must yield,"810 and for the general idea that "'where a clear and 
unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists [the environmen-
tal policy act] must give way.' "81l 
Chief Justice Haswell, the author of Kadillak, was careful to 
limit the holding in that case to its particular facts-existence of 
an irreconcilable conflict between the statutes.812 Thus, the deci-
sion should have limited applicability in the future because few of 
the Montana regulatory measures impose such rigid time con-
straints.sis Notably, the Montana legislature has already amended 
the temporal provision of the Hard Rock Mining Act, so that there 
is no longer any conflict which prevents full compliance ·with 
MEPA.814 
309. Id. 
As noted by the United States Supreme Court, a draft EIS on simple projects 
prepared by experienced personnel takes some three to five months to 
complete .... 
The trial court found that an adequate EIS would require 5 to 6 months to com-
plete and that an EIS for the Permit 41A project could not have been prepared in 
60 days. 
Id. at 152-53 (citation omitted). 
310. Id. at 153. 
The federal courts have concluded that in such situations an EIS is not neces-
sary .... Under the facts of the instant case this court holds that an EIS was not 
required for the same reasons that an EIS was not required in the Flint Ridge 
case. 
Id. (citation omitted). Flint Ridge is Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 
776 (1976), the leading federal case on conflicts in statutory procedures created by the tem-
poral provisions of substantive agency legislation. See note 84 supra. 
311. Id. The language quoted by the Montana court comes once again from Flint 
Ridge. The court appeared compelled to follow relevant federal case law by a statement 
drawn from the dissenting opinion in Beaver Creek: "(B]ecause MEPA is modeled after 
NEPA, it is appropriate to look to the federal interpretation of NEPA." Kadillak v. Ana-
conda Co., _ Mont. _, 602 P.2d 147, 153 (1979). 
Id. 
312. Under the facts of the instant case this Court holds that an EIS was not 
required for the same reason that an EIS was not required ·in the Flint Ridge case. 
We emphasize that Flint Ridge and similar federal cases are uniformly based on 
the unavoidable and irreconcilable conflict between federal statutes. 
313. Examples of statutes that do not are MCA § 75-20-101 et seq. (1979); MCA§ 75-
5-101 et seq. (1979); and MCA§ 82-4-101 et seq. (1979). Cf. S. PERLMUTTER, supra note 246, 
at 16-17 (Review of the policy statements and criteria for granting or denying permits con-
tained in the important permit statutes reveals that explicit conflict is rare.). 
314. If the department determines that additional time is needed to review the 
application and reclamation plan for a major operation, the department and the 
applicant shall negotiate to extend the 60-day period by not more than 365 days 
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4. Summary of MEPA 
The Montana Environmental Policy Act was passed in 1971 to 
combat the declining quality of Montana's environment by effect-
ing changes in the decisionmaking processes of state agencies. 
However, those agencies, and to some extent the Montana Su-
preme Court, have interpreted MEP A in a way that frustrates its 
mandates. The judicial construction and the agency interpretation 
extending it find no support in legislative intent of the Montana 
legislature or Congress, as evidenced by the statutory language and 
legislative history of the environmental policy acts passed by them, 
or in case law interpreting the analogous federal and state mea-
sures. Any viability that the theory might retain in other jurisdic-
tions is vitiated in this state by the Montana Constitution. 
II. THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION 
A. Introduction 
The statutory interpretation provided in the first section of 
this article demonstrates that the construction espoused in Mon-
tana is untenable. Agencies of any state that has adopted legisla-
tion comparable to NEPA have an affirmative duty, in addition to 
their other obligations, to consider environmental impacts of their 
decisions. Montana agencies have an even stronger reason to fullfill 
that duty. The Montana Constitution includes two environmental 
provisions that buttress MEP A's mandate to all state agencies. Ar-
ticle II, § 3 of the constitution declares that all Montanans enjoy 
an inalienable right to a clean and healthful environment.8 1& Arti-
cle IX, § 1(1) commands the state and all persons to maintain and 
improve the environment for present and future generations. 316 
in order to permit reasonable review. 
MCA § 82-4-337(1)(b)(ii) (1979). Indeed, the Montana Supreme Court observed that the 
fact that the 60-day period for EIS preparation is woefully inadequate was "recognized by 
the legislature when in 1977 the statute was amended." Kadillak v. Anaconda Co.,_ Mont. 
_, 602 P.2d 147, 152 (1979). 
315. All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include 
the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's 
basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, pos-
sessing and protec~ing property, and seeking their safety, health and happiness in 
all lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding 
responsibilities. 
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
316. (1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and 
healthful environment in ·Montana for present and future generations. 
(2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this 
duty. 
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the en-
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Many states in recent years have resorted to their constitu-
tions for environmental protection because agencies have failed to 
properly enforce environmental statutes.317 There is no indication 
that agency recalcitrance provided the impetus for Montana to 
adopt the environmental provisions in the constitution, but the 
Constitutional Convention delegates were well aware of MEP A and 
sought to reinforce the duties imposed by the statute. 318 It is ironic 
that agencies in Montana have since adopted a position that frus-
trates the policy established by the legislature in MEPA and en-
shrined by the people of Montana in the constitution. 
The provision made for protection of the environment in the 
Montana Constitution surpasses the efforts of other states. Mon-
tana's provisions are unique in that they declare both a right and a 
duty in separate articles.319 Some state constitutions merely an-
nounce a general policy of conservation320 or direct the legislature 
to provide for environmental protection. 321 In contrast, Montana's 
constitution enjoins the state and all persons to maintain and im-
prove the environment. Several states declare a right to a decent 
environment, 322 but few go so far as to establish that right on a par 
with fundamental, inalienable rights. 323 
By establishing a policy of environmental protection as a con-
stitutional imperative, the Montana Constitution reinforces in the 
strongest way possible MEPA's command to state agencies to con-
sider ecological factors in their decisions. Both MEPA and the con-
vironmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies 
to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
MoNT. CoNsT. art. IX, § 1. 
317. Tobin, Some Observations on the Use of State .Constitutions to Protect the En· 
vironment, 3 ENVT'L AFF. 473, 473 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tobin]. See also Platt, To-
ward Constitutional Recognition of the Environment, 56 A.B.A.J. 1061,)062 (1970). 
318. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Montana Constitutional Convention 3770-71 (1972) 
[hereinafter cited as Proceedings] (remarks of delegate Brazier). 
319. Some states create both a right and a duty, but not in separate articles. See, e.g., 
ILL. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2; R. I. CONST. art. 1, § 17; Tux. CoNST. art. 16 § 59(a). Where 
particular provisions are placed within a constitution is a significant factor in determining 
the meaning of those provisions. Comment, The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights 
Seriously, 39 MoNT. L. REv. 221, 227 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Taking Rights Seriously]. 
320. E.g., FLA. CONST. art II,§ 7 (General Provisions article); N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 4 
(Conservation article); VA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (Conservation article). 
321. E.g., MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52. 
322. E.g., MASS. CONST. amend. XLIX; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27. 
323. MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 3. Montana's declaration of an inalienable right to a clean 
and healthful environment r~ftects Rutherford Platt's view that the use of constitutions as 
vehicles for conservation "is based on the parallelism between today's environmental anxie-
ties and the fear of political oppression that motivated the drafters of the original Bill of 
Rights." Platt, Toward a Constitutional Recognition of the Environment, 56 A.B.A.J. 1061, 
1062 (1970). 
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stitutional provisions are intended to accomplish the same result, 
and in a similar manner. In fact, the broad policy established by 
Congress in NEPA, which is echoed in MEP A, has been likened to 
a constitutional provision: 
In form, the National Environmental Policy Act is a statute; in 
spirit, a constitution: 
[Its] statement of environmental policy is more than a state-
ment of what we beli~ve . . . . It establishes priorities and 
gives expression to our . . . goals and aspirations. It serves a 
constitutional function in that people may refer to it for gui-
dance in making decisons where environmental values are 
found to be in conflict with other values. 
It is in this sense that the Act must be read.324 
Moreover, the common basis for MEP A and the constitutional 
declarations is reflected in language in Montana's policy act, not 
found in its federal counterpart, that compares with the inaliena-
ble right declared in the constitution: "The legislature recognizes 
that each person shall be entitled to a healthful environment and 
that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preserva-
tion and enhancement of the environment."3211 When the same pol-
icy that underlies MEPA is enshrined in the constitution, that pol-
icy is strengthened. Agencies have a duty to honor broad policies 
established outside of their own enabling legislation;826 this is espe-
cially true when the policy is expressed in a state's constitution.817 
An interpretation that denies effect to MEP A's mandate also dis-
regards the fundamental law of Montana. 
Two decisions of the Montana Supreme Court raise some 
questions about the relationship between the constitution and the 
act. In Beaver Creek, the majority failed to consider the constitu-
tional provisions when it stated that MEPA did not expand the 
scope of agency authority to take into account environmental fac-
tors other than those expressly provided for in the Sanitation in 
Subdivisions Act.828 Chief Justice Haswell's well-considered dissent 
intimated that Article IX, § 1 of the constitution was not intended 
to be self-executing, because it contemplates legislative implemen-
tation.829 He observed, however, that the court should recognize 
324. Hanks & Hanks, supra note 54 at 245, quoting 115 CONG. REC. 87815 (daily ed. 
July 10, 1969). 
325. MCA § 75-1-103(3) (1979). 
326. Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193, 210 
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Howard]. 
327. Id. at 213. 
328. 171 Mont. at 485, 559 P.2d at 1161. 
329. Id. at 498, 559 P.2d at 1168 (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
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the fact that the legislature had not fulfilled its duty under Article 
IX, § 1(2),sso which suggests that the court could enforce the sub-
section (1) command on its own. The Chief Justice also empha-
sized that the Article II, § 3 inalienable right to a clean and health-
ful environment enabled persons to compel agency action; 
otherwise, it would be a "right without a remedy."ssi 
In Kadillak v. Anaconda Co.,ssz however, the inalienable right 
argument did not persuade the Chief Justice to require compliance 
with MEP A. sss The court reasoned that because the act predated 
adoption of the constitution, the statute could not be said to im-
plement the environmental provisions. The court held specifically 
that MEPA's EIS requirement was not raised to constitutional sta-
tus by the subsequent enactment of the constitutional guaran-
tees. m The holding seemed to focus on the Article IX duty to 
maintain and improve the environment; the court did not address 
the effect of the Article II inalienable right. Nor did the court ex-
pressly examine the issue of self-execution of either article, but im-
plied that neither is self-executing. 
A self-executing constitutional provision is one that is immedi-
ately effective without the necessity of ancillary legislation; that is, 
it supplies a sufficient rule by which a right given may be enjoyed 
or a duty imposed may be enforced.ss6 If both the Article IX com-
mand to maintain and improve the environment and the Article II 
inalienable right are self-executing, they greatly reinforce MEPA's 
mandate that all agencies incorporate ecological considerations 
into their decisions. But even if the two provisions are not self-
executing, that does not mean they are of no effect. The remainder 
of this article will examine whether the constitutional provisions 
are self-executing, and what implications either intepretation 
would have for agency decisionmaking. 
B. Article II, § 3 Inalienable Right to a Clean and 
Healthful Environment 
There can be little doubt that the Montana Constitution's 
declaration of an inalienable right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment is self-executing. The environmental right is on a par with 
330. Id. 
331. Id. 
332. _ Mont. _, 602 P.2d 147 (1979). 
333. Id. at_, 602 P.2d at 154. 
334. Id. 
335. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1525 (4th ed. rev. 1968). 
256 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
more traditional inalienable rights.336 No one would seriously con-
tend that the rights to pursue life's basic necessities and to acquire 
and possess property depend ~pon legislation to be effective. These 
are guaranteed by the same section, indeed the very sentence, of 
the constitution that secures the right to a clean and healthful en-
vironment. Moreover, the latter provision satisfies all the tradi-
tional criteria for self-execution: 1) it is a limitation on govern-
ment; 2) it provides a standard for judicial review; and 3) it does 
not depend on legislation to be effective. 337 
The Montana Supreme Court addressed the question of self-
execution of fundamental rights almost forty years ago. In State ex 
rel. Palagi v. Regan,338 the court stated that "a declaration of a 
fundamental right may be the equivalent of a prohibition against 
legislation impairing the right. . . . Furthermore, constitutional 
prohibitions against legislative actions are self-executing."339 
With respect to the inalienable right to a clean and healthful 
environment in particular, the Constitutional Convention proceed-
ings indicate that the framers intended the right to be self-execut-
ing. Delegate Dahood, the head of the Bill of Rights Committee, 
was asked specifically whether the right would be self-executing, 
and he responded affirmatively. uo 
Finding Article II, § 3 to be self-executing is only the first part 
of the inquiry; a more difficult question is the effect that the right 
to a clean and healthful environment has on an agency's duty to 
consider environmental factors in its decisions. The constitutional 
status of the right has great significance. In General Agriculture 
Corp. v. Moore, 341 the Montana Supreme Court stated that: 
No function of government can be discharged in disregard of or in 
opposition to the fundamental law. The state constitution is the 
mandate of sovereign people to its servants and representatives. 
No one of them has a right to disregard its mandates, and the 
legislature, the executive officers, and the judiciary cannot law-
fully act beyond its limitations. 841 
Professor Tribe concurs in discussing the effect of the United 
336. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 
Mont. at 498, 559 P.2d at 1167 (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
337. Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 319, at 233, citing T. COOLEY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS 165-72 (8th ed. 1927) [hereinafter cited as COOLEY). 
338. 113 Mont. 343, 126 P.2d 818 (1942). 
339. Id. at 356, 126 P.2d. at 826. 
340. Proceedings, supra note 318, at 5067-68. See Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 
319, at 233. 
341. 166 Mont. 510, 534 P.2d 859 (1975). 
342. Id. at 515-16, 534 P.2d at 862-63. 
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States Constitution on non-judicial government officials: 
The United States Constitution addresses its commands not only 
to federal judges but to all public authorities in the United 
States. It is at least ironic that generations of students and law-
yers preoccupied with lamenting judicial excess have paid virtu-
ally no attention to the substantive meaning of the Constitution 
as a guide to choice by nonjudicial actors. . . . Must not a state 
legislator, voting on a proposed regulation of contraception or 
abortion, ask whether the regulation would deprive women of 
liberty without due process of law? . . . [I]t is, after all, a consti-
tution, and not merely its judicial management, that we are 
expounding. 848 
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Tribe's reasoning applies with equal force to the actions of state 
agency officials in performing their functions under state constitu-
tions. Public servants should consider seriously whether their fail-
ure to take into account in decisionmaking all environmental f ac-
tors will infringe on citizens' rights to a clean and healthful 
environment. 
Other commentators agree. Professor Howard states that "it is 
implicit in the character of public agencies that they are to be 
compatible with public policy as ordained by the constitution. "84' 
Some are even more explicit: 
[T]here is widespread agreement that constitutional environmen-
tal declarations can set goals and provide guidance for state agen-
cies. . . . In short, a constitutional declaration that guarantees 
citizens the right to a decent environment should also require all 
state agencies to consider the impact of their decisions on the 
environment. 8411 
Similarly, Montana's inalienable right to a clean and healthful en-
vironment demands that agencies take into account all ecological 
effects in their decisional processes. 
The obligation to consider environmental factors in agency 
decisionmaking arises apart from the specific mandate in 
MEPA. 848 But it is not argued here that the constitution imposes 
343. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-9 (1978), citing McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819) (emphasis in original). 
344. Howard, supra note 326, at 212. 
345. Tobin, supra note 317, at 475. See also Comment, A Constitutional Right to a 
Livable Environment in Oregon, 55 ORE. L. REV. 239, 244-45 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A 
Constitutional Right to a Li:Jable Environment]. 
346. There is contrary authority. Pennsylvania's environmental rights provision, PA. 
CONST. art. I, § 27, was held not to require consideration of factors beyond those which, by 
statute, must be considered in evaluating projects posing potential harm to the environ-
ment. Snelling v. Dept. of Transportation, 366 A.2d 1298, 1305 (Pa. Comm. 1976); Common-
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the precise procedural requirements that the act prescribes. As 
with most constitutional declarations, Montana's environmental 
right lacks explicit definition.347 The lack of specificity in Article 
II, § 3 should not bar the accomplishment of its purposes, how-
ever. 348 Agencies should take into account the constitutional limi-
tation imposed on them by Article II, § 3. MEP A provides the 
statutory framework for incorporating ecological considerations 
into agency decisions. Article II, § 3 simply amplifies the specific 
duties of the act by imposing a constitutional obligation to protect 
environmental rights. 
C. Article IX, § 1 Command to Maintain and Improve the 
Environment 
1. Self-Execution 
The extent to which Article IX, § 1 affects an agency's obliga-
tion to comply with MEP A may depend in part on whether the 
charge to maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment 
is self-executing. The modern view is that constitutional provisions 
are presumed self-executing/149 unless they require future legisla-
tive action.3110 Montana follows this general rule.3111 At first blush, 
then, it appears that the direction to the legislature in subsection 
(2) of Article IX, § 1-to administer and enforce the duty pre-
scribed by subsection (1)-renders the entire section non-self-
wealth v. Precision Tube Co., 358 A.2d 137, 140 (Pa. Comm. 1976); Commonwealth College 
of Delaware County v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468, 482 (Pa. Comm. 1975). It must be noted, however, 
that Pennsylvania's environmental rights provision differs significantly from Montana's, in 
that Pennsylvania's is based on a public trust, a concept that was rejected by the Montana 
Constitutional Convention. Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 319, at 228-29; Proceed-
ings, supra note 318, at 3789. 
347. See Tobin, supra note 317, at 478. Most authorities agree, however, that a consti-
tution should declare fundamental law, leaving details to statute. A Constitutional Right to 
a Livable Environment, supra note 345, at 249. 
348. Article II, § 3 is no less definite than the concepts of due process and equal pro-
tection. If the United States Supreme Court can infuse substance into the indefinite provi-
sions of the United States Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court should not hesitate to 
define Montana's right to a clean and healthful environment. See Taking Rights Seriously, 
supra note 319, at 236-37 and n. 89. Unlike due process and equal protection, however, 
Montana's inalienable right to a clean and healthful environment has no common law tradi-
tion to help define the right. See A Constitutional Right to a Livable Environment, supra 
note 345, at 243. But definition must start somewhere, and the Montana court should begin 
the task. 
349. 16 AM. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 142 (1979). 
350. COOLEY, supra note 337, at 165; Tobin, supra note 317, at 481; Frye, Environ-
mental Provisions in State Constitutions, 5 ENVT'L L. REP. 50028, 50037 (1975). 
351. General Agriculture Corp. v. Moore, 166 Mont. 510, 514, 534 P.2d 859, 862 (1975); 
State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 114 Mont. 52, 74, 132 P.2d 689, 700 
(1942). 
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executing. 
Critical analysis leads to a different conclusion, however. A 
constitutional provision does not lose its self-executing character 
merely because it also directs the legislature to pass supplementary 
legislation.3112 Subsection (1) of Article IX, § 1 is more than a mere 
statement of policy; it is itself an enforceable command, and does 
not require legislation to make it effective.s11s The directive to the 
legislature in subsection (2) merely supplements the command to 
the state and all persons to maintain and improve the 
environment. 
The purpose of interpreting a constitutional provision is to as-
certain the intent of those who framed it. 311" There is a danger in 
relying too heavily on arbitrary rules of construction, especially 
where they may not reflect the true purpose of the drafters. 31111 The 
best indications of the intent of the framers of Article IX, § 1 are 
the report of the committee that drafted the provision and the pro-
ceedings of the Constitutional Convention. The report of the Natu-
ral Resources Committee clearly states that the committee consid-
ered the duty to maintain and improve the environment self-
executing: 
[Subsection (2) mandates the legislature to administer and en-
force this duty.] Your committee was urged by many to detail the 
manner of accomplishing this duty, but the temptation to legis-
late in the Constitution was resisted and confidence reposed in 
the legislature. To those who may lack such confidence in the 
elected representatives of the people the clear and concise duty 
to maintain and enhance the Montana environment can't be 
contravened. 8118 
The possibility that subsection (2) might be construed to delegate 
to the legislature exclusive authority to execute Article IX, § 1 was 
raised by the head of the Natural Resources Committee.3117 The en-
suing debate on whether the section should expressly charge the 
legislature to administer and enforce the subsection (1) duty indi-
352. CoOLEY, supra note 337, at 170; General Agriculture Corp. v. Moore, 166 Mont. 
510, 514, 534 P.2d 859, 862 (1975). 
353. See COOLEY, supra note 337, at 167-69. 
354. General Agriculture Corp. v. Moore, 166 Mont. 510, 518, 534 P.2d 859, 864 (1975). 
355. See COOLEY, supra note 337, at 171. "All external aids, and especially all arbitrary 
rules, applied to instruments of this popular character, are of very uncertain value. . . . 
[T]hey are to be made use of with hesitation, and only with much circumspection." 
356. Montana Constitutional Convention, Reports of the Substantive Committees, 
Report VJ-Natural Resources 7 (1972); Proceedings, supra note 318, at 3702-03. 
357. Proceedings, supra note 318, at 3859 (remarks of delegate Cross). 
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cated that the delegates did not share the head's doubts.sas A fair 
reading of the debate discloses that the framers of Article IX con-
sidered the first subsection self-executing and that subsection (2) 
was intended to be supplementary. Furthermore, this interpreta-
tion of section (1) comports with the frequently stated purpose of 
adopting the strongest environmental provision possible.3119 Al-
lowing the command to maintain and improve the environment to 
lie dormant until the legislature acted would contravene this 
intention. 
Use of the adjectives "clean and healthful" in subsection (1) 
also demonstrates that the command is self-executing. One of the 
fundamental tests for self-execution is whether language is di-
rected to the courts or the legislature. 380 The history of the subsec-
tion reflects an intention to encourage judicial interpretation. Sub-
section (1) as originally proposed did not include the adjectives 
"clean and healthful;" they were added during floor debate.881 By 
so doing, the convention rejected a concerted effort to prevent ju-
dicial construction, 881 thus evincing intent that the provision be 
self-executing. 
The Montana Supreme Court has held self-executing a com-
parable section of Article IX, despite a directive to the legislature 
in one of its subsections. In General Agriculture Corp. v. Moore,868 
the court construed section 3 of Article IX, which concerns water 
rights and their regulation:8" 
The fact that a right granted by a constitutional provision may be 
better or further protected by supplementary legislation does not 
358. Id. at 3859-66. 
359. Id. at 3702, 3728. 
360. State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 114 Mont. 52, 73, 132 
P.2d 689, 700 (1943). 
361. Proceedings, supra note 318, at 3857. 
362. Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 319, at 232. 
363. 166 Mont. 510, 534 P.2d 859, 862 (1975). 
364. MoNT. CONST. art. IX, § 3 provides: 
(1) All existing rights to the use of any waters for any useful or beneficial pur-
pose are hereby recognized and confirmed. 
(2) The use of all water that is now or may hereafter be appropriated for sale, 
rent, distribution, or other beneficial use, the right of way over the lands of others 
for all ditches, drains, flumes, canals, and aqueducts necessarily used in connec-
tion therewith, and the sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting and storing 
water shall be held to be a public use. 
(3) All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the bounda-
ries of the state are the property of the state for the use of its people and are 
subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law. 
(4) The legislature shall provide for the administration, control, and regulation 
of water rights and shall establish a system of centralized records, in addition to 
the present system of local records. 
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of itself prevent the provision in question from being self-execut-
ing; nor does the self-executing character of a constitutional pro-
vision necessarily preclude legislation for the better protection of 
the right secured, or legislation in furtherance of the purposes, or 
of the enforcement of the provision. 8811 
The court then held self-executing all of Article IX, § 3, except for 
subsection (4), which requires legislation to implement it.868 Sec-
tion 3 of Article IX, the provision on water rights, compares favor-
ably with section 1, the environmental provision. Subsection 4 of 
the water rights provision directs the legislature to provide for the 
administration, control, 'and regulation of those rights, which are 
described in general terms in the preceding subsections. Subsec-
tion 2 of the environmental provision similarly instructs the legis-
lature to provide for the administration and enforcement of the 
duty generally prescribed in subsection 1. The holding of General 
Agriculture Corp. thus compels the conclusion that Article IX, § 1 
is self-executing. 
That interpretation also comports with the intention of the 
framers. 887 It is significant that in each of the other sections of Ar-
ticle IX, the command to the legislature is not stated in a separate 
subsection. 888 The different treatment of sections 1 and 3 of Article 
365. General Agriculture Corp., 166 Mont. at 514, 534 P.2d at 862. 
366. Id. at 515, 534 P.2d at 862. 
367. See text accompanying notes 357-60 supra. 
368. The other sections of Article IX provide: 
(1) All lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources shall be reclaimed. The 
legislature shall provide effective requirements and standards for the reclamation 
of lands disturbed. 
(2) The legislature shall provide for a fund, to be known as the resource indem-
nity trust of the state of Montana, to be funded by such taxes on the extraction of 
natural resources as the legislature may from time to time impose for that 
purpose. 
(3) The principal of the resource indemnity trust shall forever remain inviolate 
in an amount of one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000), guaranteed by the 
state against loss or diversion. 
MONT CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
The legislature shall provide for the identification, acquisition, restoration, en-
hancement, preservation, and administration of scenic, historic, archeologic, scien-
tific, cultural, and recreational areas, sites, records and objects, and for their use 
and enjoyment by the people. 
MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 4. 
The legislature shall dedicate not less than one-fourth ( ~) of the coal severance 
tax to a trust fund, the interest and income from which may be appropriated. The 
principal of the trust shall forever remain inviolate unless appropriated by vote of 
three-fourths (3/•) of the members of each house of the legislature. After Decem-
ber 31, 1979, at least fifty percent (50%) of the severance tax shall be dedicated to 
the trust fund. 
MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 5. 
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IX demonstrates that the framers intended the substantive rights 
and duties of those sections to stand on their own and that the 
mandates to the legislature were meant to be supplementary. 
Finally, a proper determination of the character of Article IX, 
§ 1 requires examination of the constitution as a whole. 889 Article 
IX, § 1 is inextricably intertwined with the inalienable right de-
clared in Article II, § 3, and that provision certainly is self-execut-
ing. The bond between the inalienable right and the command to 
maintain and improve the environment is shown not only by the 
common subject matter and repetition of the adjectives "clean and 
healthful," but also by the convention transcript. During debate on 
the Bill of Rights, Delegate Burkhardt moved to add the environ-
mental right to Article II, § 3 by stating that it was "the other side 
of the balance" to the duty imposed in Article IX, § 1.87° Finally, 
the last sentence in the inalienable rights section recognizes the 
existence of corresponding duties. 871 It would be inconsistent to 
create a right without giving effect to the corresponding duty ex-
pressed in Article IX. 
2. Effect of Article IX on MEPA Compliance 
A self-executing command to maintain and improve the envi-
ronment strongly reinforces MEPA's mandate that all agencies in-
corporate ecological factors into their decisions. The constitutional 
directive alone demands attention to environmental considera-
tions. It is difficult to imagine how a state agency could satisfy its 
constitutional obligation to maintain and improve the environment 
without taking into account all of the ecological impacts of its ac-
tions in decisionmaking. MEPA supplies the procedural framework 
for accomplishing the constitutional objective. The importance of 
that objective is further emphasized by the corresponding inaliena-
ble right declared in Article II, § 3. 
369. Board of Regents of Higher Education v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 444, 543 P.2d 
1323, 1330 (1975) ("All of the provisions of the constitution bearing upon the same subject 
matter are to receive appropriate attention and be construed together."). See also CooLEY, 
supra note 337, at 127-29 ("[T]he whole is to be examined with a view to arriving at the 
true intention of each part. . . . This rule is applicable with special force to written 
constitutions."). 
370. Proceedings, supra note 318, at 5047. 
371. Art. II, § 3 provides: 
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the 
right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic 
necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing, 
and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health, and happiness in all law-
ful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons recognize corresponding responsi-
bilities. [Emphasis added.] 
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The relationship between Article IX and MEP A is evidenced 
by the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. The proceed-
ings show that the delegates were aware of the policy act,372 so 
there is no need even to rely on the presumption that a constitu-
tional provision has been framed and adopted in light of existing 
laws and with reference to them. 379 The Constitutional Studies 
prepared by the Montana Constitutional Convention Commission 
for use by the delegates also emphasized the need for "something 
which [would] compel compliance with the policy propounded by 
[MEPA)."37• Telling evidence of the link between the constitu-
tional provision and the policy act is the parallel statement in 
MEP A recognizing that each person is entitled to a clean and 
healthful environment and has a corresponding responsibility to 
contribute to its preservation and enhancement. 876 Agencies and 
courts alike should recognize the connection between the constitu-
tion and MEP A and give full effect to their mandates. 
Considerable attention has been focused on whether the Arti-
cle IX, § 1 mandate is self-executing. Even if the provision were 
not self-executing, it would still have significant force. At a mini-
mum, a non-executed provision prohibits actions which contravene 
its principles. 878 For example, even if the legislature has not passed 
implementing legislation to execute a constitutional provision, it 
cannot enact laws inconsistent with the provision. 877 There is no 
reason to limit application of this principle to the actions of the 
legislature; the rationale applies as well to agency action. 378 Thus, 
even an unexecuted Article IX, § 1 prohibits an agency from ap-
proving a project that would significantly harm the environment. 
This is especially true in light of the inalienable right to a clean 
and healthful environment declared in Article II, § 3. 
Moreover, the Montana legislature has implemented Article 
IX, § 1. That body has enacted since 1972 significant legislation 
372. See, e.g., Proceedings, supra note 318, at 3722, 3726-27, 3759, 3770-71, 3882. 
373. Krutka v. Spinuzzi, 153 Colo. 115, 124, 384 P.2d 928, 933 (1963). Accord, Henrie 
v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp., 113 Utah 415, 426, 196 P.2d 487, 493 (1948). 
374. Montana Constitutional Studies, Report No. 10, Environmental Protection 256 
(1972). 
375. MCA § 75-1-103(3) (1979). A similar, but significantly weaker provision appears 
in NEPA. See notes 238-39 and accompanying text supra. The corresponding section of the 
Washington State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) states that "each person has a funda-
mental and inalienable right to a healthful environment." RCWA 43.21 C.020(3) (Supp. 
1978). SEPA has been said to have constitutional dimension. Note, A Standard for Judicial 
Review of Administrative Decisionmaking under SEPA, 54 WASH. L. REV. 693, 705 (1979). 
376. 16 AM. Jua. 2d Constitutional Law § 140 (1979). 
377. Id. 
378. See notes 341-45 and accompanying text supra. 
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pursuant to the command of Article IX, § 1(2) as well as the other 
sections of Article IX. 879 The statutes passed under Article IX, § 
1(2) include the Major Facility Siting Act,880 the Nongame and En-
dangered Species Act,881 and a temporary moratorium on the use 
of uranium solution extraction. m This legislation treats specific 
problems; as such, it represents a piecemeal approach to ·environ-
mental protection, which is no substitute for the broad mandate to 
consider ecological factors in MEPA.888 But since the policy act al-
ready existed, the legislature had no reason to pass another com-
prehensive statute after the constitution was adopted. 
The Montana Supreme Court's opinion in Kadillak presents 
difficulty with respect to the effect of the constitution on MEPA. 
The decision, read narrowly, states only that the policy act's EIS 
requirement lacks constitutional status. 884 However, the premise 
underlying that observation is troubling. The court stated that 
since the legislature had enacted MEP A before the constitution 
was adopted, the statute cannot be said to implement the Article 
IX, § 1 duty.8811 The court's focus was misdirected. Ascertaining 
what the legislature intended when it passed MEP A is not the 
question; the issue is what effect to accord the statute now, in light 
of the constitutional policy. MEPA still has vitality. The new con-
stitution did not repeal it; on the contrary, a savings clause pre-
served all statutes that are not in conflict with the constitution. 886 
MEP A is certainly not inconsistent with the constitution. The leg-
islature should not be required to re-enact a valid statute in order 
to give effect to the constitutional provision. Instead of asking 
whether the legislature intended to implement Article IX, § 1, the 
question should be whether the framers of the constitution meant 
to strengthen the policy behind MEPA. The convention record 
answers the latter question affirmatively. 887 The Montana Supreme 
379. Roberts & Stone, Recent Developments in Montana Natural Resources Law, 38 
MONT. L. REV. 169, 180-81 (1977). 
380. MCA § 75-20-101 et seq. (1979). 
381. MCA § 87-5-101 et seq. (1979). 
382. The moratorium is no longer in effect, but was formerly codified at REVISED 
CODES OF MONTANA (1947), §§ 50-1701 through -1704 (Supp. 1977) .. 
383. See Hanks & Hanks, supra note 54, at 247. 
384. Kadillak, _Mont._, 602 P.2d at 154. 
385. Id. 
386. MONT. CONST. Transition Schedule § 6(1) states: 
All laws, ordinances, regulations and rules of court not contrary to, or inconsistent 
with, the provisions of this Constitution shall remain in force, until they shall 
expire by their own limitation or shall be altered or repealed pursuant to this 
Constitution. 
387. See notes 372-74 and accompanying text supra. Cf. O'Neill v. White, 343 Pa. 96, 
100, 22 A.2d 25, 26-27 (1941). There the Pennsylvania court considered the effect of a non-
1980) THE ENVIRONMENT AL POLICY ACTS 265 
Court should reconsider the view espoused in Kadillak and limit 
the decision to clear conflicts in statutory authority created by 
time constraints. sss 
Similarly, the Beaver Creek opinion should not prevent the 
court from recognizing and giving effect to the constitutional provi-
sions. The majority based its finding on the issue of local control of 
subdivisions,ss9 and the decision should be limited to Department 
of Health review under the Sanitation in Subdivisions Act. 390 The 
majority failed to cite any cases in support of the proposition that 
the department lacked authority to examine factors outside that 
statute.891 The majority also did not address the effect of the con-
stitutional provisions. Chief Justice Haswell's dissent offers valua-
ble guidance in interpreting those provisions: 
The real issue in this case concerns the right of two . . organiza-
tions . . . to compel a state agency to conform to the require-
ments of the [MEPA] ... to the end that an adequate environ-
mental assessment will be made and considered by the decision 
makers. . . . If they cannot, the inalienable right of all persons to 
a clean and healthful environment guaranteed by Montana's Con-
stitution confers a right without a remedy.392 
The Chief Justice also intimated that the court could enforce the 
Article IX, § 1(1) command to maintain and improve the environ-
ment, even in the absence of implementing legislation.893 That in-
terpretation properly gives effect to the constitutional provisions 
and MEPA, instead of rendering them "useless verbiage, stating 
rights without remedies, and leaving the state with no checks on its 
self-executing provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution relating to the filling of vacancies 
in public office. The court stated: 
It is obvious that the ... mandate of Article 4, Section 8 of the Constitution 
assumes the existence of election machinery to carry it out. But the election ma-
chinery provided by the Election Code is not geared to the carrying out of that 
constitutional mandate. 
The pre-existing election statutes in O'Neill conflicted with the new constitutional provi-
sion. The court implied, however, that if the statutes had been compatible, they would suffi-
ciently execute the constitutional provision. MEPA is consistent with the Montana Consti-
tution. That the statute predates the constitution should not render it ineffective to 
implement the constitutional mandate. 
388. Kadillak, _ Mont. -· 602 P.2d at 153. 
389. Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 171 
Mont. at 484-85, 559 P.2d at 1161. 
390. MCA § 76-4-101 et seq. (1979). 
391. See Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 
171 Mont. at 485, 559 P.2d at 1161. 
392. Id. at 486, 559 P.2d at 1162 (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
393. Id. at 498, 559 P.2d at 1168 (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
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powers and duties under [MEPA]."m 
Finally, the Montana legislature since 1972 has reaffirmed its 
commitment to the policy expressed in MEP A. In a 197 4 joint res-
olution, Montana's lawmakers directed all agencies in the state to 
"achieve forthwith the full implementation of the Montana Envi-
ronmental Policy Act."8911 Short of re-enacting the statute, which 
would serve no purpose, the legislature has done all that it can to 
confirm the act's vitality. Beaver Creek and Kadillak should not 
be allowed to thwart the express intent of the legislature. 
D. Summary 
If agencies in Montana are to take their constitutional obliga-
tions seriously, they should immediately implement in full 
MEPA's mandate. Both the right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment and the command to maintain and improve the environment 
should be considered self-executing. Even if the latter provision is 
not, it still has considerable force. Agencies at least must not con-
travene the policy underlying the Article IX, § 1 directive, and 
they must respect the declared inalienable right to a clean and 
healthful environment. 
The constitutional provisions themselves demand considera-
tion of environmental factors by all branches of government. 
MEP A provides the specific framework for agencies to fulfill their 
obligations under the constitution. The constitutional provisions 
were adopted in response to the same problems that engendered 
MEP A. The elevation of the policies that underlie the statute to a 
constitutional imperative demands that they be considered seri-
ously. As Professor Howard stated: 
A constitution, whether state or national, is the ultimate reposi-
tory of a people's considered judgment about basic matters of 
public policy. When the framers of a constitution elevate environ-
mental quality to the stature of a constitutional postulate, then 
officials, courts, and citizens alike should repair to that 
standard. 8114 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
The state agencies, and to some degree the Montana Supreme 
Court, have interpreted the Montana Environmental Policy Act in 
a way that finds no support in any other jurisdiction or in the in-
394. Id. at 499, 559 P.2d at 1168 (Haswell, J., dissenting). 
395. 1974 MoNT. LAWS, H.R.J. Res. 73, p. 1571. 
396. Howard, supra note 326, at 229. 
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tent of the Montana legislature, as expressed in the statutory lan-
guage and legislative history of the act. By according MEP A such a 
narrow construction, the agencies have ignored their constitutional 
obligations and violated the inalienable rights of the citizens of 
Montana. The legislative intent of the Montana legislature, as but-
tressed by the unequivocal constitutional duty to prevent degrada-
tion of the environment by the state, imposes a clear and incontro-
vertible obligation upon Montana agencies: they must consider 
fully in decisionmaking all environmental impacts of their actions, 
including those not expressly provided for in the substantive legis-
lation pursuant to which they are acting. Until the state agencies 
comply with this mandate their crabbed interpretation will con-
tinue to make a mockery of the Montana Environmental Policy 
Act. 
